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Vygotsky and his critics: philosophy and rationality 
Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the philosophi~ background of Vygotsky's work. 
Vygotsky himself made clear that it was not only Marx who influenced him, but 
also Spinoza and Hegel. Most commentaries on Vygotsky have failed to 
consider the influence of Spinoza and Hegel on his work. 
Recent commentators interpret aspects ofVygotsky's work as being based upon 
Enlightenment philosophy and attribute to him a position of abstract rationality. 
In taking issue with these interpretations the thesis not only reacts to the 
criticism made of Vygotsky but also suggests that much of value in his 
education theory is lost if it is taken out of its original philosophic context and 
set in an alien framework. Vygotsky was absolutely steeped in the philosophy 
of Spinoza and Hegel and it was this which allowed him to develop original 
ideas on thought, language and mind. 
Vygotsky's tum to Spinoza and to Hegel would seem to put him outside the 
mainstream of modem Anglo-American thought, yet it is precisely this field of 
thought which in the last few years has raised questions that are bringing Hegel 
back into the mainstream. A study of Vygotsky's philosophy helps bring to 
light and to question the philosophic presuppositions of much contemporary 
work on educational theory and policy. 
This thesis addresses critical questions in Vygotsky theory and post-Vygotskian 
research. Its starting point is the question of sociogenesis of mind and chapters 
2 and 3 consider recent writings on this issue and the related questions of 
constructivism and situated cognition. Chapter 4 reconsiders the opposition 
between Vygotsky and Piaget to carry the question of constructivism a step 
forward and to introduce the philosophic influences on Vygotsky's work which 
are then considered more fully in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis is a response to the claim that Vygotsky holds abstract rationality as 
the pinnacle of thought. The claim is based on the belief that Vygotsky 
subscribed to what is called the 'enlightenment project' and the thesis aims to 
show that Vygotsky had a far more sophisticated appreciation both of reason 
and of its remit than this fashionable characterisation. Its argument is developed 
through an exploration of some aspects ofthe philosophy of Hegel and Spinoza, 
to both of whom Vygotsky avows a debt. At first sight the philosophical 
underpinnings of Vygotsky's work may appear a minor point, but the issue is 
contested here, and the argument is carried a stage further to claim that the 
limitations critics see in Vygotsky's work are based on misapprehensions of his 
understanding of reason. In support of this claim it is argued that Hegel's 
investigation of the presuppositions of claims to knowledge already contains a 
critique of the frame of reference used by these commentators, who accuse 
Vygotsky of an 'old fashioned' conception of reason that cannot do justice to 
diversity. 
Further it is argued that the criticisms of what are seen as gaps in 
Vygotsky's work such as his lack of interest in institutional mechanisms and 
mediating tools believed necessary for an explanation of the sociogenesis of 
mind, are inappropriate since they entail philosophic presuppositions of a mind-
world dualism that are quite alien to Vygotsky's philosophy. It is true that 
although he was explicit about the importance of philosophy for theory, 
Vygotsky did not actually spell out the philosophy which infonned his 
argument. Yet this omission, even if this is how it is judged, does not detract 
from the subtlety and sophistication of his approach. 
The dualism of the ideal and real, of mind and world, which has 
underpinned criticism of Vygotsky both in his own time and in the current 
period, was taken up not only by his follower Ilyenkov, but also by 
6 
contemporary analytical philosophers. David Bakhurst has written on this area 
directly: in claiming normativity to be a necessary element of the sociogenesis 
of mind, he has brought to our attention links between the philosophy of 
McDowell and Ilyenkov. For modern philosophy the questions requiring 
careful analysis concern empiricism and knowing. The two philosophers whose 
work is most important in this thesis have both taken a Hegelian approach to 
make explicit points, which, though unexpressed, are necessarily assumed in 
the forms of argument that they analyse. In Mind and World McDowell 
addresses the problem of how a separate mind can connect with a world by 
working through a number of highly developed arguments about how we come 
to know. His enquires lead to the unusual conclusion that rather than 
possessing the means of thought in our head we operate with means of thought 
which are external to ourselves in the world: following Wilfred Sellars he refers 
to this external sphere as 'The Space of Reasons' . 
For McDowell and also Brandom, the other contemporary philosopher 
whose work is important for this thesis, this concept plays a crucial role. 
Simply summarised the gist of the argument is that in order to make a claim of 
knowing we are not, as commonly thought, giving a description of an event but 
placing our claims about it in a space of reasons - that is to say making claims 
on the basis of knowing what follows from them and what it is necessary to 
assume in order to make them in the first place. Where a word is used in a 
seemingly non-conceptual way, where the user has no conscious awareness of 
the reasons involved, the reasons are still present. For the implication of 
Brandom's argument is that it is the context not simply conscious intention that 
imparts reason. This approach which results from bringing a Kantian argument 
to bear upon a Humean hangover in the conception of empiricism, posits human 
knowing as fundamentally different from the 'knowing' of machines. For 
example, a human shout of 'fire!' is fundamentally different as far as general 
awareness is concerned from the differential response of a fire alarm, though 
both are an alert to the same danger. For Brandom what is distinctive about 
human beings is the ability to operate in the light of reasons rather than to 
respond simply to causes. McDowell refers to this as our second nature 
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emphasising that what it is to be human as something completely apart from 
matter, yet still part of nature. 
When the distinction between the human and the natural is drawn by 
dualism as a distinction of mind and world, a clear boundary exists between the 
conceptual (mind) and the non-conceptual (nature). Such a distinction exists 
for Kant, but for McDowell who adopts a Hegelian standpoint and speaks of the 
'unboundedness of the conceptual', it is fundamentally misconceived. 
McDowell rejects the separation of mind and world underlying so much 
philosophy in favour of a frame of thought in which reasons exist in the world 
as humans have developed. In adopting this frame of thought McDowell adopts 
a position essentially the same as Vygotsky. For both mind is social and, to 
give an account of mindedness and intellect, it is necessary to look beyond the 
individual and attend to external mediation in the formation of higher mental 
functions. 
The arguments of McDowell, Brandom, Sellars, Bakhurst and with them 
Vygotsky cast a distinctive light on rationality and reason. In their hands the 
concepts are quite different from what they are in the mainstream of 
philosophic thought which comes through Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant 
down to modem analytical philosophy. In the barest outline this orthodox 
position presents rationality as abstract and decontextualised: it relies on the 
idea that reason is separated from the world and then has greater or lesser 
degrees of adequacy in its application to the world. When applied to education 
this position can lead to the most extreme forms of formalised teaching, or it 
cautions against theory as a practice of value in its own right and, in its place, 
emphasises only the individual meaning-making of learners. 
It is beyond the remit of the thesis to begin to spell out the practical 
implications of the philosophic issues it considers. However, one matter which 
confirms there are such implications and that these are crucially important, must 
be mentioned here. It is the way reason has been made the culprit for the 
poverty of educational practice in mass schooling. McDowell's claim that 
receptivity is already 'conceptual' involves a conception of 'reason' quite 
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different to that with which Wertsch quite correctly takes issue - the extreme of 
a decontextualised schooled knowledge, presented without regard to its genetic 
development or any sense that learning involves actualising concepts. 
This matter of decontextualisation is taken up in chapter 2, which presents 
the criticisms of Vygotsky for abstract rationalism and considers the theory of 
situated cognition which has been proposed in its place. 
Chapter 3 turns to 'constructivism' which plays a central role in much 
post-Vygotskian thought. Criticism here is directed against what is argued to 
be the 'representationalist paradigm' implicit in conceptions of the active 
construction of meaning into a bare 'Given'. It is argued that constructivism 
leads to particular pedagogic strategies which, though not part of the authors' 
more sophisticated analysis, are influential in the rhetoric of classroom practice, 
specifically the undermining of the authority of the teacher, of knowledge (in 
texts) and the belief that knowledge is a matter of plurality. 
Chapter 4 uses the debate between Vygotsky and Piaget on conscious 
awareness, egocentrism and development, to illustrate the different 
philosophical frame informing both authors. The purpose of this chapter is to 
show how the different philosophical presuppositions of each author lead to 
different theoretical positions. 
Chapter 5 turns to elements of Spinoza's philosophy that influenced 
Vygotsky. In particular it is concerned with Spinoza's formulation of knowing 
in terms of a holism of one substance of which everything is a part, as opposed 
to a dualism that assumes fundamental separations. Spinoza's approach leads to 
a conception of truth not as an attribute but as an actualisation of a process 
understood as many-sided. From this standpoint, freedom appears quite 
differently from the Cartesian conception of wilful agency. It is understood as 
self-determination: to be free is to be cause of oneself rather than subject to 
external causes, and this depends upon adequate ideas. 
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Chapter 6 turns to Hegel who follows a similar approach to Spinoza, 
working through (exorcising) claims to know to reach a distinctive conception 
of knowing. This conception, rather than being based on secure foundations, 
sees new knowledge arising out of a working through of the existing to show 
that more is implicated than appears initially to be the case. 
Chapter 7 considers this anti-foundationalist character of the philosophy 
of Spinoza, Hegel and Vygotsky to argue that the conception of reason central 
to Vygotsky's work bears no relation to the caricature of abstract rationality 
criticised by contemporary post-Vygotskian researchers. 
The order here is not a linear sequence as the criticisms levelled against 
situated cognition and constructivism in chapters two and three presuppose 
philosophic ideas which are not discussed until chapters five and six. On the 
other hand, these ideas would not make sense in the context of this thesis 
without an examination of post-Vygotskian research. Furthermore, it must be 
stressed that the later chapters are intended only to indicate those parts of 
Spinoza and Hegel which are relevant for understanding Vygotsky's work. The 
aims of this thesis are first to show that Vygotsky was influenced by a different 
tradition of philosophy than that which has influenced post-Vygotskian 
research; and second, to demonstrate that this difference is significant. 
Apart from the complexities of the differences between the philosophic 
traditions, there is the additional difficulty that neither Vygotsky nor post-
Vygotskian researchers spell out their philosophic presuppositions in detail. 
Vygotsky, it is true, acknowledged the philosophic influence on his thinking 
and it is often only a matter of following the leads he gave to find his sources. 
With his commentators, however, things are much less clear and the scope for 
attributing them positions they do not hold is necessarily that much greater. But 
what must be stressed in particular here is that the criticisms made of various 
works of commentary on Vygotsky, for a failure to appreciate the significance 
of the philosophic traditions in which he was working, stop far short of denying 
the value of their contribution to the understanding of an important but difficult 
subject. 
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Chapter 2 
Situated cognition and contextualism 
This chapter and the next examme three areas - situated cognition, 
contextualism, and constructivism. But first some consideration of what has 
been termed 'decontextualised knowledge' is necessary to align these issues to 
the main theme of the thesis; that is the importance of setting Vygotsky's work 
in its proper philosophical context and overcoming the foreclosure of important 
areas of investigation by commentators who have not paid it due regard. 
A number of concepts discussed in this thesis may not be familiar; 
'decontextualised knowledge' is one example. The aim is for these concepts to 
become clear in the course of this discussion. As Aristotle (and Vygotsky in a 
similar vein) argued definition was the end rather than the beginning of a 
process of understanding, no attempt is made to specify these concepts in 
advance, the hope being that they will become clear in the course of the 
discussion. 
2.1 Decontextualisation 
A recumng theme In critical interpretations of Vygotsky IS 
decontextualised rationality; Vygotsky, it is argued, participated in what IS 
called the Enlightenment project and took abstract rationality as the epitome of 
knowing.! As it happens, the notion of abstract and decontextualised rationality 
which has informed a wide range of contemporary educational debate, was the 
subject of earlier controversy in the Soviet Union in the 1930s which stemmed 
directly from Vygotsky's work and its reception. 
I Wertsch views Vygotsky's discussion of 'scientific concepts' as indication of the belief that a 
universal human rationality was the te/os of human development. For Wertsch the fact that 
Vygotsky recognises 'other' forms of mental functioning, suggests inconsistency. Wertsch sees 
this inconsistency as due to 'a struggle between basic philosophical commitments 
[Enlightenment philosophy] on the one hand, and the results of analysing the complexities of 
human speech on the other' (Wertsch, 1996, p.26). 
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In the Soviet debate the issue was out in the open, in the contemporary 
debate it is unspecified and not treated as a matter of explicit importance yet 
despite these differences the similar underlying issues are common to both 
periods (ideal to real). Vygotsky therefore has the misfortune to be doubly 
misunderstood; first by Soviet commentators condemned by Stalinism to a 
crude materialism, and later by American commentators under the influence of 
liberal theoretical constructs and relations. In stark contrast to Vygotsky both 
adopt a dualist approach and presuppose an unbridgeable divide between the 
ideal and the real. The argument developed here is complicated by the fact that 
American commentators such as Wertsch and Wells are not only well aware of 
Ilyenkov and his rejection of dualism but also reject dualism themselves. 
However, it will be argued, their rejection is incomplete and its full implications 
unexplored - for instance, its implications for the concept of freedom. 
Contemporary discussion of Vygotsky's work is influenced by 
postmodemist theory, which, in attempting to supersede the problems of 
abstract rationality, has often failed to give thought and reason proper 
consideration. The tradition it has caricatured as the Enlightenment, has more to 
say than has been recognised in some texts on Vygotsky. Within the post-
Vygotskian research field a theory of situated cognition has been extremely 
influential. However, the attempt to theorise knowledge solely by its genesis in 
definite concrete conditions leaves out of consideration the question of 
knowledge as such. Situated cognition rejects the idea of decontextualised 
knowledge and puts in its place the idea that all knowing is contextualised. 
This chapter addresses the way in which Vygotsky has been criticised for his 
commitment to decontextualised knowledge and then examines some of the 
literature in the post-Vygotskian research field which treats this matter. 
A common theme in the literature on Vygotsky is discussion of the extent 
to which his work is premised on an abstract universal reason which can 
ultimately be achieved via a hierarchy of development. Vygotsky's short life 
and unfinished writings allow a variety of readings (Burgess, 1993). Although it 
is agreed that he revealed the socio-genesis of thought, the question of how far 
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he limited the variety and multiplicity of modes of thought by his commitment 
to absolute reason appears in recent commentaries. Is Vygotsky's commitment 
to universal reason simply an expression of the context in which he worked -
the unenlightened understanding of colonialist perceptions of the primitive 
versus the modem that prevailed in his day or the instrumental Marxism of 
Soviet practice concerned with the possibility of the creation of socialist man? 
Or does it play a fundamental role in his thought, rooted in the philosophic 
tradition within which he operated? If so, does it stand in simple contradiction 
to his concept of socio-genesis or are these aspects of his thought reconciled? 
Jay Lemke, who interprets Vygotsky from an explicitly post modern 
standpoint,z adopts the former alternative: 'Despite the optimism that Lev 
Vygotsky undoubtedly shared with his times, I hope that he did not believe that 
abstract symbolic formulations were the highest goal of meaning-making' 
(Lemke, J. 1999, p. 91). 
Like Lemke, Wertsch is concerned with what he sees as ambivalence in 
Vygotsky's writings. He presents Vygotsky as an Enlightenment Rationalist 
who 'embraced human rationality as the telos of human development (Wertsch, 
1996, p.25) adding that 'as a Marxist he also viewed rationality as an essential 
tool for constructing a centrally planned economy and state,.3 [Italic added] 
But he believes that Vygotsky's theory of sociogenesis can be detached from 
what he construes as the instrumental aspect of Vygotsky's ideas. One of the 
main objects of criticism in this thesis is the idea of reason as a tool. The thesis 
develops this criticism by exploring the meaning of rationality for Vygotsky; 
arguing that his work forms a coherent unity; exposing the influences on 
Vygotsky's work of German idealist philosophy; and showing that Vygotsky's 
2, ... post-modem theorists are mostly united by what we .. . reject from modernism, and 
unanimously by our rejection of arguments for universally valid 'master narratives', meta-
theories or discourses of any sort that aspire to set the terms of the conversation for anyone else' 
(Lemke, 1999, p. 91). 
3 It is revealing that Wertsch views Vygotsky's use of rationality as a tooL This immediately 
sets up the discussion about Vygotsky's emphasis on abstract rationality in a way which 
supports Wertsch's reading. To see rationality as a tool is to separate it off from the world and 
then suggest its artificial application. This is at odds with the reading ofVygotsky that this 
thesis develops. 
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understanding of rationality was far more sophisticated than the instrumental 
and decontextualised concept of reason attributed to him. 
The claim that Vygotsky's work is coloured by its period can of course be 
turned against those who make it, and the argument that his embrace of 
universal reason is simply an expression of modernism can be met with the 
rejoinder that its rejection is an equally simple expression of post-modernism. 
Certainly the impetus to disengage from universalising reason emerged in the 
context of research conducted in the milieu of multiculturalism as a concern to 
do justice to the variety and legitimacy of human response and creativity, 
particularly in the case of American schooling. It also drew inspiration from 
anthropological critiques of colonialism. But what is more important than 
historical name-calling is the point that the validation of the multiple ways in 
which individuals make meaning through their activities, leads to exactly the 
same sort of determinism believed inherent in the idea of universal reason.4 The 
idea that an individual's thought processes are directly and causally the result of 
the context that provides their genesis, is a mirror image of the determinism in 
Stalinist practice which Wertsch, for example, opposes so strongly. In contrast 
to Wertsch's conflation of Marxism and Soviet practice, Joravsky argues that 
Vygotsky looked to Marx rather than Stalinist reductionism for inspiration. 
Contrasting the difference between, for example, Marx's aesthetic theory which 
saw 'young Marx ... ask[ing] the same question about the persistent appeal of 
Greek classics that he [Vygotsky] was asking about Hamlet [- h]ow could it be 
that beautiful works of a slave owning society are still beautiful in a capitalist 
society and will be under socialism' (Joravsky, 1989, pp 256-257), and the 
crude base-superstructure metaphors which were adopted as orthodox Marxism 
by the Third International, Joravsky challenges the ground on which Wertsch 
levels his charges of instrumentalism against Vygotsky. Universalising 
rationality comes under attack by those for whom the most critical dimension of 
the constitution of thought is context. 
4 This is due to the unproblematic use in explanation of the same relation critiqued in the case of 
abstract reason and the assumption of the causal character oflocal explanations. 
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This chapter examines the notion of context as it is counterposed to 
decontextualised rationality. It is important to note that much of the literature on 
Vygotsky has developed in relation to issues raised by schooling and inevitably, 
where what is uppermost in recruiting ideas from Vygotsky is change and 
intentional development in schooling, this has affected the way in which 
arguments and research projects have been constructed. Once the idea that 
intellect is developed rather than inherited is applied to educational systems, the 
failures of schooling cannot be blamed on the quality of students; and 
responsibility falls on those involved in curriculum construction, pedagogical 
design, the practice of educating and resourcing. The fact that much of the work 
which makes use of Vygotsky addresses the failures of schooling means that 
many of the arguments it develops cannot be separated from the current poverty 
of practice of mass schooling. Schooling of course is a major item of State and 
welfare expenditure and as such is inextricably linked to the political agenda of 
the State, complicating matters further. 
2.2 Theorising the institutional 
The different agendas within which particular questions are raised has 
encouraged the variety of readings ofVygotsky. In their effort to understand the 
work of Vygotsky in its complexity and cultural-historical context, Jaan 
Valsiner and Rene van der Veer note the 'various myths circulating among the 
fascinated followers of that interesting scholar' (Valsiner, and Van der Veer, 
2000, p. ix). My concern here is the claim that for Vygotsky rationality was 
decontextualised, but first it is necessary to understand the background against 
which decontextualisation is construed in various commentaries, firstly in the 
work on situated cognition, and secondly in the theorisation of context. 
The Vygotskian field of research raises crucial questions about aspects of 
cognition which are not covered in cognitivist approaches. The idea that mind is 
generated and sustained externally opens up a whole area of enquiry about the 
ways in which cognitive achievement is made collaboratively and through the 
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medium of external artifacts. The quest to specify causes and effects within this 
field is compelling since one of its driving forces is the pressure to 
operationalise theory for development and changes. 
A key demand of contemporary Vygotskian research has been to fill what 
IS considered a gap in Vygotsky's original project; namely, the specific 
mechanisms and relation to context through which the sociogenesis of mind 
takes place: 
A complete account of the organization of human cognitive activity, 
manifested in a task carried out on either the individual or the social 
level, must go beyond narrowly defined psychological phenomena and 
consider the forces that create the context in which human cognition is 
defined and required to operate at the level of societal and cultural 
organisation. 
(Wertsch, Minick and Ams, 1984, p. 171) 
The fact that Vygotsky saw language as a 'generalised semiotic system' rather 
than 'a multitude of speech genres and semiotic devices that are tightly linked 
with particular institutions and ... social practices' (Fonnan, Minick, and Stone, 
1993, p. 6) is viewed as a limitation of his work. According to Cole 'One 
cannot develop a viable sociocultural conception of human development 
without looking carefully at the way ... institutions develop, the way they are 
linked with one another, and the way human social life is organized within 
them' (Cole, 1996, p.6). 
Wertsch, Tulviste and Hagstrom criticise Vygotsky for limiting his 
analysis of the relationship between inter- and intra-mental functioning to small 
groups, arguing that 'he did relatively little to specify how intennental 
functioning and mediational means fit into a broader framework of 
sociocultural processes' (Wertsch, Tulviste and Hagstrom, 1993, p.343). For 
them the absence of an approach that accounts for the causal role of contextual 
5 The relationship between policy and developmental change is not transparent as it is often 
assumed. The relationship between the intention to develop something and its own momentum 
of development is not isomorphic. See Cowen and Shenton (1996). 
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elements in the development of specific modes of mind IS evidence of 
universalism, and this is viewed in a negative light: 
.. . we think it is essential to recognise that, in isolation, a concern with 
this level of social process suggests a kind of universalism that is 
antithetical to the argument for social situatedness that Vygotsky 
himself was pursuing. This is because it fails to specify any reason to 
expect serniotically mediated intennental functioning to vary as a 
function of cultural, historical, and institutional setting 
(Wertsch et ai, 1993, p. 343) 
Wertsch et al. go beyond theorising the institutional to demanding the 
theorisation of some concrete mechanism: 'In order to avoid this shortcoming 
[i.e. a lack of such mechanism] a sociocultural approach must posit some 
concrete mechanism for connecting cultural, historical, and institutional 
processes with mediated intermental and intramental processes' (Wertsch et aI, 
1993, p. 343). 
In a more recent article Hatano and Wertsch note the alternative to 'some 
form of simple, mechanistic transmission' (Hatano and Wertsch, 2001, p. 79). 
Nevertheless they run into the difficulty of finding explanation of the means 
laid down by human activity in facilitating and sustaining mental processes, 
which resist a reductive image of mind that cannot be distinguished from a 
simply mechanical response. There are grounds for believing that the concept of 
representation implicit in their analysis of cultural tools leads to precisely the 
type of 'mechanist transmission' from which they seek to distance themselves. 
Take the following sentence: 'This knowledge or system of representation can 
be regarded as a form of culture in mind, something constituted through 
participation in practice' (Hatano and Wertsch, 2001, p. 79). The sentence is 
revealing in two closely connected ways. The first involves the equation of 
knowledge with a system of representation; the second, the idea that this 
knowledge or system of representation or a form of culture in mind is 
constituted through participation in practice. Both these themes are discussed in 
Chapter 3 later. For the moment our immediate concern is with anticipations of 
these lines of argument in the history of Vygotskian dispute and research. 
Before developing this idea it is necessary to be clear about different 
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interpretations of Vygotsky's work and the different assessments of what it 
most profitably leads to, being careful to note that the same terms have different 
meanings for different branches of Vygotskian research. For instance, to 
contemporary American scholars the institutional framework does not mean 
what it meant to one of body thought in the 1930s, namely historical and class 
background (Van der Veer, 2000). At the same time, there were scholars in the 
1920s who under the rubric of Marxism would have accepted the arguments put 
forward by contemporary scholars as non-or even anti-Marxist claims. The 
pattern is confused and confusing. Hence it is often necessary when using a 
term, to qualify its meaning even when it appears self-evident. 
As noted already, Vygotsky has been accused of neglecting the 
institutional framework in favour of the semiotic system. This focus on semiotic 
system as opposed to a more specific account of the relationships between 
institutions, social practices and mind has a deep history. It is not by chance that 
two expreSSIOns, 'cultural-historical' and 'socio-cultural' characterise 
Vygotskian research.6 The differences between these expressions indicate 
different traditions; the former stressing the importance of the historical 
whereas the latter is 'contextual' in its approach. 
2.3 The historical background 
Wertsch sketches the rationale for usmg distinct expressions to 
characterise post-Vygotskian research. It is important to appreciate the different 
traditions in which the distinct expressions arose and the extent to which the 
interpretation of the cultural historical tradition has been influenced by the 
experience of Stalinism. It is telling that Wertsch suggests that the tradition of 
sociocultural research derives from Boas, his students Sapir and Whorf/ and 
6 The distinction between the two phrases has been considered sufficiently important to warrant 
two separate international research organisations which have only recently merged 
(http://www . iscar. orglhistoryl). 
7 The influence of Whorf is significant due to his emphasis on the shaping power of language 
and the relativism it entails: 'human minds are profoundly shaped and altered by the public 
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from anthropologl. It is this tradition which proved so influential for the 
criticism of "evolutionism" and the assumptions of 'psychic unity' human kind 
made in anthropology. It is this characterisation of "evolutionism", that is a 
view of history as universal human progress, which Wertsch claims to find in 
Vygotsky's work and which he discounts as the outcome of his philosophic 
commitment to the Enlightenment. Of the tradition stemming from Vygotsky's 
Russian followers, if not Vygotsky himself, Wertsch writes: 
[it] assumed a notion of culture that is clearly in line with 
universalistic assumptions about the psychic unity of human kind and 
evolutionist claims associated with these assumptions. . .. the 
evolutionist assumptions indexed by the term 'sociohistorical' and 
'cultural-historical' are one place where most authors in this volume 
part ways with Vygotsky's followers, if not Vygotsky himself. It is for 
this reason that we prefer the term' sociocultural'. 
(Wertsch, del Rio, and Alvarez, 1995, p. 10). 
This passage illustrates two reasons why Wertsch wishes to keep the terms 
'socio-cultural' and 'cultural-historical' distinct - a rejection of what he and 
other contemporary commentators perceive of as 'evolutionism' and, associated 
with it, a rejection of the 'psychic unity of mankind'. Associated with the 
reaction against any suggestion of 'psychic unity' is a distancing of mind from 
a universal notion. However, there are problems with understanding exactly 
what 'universal' means here. The issue of what 'psychic unity' might refer to in 
a Vygotskian frame is addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 later where it is argued 
that the distinctive feature of human beings is their particular way of 
'experiencing' the world via second nature. It is to that (experiencing the world 
via second nature) that the claim of universalism is attached. 
Within the field of research under consideration, much of the 
terminology is under specified and carries the historical baggage of political 
events, particularly the history of Marxism and the various practices it was used 
languages we come to speak'. Clark notes the relativism implicated in adopting Whorfs 
position (Clark, Magic Words, web page accessed 10/1112002). 
S Anthropological literature has been important for debates about the nature of rationality as an 
influential strand in anthropology has argued for a relativist approach to culture. Wertsch 
recognizes that Vygotsky would be at odds with such relativist positions. 
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to justify. In addition to the term 'universal', others such as 'evolutionism' 
inform consideration of Vygotsky's work and the negative connotations 
associated with them are illustrated by the ambivalence of Wertsch' s attempt to 
position Vygotsky. The issue of development and history is one such area 
where politically positioned conceptions and terminology inform analysis. 
Despite noting Scribner's argument against a crude caricature of Vygotsky's 
understanding of history as recapitulationist, Wertsch et al claim that 
Vygotsky's work with Luria on 'primitive thinking ... [made] strong 
assumptions about universal rationality and progress' (Wertsch, del Rio and 
Alvarez, 1995, p. 8). Although Wertsch et al. acknowledge that 'Vygotsky 
seemed to recognise historical processes other than those that fall under the 
heading of universal human progress' (Wertsch, del Rio and Alvarez, 1995, p. 
8). Scribner argues that Vygotsky's conception of history was sophisticated and 
that Vygotsky argued 'only "sloth" .. . would assimilate his theory to 
recapitulationist or parallelist positions' (Scribner, 1985, p.l38). Wertsch et at 
also recognise that for Vygotsky in some respects as far as the view that 
'primitive languages were viewed as simpler or less adequate in all 
ways ... precisely the opposite was being argued' (Wertsch, del Rio and Alvarez, 
1995, p. 9). 
Vygotsky's comment that only a form of intellectual sloth could lead a 
commentator to reduce his approach to a simplistic notion of development 
indicates that he was working towards a more complex view than the caricature 
that align his work with what became Soviet practice. This more complex view 
put him at odds with his colleagues and followers who split to form the 
Kharkov school. In relation to Vygotsky's followers Kozulin notes that: 
The Kharkovites solved the problem of the relation between 
consciousness and activity in the following way: 'The development of 
the consciousness of a child occurs as a result of the development of 
the system of psychological operations, which, in their tum, are 
determined by the actual relations between a child and reality.' This 
insistence on "the actual relations of reality" became a major point of 
disagreement between the Kharkovites and Vygotsky. 
(Kozulin, 1986, p. xliv-xlv) 9 
9 The quoted passage in the extract from Kozulin is from Leontiev (A.N. Leontiev, 1935). 
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Kozulin understands that the split of the Kharkov school which comprised most 
of Vygotsky's followers, necessarily in the context of the Soviet Union, has 
specific consequences. As he put it: 'the thesis of "actual relations with reality" 
fitted the Soviet dialectical materialist credo of the 1930s much better than 
Vygotsky's more complex cultural-historical model' \0 (Kozulin, 1986, p. xlv). 
The members of the Kharkov school of Soviet colleagues and followers of 
Vygotsky (Leontiev, Luria, and Zaporozhets) argued that 'activity' should be 
used as the basic analytic unit in psychology and. there was debate in the Soviet 
Union over whether this extended or distorted Vygotsky's basic ideas (Wertsch, 
Minick and Arns, 1984, p. 154). 
Kozulin alerts us to the possibility that there might be something more in 
what Vygotsky was working towards than what was developed in the work of 
his followers who were compromised by the difficult political conditions of 
Stalinism. Significantly, the attempt to work out the mechanics of the 
relationship between the historical, social and cultural determinations of mind 
took place against the background of a split in Vygotskian research conditioned 
by political events in the Soviet Union. In the early 1930s Leont'ev and many 
others loosened their connection with Vygotsky and moved from Moscow to 
Karkhov to create a scientific school and to develop the 'activity approach'. 
This change of focus from the consciousness of the cultural-historical school of 
Vygotsky towards a more 'materialist' approach occurred in a climate of terror 
that had become life-threatening (Zinchenko, 1995, p.39). The issue which 
more than any other divided these schools was between the problem of 
consciousness and the problem of 'object-orientedness, in both internal and 
external mental activity' (Zinchenko, 1995, p.41). The Kharkov school moved 
from a focus on the problem of consciousness to activity. The split occurred 
during a period of intense political pressure and when some ofVygotsky's work 
had already been banned. 
\0 However, Kozulin notes that the ideological benefits of Leontiev's revisionism did have 
serious scientific underpinnings, but that 'Ideological cautiousness, honest scientific agreement, 
and also a misunderstanding ofVygotsky's ideas - all were intricately interwoven in the 
phenomenon that later became known as Leontiev's theory of activity' (Kozulin, 1986, p. xlv). 
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A sharp distinction was drawn between what was thought of as 
materialism and idealism. According to Zinchenko: 
The psychological theory of activity was concerned with the problem 
of real (i.e. concrete) tools and objects that humans, also in accordance 
with Marxism, place between themselves and nature. In other words 
what makes a human human? Symbol or thing? The crucifix or the 
hammer and sickle? If it is the symbol, then this is idealism. If it is the 
thing, then this is materialism or perhaps dialectical materialism. 
(Zinchenko, 1995 p. 44) 
This stark separation of material and ideal played a central role in the failure to 
appreciate aspects of Vygotsky's work in the Soviet Union. But of particular 
relevance here is Zinchenko's awareness of the reductive and dehumanising 
implication of accounting for mind solely in terms of object-orientated activity. 
He illustrates the implication of viewing what it is to be human as the outcome 
of a solely mechanical and material process by referring to the way in which 
research 'analogous to the theory of activity' was carried out by German and 
Italian totalitarian regimes. Intrinsic to the research was an aim to develop the 
kind of conformist personality which would acquiesce in the push to 
collectivisation by such regimes. The idea of activity was reduced to the notion 
that the 'human being was nothing more than a ... functional organ that served 
as a means for carrying out activity that had been ordered (Zinchenko, 1995, p. 
51). Zinchenko emphasises the extent to which communist ideology pushed 
towards the removal of the subject from the understanding of activity. He 
quotes Marx to show that such an ideology was alien to Marx's own view: 'We 
have fallen into a difficult position owing to the fact that we examined persons 
only as personified categories and not as individuums' (Marx cited by 
Zinchenko, 1995 p. 51). Zinchenko's appreciation of the potential determinism 
presented by a mechanical 'materialist' account of mind is still at issue today 
though in the different area of research concerned with bringing the situated 
nature of cognition to our attention and contesting the idea of abstract 
rationality. 
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2.4 Situated cognition 
Abstraction and decontextualised knowledge have been brought to the fore by 
work on the situated character of cognition. It is possible, with the focus on 
cognition as situated, for the issue of abstraction to be dissolved away and for 
all knowledge to be understood solely as situated. Lave notes that: 
Usually contextualised learning is not discussed alone, but as part of a 
duality of which decontextualised learning fonns the other half. But 
the theories discussed in the previous section [and in this Lave 
includes activity theory] are intended to apply broadly to all social 
practices. They claim that there is no decontextualised social practice. 
Such a claim commits us to explaining what has often been taken to be 
'decontextualised knowledge' or 'decontextualised learning as 
contextualised social practices. 
(Lave, 1996,p.22) 
Situated cognitivists address a significant issue raised by Vygotskian research, 
namely that mind cannot be conceived as an attribute of an individual in 
isolation from the world. In opposition to the view of mind as the attribute of 
isolated individuals, situated cognitivists argue that thinking is conceived of 
differently once the sociality of thought is taken properly into account. Their 
aim is to dec entre cognition. This would resolve the learning paradox of 
explaining how we can come to know anything that we don't already know, by 
removing the dualism of thought acting on world and replacing it with 'activity 
in context'. The work of Lave and Wenger counts as an important attempt to 
change the focus of learning from a cognitivist type towards a focus on 
communities of practice which emphasises the situated character of knowledge 
production and reproduction. They see their move to decentre the analysis of 
learning as one which 'open[s] an alternative approach to the dichotomy, 
., .between learning by doing and learning by abstraction' (Lave and Wenger, 
1991 p. 105). For Lave and Wenger, this is a part of 'a folk epistemology of 
dichotomies, for instance between "abstract" and "concrete" knowledge' (Lave 
and Wenger, 1991 p. 104). They aim to dissociate learning from pedagogical 
intention and to understand situated learning activity as 'legitimate peripheral 
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participation' in communities of practice. From this standpoint learning can be 
viewed as a less conscious or artificial process constructed via a specific 
pedagogical form and, as such, more naturalistically as an event arising via 
changes in activity within a specific domain of practice. Lave argues it is 
difficult: 
to avoid the conclusion that learning is ubiquitous in ongoing activity 
though often unrecognised as such. Situated activity always involves 
changes in knowledge and action ... and 'changes in knowledge and 
action' are central to what we mean by 'learning' .... We have come 
to the conclusion, .. . that there is no such thing as 'learning' sui 
generis, but only changing participation in the culturally designed 
settings of everyday life. 
(Lave,1. 1996, p.6) 
Two points follow from Lave's view: what has previously been seen as 
decontextualised is considered as just another form of contextualised 
knowledge; and learning is viewed as a more naturalised less artificial process: 
'Conventional theories of learning and schooling appeal to the decontextualised 
character of some knowledge ... whereas in a theory of situated activity, 
"decontextualised learning activity" is a contradiction in terms' (Lave, 1. 1996, 
p.6). 
The view that takes all learning to be contextualised attempts to eradicate 
the dualism of a mind acting on a world by putting in place of the dualism, a 
reconceptualisation of knowledge. The resulting view of knowledge as the 
outcome of situated practice lends itself to an anti-realist stance even in the 
conception of science: 
The idea of learning as cogmtlve acquisition - whether of facts, 
knowledge, problem-solving strategies, or metacognitive skills -
seems to dissolve when learning is conceived of as the construction of 
present versions of past experience for several persons acting together . 
. . . And when scientific practice is viewed as just another everyday 
practice .. .it is clear that theories of 'situated activity' provide 
different perspectives on 'learning' and its 'contexts.' 
(Lave, 1996, p. 8) 
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Although the VIew of scientific practice as 'just another everyday practice' 
implicates scientific knowledge in the constructive activity of individuals in 
contexts, the relativisation of scientific knowledge does not automatically 
follow. Attention to the way in which cognition is situated and formed by a 
context allows different stances towards realism. In clarifying different 
viewpoints on context as situated activity, Lave indicates two different 
positions found in contextual approaches. She paints one approach as holding to 
a world out there, independent of human activity; and the second, 'social 
constructionist' approach, as a far more limited conception of the context in 
which humans engage in activity. In the first case world history is the context in 
which human activity takes place but in the second case, activity creates its own 
context since inter-subjectivity serves as the basis of what the world means to 
humans: 
One argues that the central theoretical relation is historically 
constituted between persons engaged in socioculturally constructed 
activity and the world in which they are engaged. Activity theory is a 
representative of such a theoretical position. The other focuses on the 
construction of the world in social interaction; this leads to the view 
that activity is its own context. Here the central theoretical relation is 
the intersubjective relation among co-participants in social interaction. 
This derives from a tradition of phenomenological social theory. II 
(Lave, 1996, p.17) 
Lave is well aware that the VIew of context developed within the 
phenomenological tradition can lead to the 'eras[ing] of historical processes, 
both large and small' (Lave, 1996, p. 20). She explains: 
The major difficulty of phenomenological and activity theory in the 
eyes of others will be plain: Those who start with the views that social 
activity is its own context dispute claims that objective social 
structures exist other than in social- interactional construction in situ. 
Activity theorists argue, on the other hand, that the concrete 
connectedness and meaning of activity cannot be accounted for by 
analysis of the immediate situation. 
(Lave, 1996, p. 20) 
II These viewpoints replicate the classic polarisation in sociology between agency and structure. 
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What is clear is that the impetus in this field to move from abstract knowledge 
towards a 'distributed form of knowledge production' raises key questions. The 
latter examines knowledge as distributed and sustained across a variety of 
artefacts, discourses and social practices in context. Of particular importance is 
the attempt to account for the mechanics of such a relation of different elements 
involved in the production of knowledge. This attempt involves questions 
concerning representation, affordance and cause and effect, all of which are 
under theorised at present. But more importantly it involves human freedom 
and agency to the extent that these should play a critical role in any proper 
consideration of these questions. 
As the historical background to the field of Vygotskian studies illustrates, 
the question of freedom has been at issue in both the cultural-historical and 
activity theory traditions. The question of agency has remained particularly 
pertinent given the claims made for artificial intelligence. AI (Artificial 
Intelligence) researchers have also adopted a conception of cognition as 
emergent in an environment rather than programmable in advance. Wertsch, 
Tulviste and Hagstrom (1993) remark on how the use of computers to take over 
tasks formerly carried out by humans poses questions of whether computers are 
agents which can have consciousness. At the same time that commentators 
entertain the idea of an artificial intelligence on a par with human intelligence, 
the role of theory in facilitating thought and action is diminished in favour of 
participation in a community of practice as the way of learning. There is also a 
questionable disregard of the counter intuitive character of scientific knowledge 
and the value of the formal character of instruction. A further problem concerns 
the importance attached to consensus in the idea of truth/consensus warranted 
by a community/collective. 
2.5 Transfer problem and policy implication 
The issue of decontextualisation is posed most sharply by what is known as the 
transfer problem. In effect, once knowledge is understood as contextualised 
then the issue of application in different domains becomes critical. Once the 
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conception of mind and world has been radically rethought, first, in the way in 
which intellect is developed and has a sociogenetic origin; and second, through 
an approach to knowledge conceived as existing only in a process of human 
construction/intervention, a number of policy implications follow.12 What is 
contested by writers concerned with the transfer problem is a view of 
knowledge delivered by an expert, to be acquired by the learner in a general 
form and then applied in a variety of specific circumstances. The idea of a 
universally applicable knowledge capable of being transferred across domains 
is rej ected. 
Kirshner and Whitson equate what is termed decontextualised knowledge 
with the idea that knowledge can be transferred across contexts i.e. with the 
idea that knowledge is not locally bound, but rather is tied to a specific form of 
pedagogic practice, i.e. a passive transmission mode oflearning: 
If abstract decontextualised knowledge is theorised to be the means by 
which people transfer learning from context to context, then schools 
will set their goal to provide as much of it as possible with the greatest 
possible efficiency. Thus, teaching becomes telling and learning 
becomes listening and memorizing. 
(Kirshner and Whitson, 1997 p. viii) 
The complications that surround the issue of decontextualisation can be seen by 
debates about how knowledge can be transferred from one domain and applied 
in another. Attempts have been made to overcome the polarised character of the 
discussion that has emerged around the transfer problem. An influential 
discussion in the literature was conducted between Anderson and Greeno. It 
relates to concerns over the value of what is described as propositional and 
abstract knowledge and the claim that this mode of representation (dressed up 
as universal knowledge) is the result of elite interests which fails to respond to 
the diversity of learners (Anderson, 1996). 
12 However, the coincidence between theories of situated cognition and education positions 
policy may be fortuitous, arising for example, from the need of welfare states to reduce the 
funding of mass schooling. 
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Greeno has argued that the polarisation of arguments about situativity 
results from the different usage of the same terms and from confusion over 
levels of analysis. Anderson, although not expressly rejecting the argument for 
situativity out of hand, offers examples of boundary crossing and successful 
applications of generic learning. Greeno responds that Anderson's argument 
sets up a straw man on the grounds that he (Anderson) is employing a 
cognitivist model. But this response of Greeno's neglects important issues. 
Namely by shifting attention to the communicative dimension of knowledge, 
the situative approach finds it difficult ifnot impossible to avoid a model which 
restricts understanding to cognitive states as the outcome of situated contexts. 
Anderson remarks on the frequently cited example of Carraher, Carraher 
and Schliemann's (1985) account of Brazilian street children who can perform 
mathematics when making sales in the street but are unable to answer similar 
problems presented in a school context. The example is famously used by Lave 
for the more familiar purpose of criticising the failures of schools to offer 
learning that is of use to the learner (Lave, 1988, p. 149). The extent to which 
discussions of decontextualised knowledge are implicated in key education 
policy decisions is indicated by Anderson's critique of what he sees as Lave's 
value-laden interpretation: 
The literature on situation-specificity of learning often comes with a 
value judgment about the merits of knowledge tied to a non-school 
context relative to school taught knowledge and an implied or 
expressed claim that school knowledge is not legitimate. Lave (1986, 
1988, p.195) goes so far as to suggest that school-taught mathematics 
serves only to justify an arbitrary and unfair class structure. 
(Anderson, 1996, p. 6) 
Greeno takes issue with the way in which a cognitivist framework is used to 
support an argument which he suggests could equally well be read within a 
framework of situativity. So where Anderson cites evidence that 'it is not the 
case that learning is wholly tied to a specific context' (Greeno, 1997, p. 7), 
Greeno turns the point around to argue that on the contrary the findings can be 
read as 'supporting the view that activities in some situations include aspects of 
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practices that have been learned in different types of situations ' (Greeno, 1997, 
p.7). The most important question here is whether the phenomenon which 
Greeno views as a case of discourse and Anderson a case of abstraction, is 
really one and the same. 13 
Greeno attempts to reconcile what appear to be contradictory positions by 
arguing that generality is conceptualised differently in the two perspectives. 
However, the situative understanding which he claims is capable of moving 
beyond context, presupposes common physical/empirical grounds between 
context - it is this common ground that makes possible a transfer from one 
context to another. As a result, Greeno ends up in a position close to Lave's and 
actually quotes her results that reasoning activities can reach mathematically 
correct conclusions without making significant use of the algorithms typically 
taught in school. And to underline the point he goes on to argue that 'if a goal 
of education is for students to reason successfully in their everyday activities 
outside of school, school mathematics programs that are limited to teaching 
algorithmic skills do not reach important aspects of those reasoning activities' 
(Greeno, 1997, p.7). 
Greeno sees a problem with the terminology used in this area when he 
takes up what he terms a 'cognitivist position' on 'knowledge'. He argues that 
from within a situative framework the term 'knowing' is a better way of 
evoking a process than 'knowledge', and 'generality of knowing' is a better 
term than 'transfer of knowledge': '''knowing'' refers more appropriately to 
regular patterns in someone's participation in interactions with other people and 
with material and representational systems, and "generality of knowing" is a 
more accurate phrase than "transfer of knowledge'" (Greeno 1997, p. 11). What 
is missing here is any sense of a transformative or creative role for the knower 
in transferring 'patterns of participation with people and objects' - what Greeno 
calls adaptive. The knower is able to appear knowledgeable in the new context 
by replicating patterns of activity as though the repeating of the shout 'Fire' is 
sufficient to be read as a knowledge of combustion on the part of the shouter. 
13 Walkerdine (1990) in her work on the learning of mathematics, goes as far as to suggest that 
what are understood as highly abstract cognitive activities may be seen a matter of discourse. 
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It may be the case that when the inadequacy of schooling is identified as 
failing to prepare learners for jobs, then the replication of 'patterns of 
participation' would be appropriate. However, from this point of view of 
schooling, learning is a reductive process that attempts to meet certain ends but 
not go beyond them. Such an instrumental view of schooling is evident in 
Greeno's argument; 'we need to take into account the kinds of activities in 
which we want students to learn to be successful, and develop learning 
environments in which they can develop their abilities to participate in certain 
kinds of practices that are important to them' (Greeno, 1997, p. 13). 
Greeno takes issue over the significance to be attributed to the terms 
specific and abstract. For instance, when he refers to the transfer of knowledge 
between domains, the emphasis is not upon a concept of abstract knowledge 
that can be applied in different specific conditions but upon the generalisability 
of patterns of experience. As he puts it: 'It seems more likely that knowing how 
to use abstract representations can be a significant part of general knowing, but 
that knowing abstractions is neither sufficient nor necessary for generality' 
(Greeno, 1997, p. l3). The problem here centres on what is meant by 'knowing 
abstractions' or 'knowing how to use abstract representations'. Chapter 3 takes 
up the work of Brandom, who, building on Sellars, argues that knowing is never 
merely a matter of knowing a representation but always involves knowing the 
reasons that follow and the reasons that support a particular representation. A 
significant point to note here is Greeno's effectual identification of abstract 
knowledge and abstract representation l4 - as though the ability to understand 
and apply quadratic equations is the same as the capacity to reproduce them 
mechanically as a purely formal exercise, or, to use a recurring example, that 
the understanding of the significance of the shout of 'fire' by an adult is the 
same as the same cry made by an infant. 15 
14 The question remains whether scientific theorems are 'representations' in this sense, or 
generators which are transferable. 
15 The identification of abstract knowledge with abstract representation or decontextualised 
knowledge in Greeno's account is in tune with the contemporary practice of mass schooling 
which he would of course criticise. 
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Greeno uses Searle's parable (1980) of the Chinese room to illustrate the 
poverty of mass education. However, although Greeno uses the parable to 
attack abstract knowledge, the purpose of Searle's parable is a different one of 
distinguishing between human and machine activity. The parable illustrates that 
a process of transmitting instructions does not require human understanding and 
that human activity is not reducible to that of a machine. For Greeno this 
parable is an illustration of the shortcoming of abstract knowledge, that is - in 
the case of mathematics - of the apprehension of formal rules and procedures 
without the pupil having understood their meaning. But what Greeno calls 
abstract knowledge is really only abstract representation, and his failure to 
distinguish the one from the other calls into question his general criticism of 
abstract knowledge. His case against abstract representation may be valid but 
this is not sufficient to justify its use as a critique of abstraction as a general 
practice. )6 
Within the field of Vygotskian research)7 there are other conceptions of 
knowledge than that of Greeno; there are those who do not believe that 
knowledge is inert merely because it is decontextualised and universal. For 
instance, the cultural-historical tradition emerging from the Soviet Union 
(particularly the work of Davydov and Hedegaard) stresses conscious 
instruction rather than tacit apprenticing. Teaching, according to this tradition, 
is not simply a matter of telling, but requires expertise and deep knowledge of 
16 Greeno compares the poverty of an approach to mathematics education which teaches formal 
rules and procedure without pupils understanding their meaning to Searle's (1980) parable of 
the Chinese Room (Greeno 1997, p.14). The example is used to criticise the view advanced by 
advocates of artificial intelligence, that by following rules, machines can transform strings of 
characters to produce a response that could have the same form as the answer that a human 
being could make. Searle, however, intended his example to be used to illustrate that meaning 
cannot exist for a machine. 
17 The debate between Greeno and Anderson shows how terminology is used in a variety of 
ways. The conflation of representation to abstractions makes them meaningless in application. 
The same understanding of abstraction as representation is present in Kirshner and Whitson 
leads to their claiming that an assumption about knowledge as decontextualised leads to a 
transmission approach to teaching, involving telling and memorizing (Kirshner and Whitson, 
1997, p.12). 
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the subject. 18 This 'deep knowledge' is necessary for the teacher to be in a 
position to unpack and open up the genetic development of ideas and to 
provoke students into acquiring scientific concepts through a process that 
recapitulates that of their development. An appreciation of the depth of 
knowledge of the subject on the part of the teacher is necessary for pupils to 
acquire scientific concepts. 
When Vygotsky talked of scientific concepts (as part of the content of 
school curricula), he did not believe that abstraction entailed decontextualised 
rationality in the sense of being totally separate from context. At stake here is 
the meaning to be attached to the term context. Even Lave and Wenger who 
refute any form of decontextualisation concede that what constitutes a 
community of practice need not be specifically geographical or temporal. For 
Vygotsky, however, concepts are only meaningful and hence concepts, when 
they comprise elements of a system of connections that is historically 
constituted. This is totally different from the shallow notion of concepts as 
representations criticised as part of the transmission mode of pedagogy found in 
formal schooling. Vygotsky was clear about the need to challenge the version 
of knowledge based on our senses (empiricist) where knowledge is inert and 
learnt passively. His conception of theory and concepts was certainly not one of 
correspondence or signification, in the sense of standing for something. Instead 
concepts are tools: 
... with the help of the concept, we are able to penetrate through the 
external appearance of phenomena to penetrate into their essence, just 
as with the aid of a microscope, we disclose in a drop of water a 
complex and rich life, or the complex structure of the cell hidden from 
our eyes. 
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 54) 
18 The reference here to 'knowledge of the subject' does not equate with the conception of 
'subject knowledge' currently laid down in British government prescriptions for teacher 
education. It is more akin to the concept of Bildung where a teacher works around a subject area 
in a number of ways that allow a deep and developmental grasp of issues and concepts. It 
certainly cannot be assumed to be present by the current criteria of a 'good degree', as research 
has indicated how passing examinations at degree level does not necessitate a proper grasp of a 
subject. 
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Vygotsky often cites Marx's claim that science would be unnecessary 'if 
the fonn of a manifestation and the essence of things coincided directly.' 
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 54) He makes the anti-positivist claims that things cannot 
be understood independently of one another and that concepts do similar work 
to technologies such as microscopes: 
For this reason thinking in concepts is the most adequate method of 
knowing reality because it penetrates into the internal essence of 
things, for the nature of things is disclosed not in direct contemplation 
of one single object or another, but in connections and relations that 
are manifested in movement and development of the object, and these 
connect it to the rest of reality. The internal connection of things is 
disclosed with the help of thinking in concepts, for to develop a 
concept of some object means to disclose a series of connections and 
relations of the object with the rest of reality, to include it in a 
complex system of phenomenon 
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 54) 
Given this point of view, it would be difficult to believe that scientific concepts 
could be taught without the disclosing of their relationship to one another -
what Brandom calls their inferential form (see below). Kirshner and Whitson 
may be correct in characterising the dominant form of pedagogy as 
'transmission', however, it does not follow that this mode of pedagogic practice 
is the result of the particular type of (decontextualised) knowledge that they are 
criticising. A far more likely cause is the quantity and fonn of resources. 
2.6 Determination, conditioning or shaping? 
The advocates of situated cognition are not free of the dualism they oppose so 
strongly. As Kirshner and Whitson point out, many issues remain unresolved. 
One of these is the overly determinist conception of what it is to be human that 
arises from the attempt of post-Vygotskian researchers to work out the 
mechanics of cognition arising in activity. Kirshner and Whitson use 
Bourdieu's work as example of what they criticise, namely the discursive as 
ultimately reducible to something else such as class conditions or capital 
composition. They also claim that the same reductionism can be found in 
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Vygotsky's work, citing the often quoted passage in which he argues that 
functions in the child's development appear twice, first between people and 
then within the child: 'Social relations or relations among people genetically 
underlie all higher [mental] functions and their relationships' (Vygotsky, cited 
by Kirshner and Whitson, 1997, p. 8). Kirshner and Whitson's criticism of 
Vygotsky mayor may not be well-grounded but the matter to note here is that it 
follows almost automatically from the suppositions of their own work. The 
logic of this claim centres on the replacement of the Cartesian ego with social 
conditions as an explanation for the development of thought, in other words a 
rejection of Cartesianism which actually retains its fundamental dualist 
structure. 
The problems of determinism which were already present in classical 
sociological theory become far more serious with explanations of human 
activity in terms of enculturation through a community of practice. In 
sociology, where enculturation is explained in terms of socialisation rather than 
activity, criticisms were levelled against what were taken to be overly 
determinist characterisations of how humans become fully human. Denis 
Wrong's commentary The Oversocialised Conception of Man in Modern 
Sociology offers a particularly clear example of how sociology, by virtue of its 
attempt to explain socialisation as a causal and constitutive process, was forced 
into a highly deterministic conception of what it is to be human. Wrong 
challenged the view developed by Parsons who, drawing on Durkheim, argued 
in The Structure of Social Action that social rules are constituted by the actors' 
ends and do not arise externally. Wrong discussed the variety of ways in which 
internalisation has been equated by sociologists to 'learning' or 'habit 
formation'. He argued that although Freud became influential for sociology 
(and Parsons) for the explanation of the internalization of social norms, none of 
these ways has any real sense of a Freudian notion of inner conflict and tension 
between powerful impulses (Wrong, D. 1969, p. 125). For Freud, Wrong notes, 
internalisation means a norm has been introjected to become part of the 
superego, so that a person suffers guilt-feelings if he fails to live up to it. 
Intemalisation does not of course mean that a person will actually live up to the 
norm. Wrong's methodological claim is that the psychoanalytic approach which 
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admits tensions and repression and sees 'inner life as a battle field of conflicting 
motives' (Wrong, D. 1969, p.125), is less determinist than the sociological 
approach. 
Now, this determinism which Wrong criticises in sociology is carried 
further by writers such as Lave who take as their brief not simply the 
explanation of behaviour but also the apprehension at least by implication of the 
nature of mind. Enculturation for Lave entails the development of mind as 
being in context. For Lave 'Understanding-in-practice looks like a more 
powerful source of enculturation than [socialisation through] the pedagogical 
efforts of caregivers and teachers' (Lave, 1997, p. 32). Citing, Ortner's (1984) 
argument, Lave believes that the concept of socialisation has been replaced by 
the claim that everyday practices 'embody within themselves, the fundamental 
notions of temporal, spatial and social ordering that underlie and organise the 
social system as a whole (Ortner cited by Lave, 1997, p. 32). However, with 
the incorporation of psychology in the work of Lave and Wenger, there is 
potentially an even deeper level of 'oversocialisation' since learning-in-
practice builds higher mental functions and modes of identity and is not limited 
to one aspect of a person's activity. Activity in a social context is a form of 
apprenticeship, albeit one involving conflict though this is not theorised. 
However, in so far as Wrong's criticism deals with methodology it covers 
Lave's position as well. 19 
Nardi20 shows similar concern about the potentially determinate nature of 
explanation implicit in activity theory when she raises questions about the 
limitations of activity theory, with its emphasis on object-orientated action, and 
the reduction of activity to three levels. According to Nardi: '[a]ctivity theory 
excels at describing object-related activity but says little about how we are 
19 'If our assumptions are left implicit, we will inevitably presuppose a view of man that is tailor 
made to our special needs' (Wrong, D., 1969, p.l31). The underlying argument informing this 
thesis is that by not making underlying assumptions explicit, theoretical positions do not deal 
with their own internal contradictions. 
20 Nardi works within the activity theory field and utilizes activity theory to address issues of 
design and pedagogy in the application of new technologies. 
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diverted, distracted, interrupted, seduced away from our objects, subject to 
serendipity and surprise' (Nardi, B. 1997, p. 377). It is not by chance that she 
draws on a passage from Middlemarch by George Eliot to illustrate the 
complexity of consciousness. Eliot was greatly influenced by Spinoza and was 
the first to translate his Ethics into English. In the passage Nardi selects, the 
protagonist is thinking of three totally different things at the same time as well 
as experiencing 'a powerful emotional response that reverberates through his 
body to his very fingertips. Indeed Eliot avers that "every molecule in his body" 
is affected, thereby asserting the primacy of the body in our activity, our 
responses to events' (Nardi, B. 1997, p. 377). Nardi seeks to emphasise the 
ambivalence and contradictory variables that the protagonist is facing at a 
decisive moment. 
For Wertsch et al the issue of determinism comes up in the role played by 
artefacts within sociocultural explanations. For example, they write: 
While the cultural tools or artifacts involved in mediation, certainly 
playa central role in shaping they do not determine or cause action in 
some kind of static, mechanistic way .. , . such cultural tools are 
powerless to do anything. They can have their impact only when 
individuals use them. 
(Wertsch, del Rio and Alvarez, 1995, p. 22) 
But at the same time as they resist determinist explanation, Wertsch et al seek 
to credit cultural tools with the capacity to constrain our actions; 'We can never 
"speak from nowhere" given that we speak (or more broadly act) only by 
invoking mediational means that are available in the "cultural tool kit" provided 
by the sociocultural setting in which we operate (Wertsch, 1991), (Wertsch, del 
Rio and Alvarez, 1995, p.25). For Wertsch the social character of mind 
requires a conception of agency extending beyond the individual. This agency 
can only be understood if the mediational means that are party to it are seen as 
both products and sources of social/cultural contexts. 
Wertsch, Tulviste and Hagstrom argue in favour of the sociocultural 
situatedness of agency: 'The line of argument we pursue is that the mediational 
means that shape human mental functioning reflect and are fundamentally 
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involved in creating and maintammg cultural, historical and institutional 
contexts,21 (Wertsch, Tulviste and Hagstrom, 1993, p. 344). They present this 
claim as the alternative to the poverty of a: 
typically modem notion of freedom, as the ability to act on one's own, 
without outside interference or subordination to outside authority 
(Taylor, 1985, p.5) which underlies psychology and limits the 
possibility of dealing adequately with how sociocultural forces shape 
or constitute individuals. 
(Wertsch, Tulviste and Hagstrom, 1993, p. 338) 
As we shall see in Chapter 5, the crucial issue here, is that Wertsch et al. 
are responding to the conception of human freedom as acting without 
'subordination to outside authority'. In rejecting such a view of free will, it is 
not unexpected that, in an effort to recognise that human will does not work in 
conditions free of constraint, they tum to crediting cultural tools with a fonn of 
agency. However, as we see below, Spinoza, who was particularly important for 
Vygotsky, was able to acknowledge constraint on human activity yet see 
freedom as an altered position within this restraint. Thus the attempt 
theoretically to credit mediational means with the capacity to shape may press 
its case too far if it overlooks the distinctive feature of free human beings. 
Wertsch et al. are fully aware that there is a problem of implicit assumptions in 
psychology and they cite Joravsky approvingly for lamenting the neglect of 
fundamental questions: 'Sophisticated people have learned to evade questions 
that seemed urgent a century ago' (Wertsch, et at. 1993, p. 336). But while they 
recognise the need to reject the Cartesian conception of the individual, their 
theorisation of agency implicitly retains Taylor's fonnulation of an individual 
with will. But instead of exploring the concept of freedom they restrict 
themselves to examining instances where freedom appears to be curtailed by 
mediational means. In a sense it can be said that, using Batesonian language, 
they embrace a position that 'extends it [will] beyond the skin' to include 
21 In a footnote Wertsch et al. attempt to clarify their conception of the power of agency 
attributable to mediating tools which is inextricable from utilisation by individuals: 'In our 
view, the psychological tools that mediate thinking, memory, and other mental functions are 
typically shaped strongly by forces distinct from the dictates of mental functioning and for this 
reason import "foreign" structures and processes into this functioning' (Wertsch, Tulviste, & 
Hagstrom, 1993, p. 353). 
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mediational means. The argument of Wertsch et al. is that the boundary of 
agency must be extended to include an 'irreducible aggregate of individual (or 
individuals in intennental functioning) together with mediational means' 
(Wertsch, Tulviste and Hagstrom, 1993, p. 341)?2 Wertsch and his co-authors 
argue that the boundary of agency 'extends beyond the skin'. For this argument 
they find further support in Bakhtin's notion of speech genres. 
Wertsch et al. recruit Bakhtin's notion of speech genres, which they liken 
to Bernstein's notion of code, to support their claim of a detenninate relation 
between particular social fonns and specific genres. Citing Holquist and 
Emerson, (Holquist and Emerson, 1981, p. 431) they claim that social 
languages23 are 'peculiar to a specific substratum of society ... within a given 
social system at a given time' (Wertsch et al. 1993, p. 346). Drawing first on 
Bakhtin's distinction between a social language and a national language and 
secondly, upon Bakhtin's view that when a word is used it is neither neutral nor 
impersonal, but 'rather exists in other people's mouths, in other people's 
concrete contexts, serving other people's intentions' (Wertsch, et al. 1993, p. 
345) they claim for words a detennining effect on the intramental. Bakhtin 
called this 'ventriloquism' and Wertsch et al. see it as a special kind of 
dialogicality, which they tenn 'double voicedness'. 
22 ' •• • the irreducible unit of analysis for agency is "individual( s) operating with mediational 
means'" and for convenience Wertsch et al. shorten this to 'mediated agency' (Wertsch, 
Tulviste and Hagstrom, 1993, p. 342). 
23 Wertsch et al. view a language as a mediational means: 'The notion of social language is 
useful because it is a mediational means that is inherently tied to a sociocultural setting' 
(Wertsch, Tulviste, and Hagstrom, 1993, p. 346). 
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The importance of mediational means in fonning and shaping the means 
of thought is carried further in Tulviste's work. Wertsch and his co-authors cite 
Tulviste in support of their argument about the cultural domain as the context of 
activity and as a factor of crucial importance for specific modes of thinking: 
Tulviste (1975, 1987, 1988) has argued that various modes of thinking 
correspond functionally to an array of "cultural activities" and are 
created by them. Each cultural activity (e.g. science, arts, everyday 
life, religion) poses specific tasks that can be solved only by using the 
corresponding modes of thinking. For instance, practical thinking or 
common sense is not sufficient to solve scientific tasks, whereas 
scientific thinking is of little use when writing a poem or a sermon or 
when solving most everyday problems. ' 
(Wertsch, Tulviste and Hagstrom, 1993, p. 351) 
This degree of specialism in the modes of thought is viewed by the 
authors as antithetical to universal rationality since 'mental functioning and the 
mediational means it employs are viewed as being domain-specific' (Wertsch, 
Tulviste and Hagstrom, 1993, p. 351). The point is put most strongly when they 
write 'In an important sense, individuals can be no more intelligent than the 
psychological tools they employ' (Wertsch, Tulviste and Hagstrom, 1993, p. 
352). This statement is particularly significant for the degree of detennination 
and power it attributes to mediational means - sufficient to affect potential 
intelligence. Great weight is placed on the mediational means while 
consideration of the implicit assumption about the nature of agency and 
freedom is neglected.24 The impetus to explore the extent of the contribution of 
mediational means is a powerful one. As Wertsch points out, the approach used 
in post-Vygotskian research is quite distinct from mainstream cognitive 
psychology and opens up a completely new way of thinking about mind. But it 
is the implicit assumptions that 10ravsky comments upon which are the key to 
development in this field. 
24 Wertsch et at. argue that it is not the individual but 'individuals-operating with-mediational 
means, who define the basic unit of agency' (Wertsch, Tulviste and Hagstrom, 1993, p. 352). 
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The next chapter begins to examme these implicit assumptions by 
exploring the dualism implicit in the representational paradigm underlying post-
Vygotskian and other areas of research. This is presented within the broader 
frame of constructivism and schooling since it is in relation to these that reason 
and universal rationality are brought into question. 
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Chapter 3 
Constructivism and Schooling 
To put the argument about constructivism, schooling and reason which follows 
in context it is necessary to recall that the central theme of this thesis is the 
importance for Vygotsky of the tradition of philosophy which is associated with 
Spinoza, Hegel and Marx. Neglect of this tradition not only ignores critical 
elements in the genesis and development of Vygotsky's thought, but even more 
importantly it subtracts from the contemporary relevance of this thought and 
diminishes the contribution it can make to current educational questions. It is, 
of course, possible to abstract certain themes from Vygotsky and assimilate 
them into a frame of reference which is not his own, and this approach is not to 
be dismissed out of hand. At the same time the gains that this approach makes 
available do not compensate for the losses. The most important of these losses 
all derive directly, or at one remove, from the understanding of reason. 
In connection with the question of reason, difficulties mUltiply and they 
come from all sides. It would be convenient if reason in the philosophic 
tradition from which Vygotsky drew his inspiration could be characterised as 
abstract reason and the position which contemporary commentators adopt could 
in tum be characterised as rejection of this conception of reason. But as 
Vygotsky never entertained an idea of abstract reason and his modem 
commentators do not reject reason out of hand, such a clear demarcation is 
wrong on both sides. It is implications, fine distinctions and variations of 
emphasis that count here. Moreover, the complications are compounded by the 
fact that the issue with which this thesis is concerned is not one that directly 
concerns the authors considered here. These authors touch upon the question of 
reason, but only in connection with other questions and the argument here has 
to rely upon implications and deductions. Clearly the authors referred to are 
more aware of the complex issues than the schematization used here suggests. 
Referring to Gadamer, Joseph Dunne (1993) stressed the merits of 
'conversation' and it is this approach, rather than one of critique, that is 
attempted here. 
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What then is the topic of conversation? What exactly is the issue and why is it 
important? 
3.1 Representation as a paradigm 
The theme explored here is representation as a paradigm25 and the 
consequences of this paradigm for the theorization of sociogenesis. The term 
representation26 conveys too many meanings to be self-evidently clear. My 
point is that much of the post-Vygotskian research field inhabits this 
representationalist paradigm and that this has theoretical consequences for 
treatment of underlying issues including freedom and agency. The problem of 
attempting to use the idea of a paradigm of representationalism to frame an 
argument about how sociogenetic explanations might develop and to sound a 
note of caution about forms of explanation, is not straightforward. At first sight 
it would seem that such a paradigm is completely at odds with the position 
taken by the authors discussed here. Whereas much post-Vygotskian research 
implicitly takes what Brandom defines as the representationalist paradigm to be 
a correspondence view of truth - that is mirror view of nature or an idea that 
representations reflect the external world - which they reject out of hand, my 
argument is concerned with a different aspect of the paradigm, namely its 
implicit dualism. 
What are the most important aspects of the 'representationalist 
paradigm'? To put the matter simply it refers to a particular epistemological 
position involving assumptions about the human condition and the relation of 
mind to world. The criticism of this paradigm is that it forecloses certain 
possibilities and that when it is adopted without a consideration of 
philosophical presuppositions, the danger is that closure becomes unconscious 
and appears self-evident. 
25 I am making use of the work of Brandom when I refer to a 'representionalist paradigm' . 
Brandom takes care to distinguish the concept of representation from a representationalist 
paradigm but for the purposes of this thesis I will refer to the terms synonymously. 
26 The discussion of this area in philosophy is extensive and beyond the remit of this thesis . 
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The representationalist paradigm poses the relation of mind to world as 
one in which knowledge caused by sense experience is made meaningful by the 
constructions that are put upon it. The mind is understood to create meaning (as 
there is an implicit distinction drawn between fact and value) in a disenchanted 
world of brute nature or in circumstances where whatever 'reality' there might 
be is unknowable. This position corresponds to what has been called by Wilfred 
Sellars The Myth of the Given27 in which experience is understood as something 
that cannot be a tribunal and yet must also somehow stand in judgment over our 
thinking. This idea, at the heart of the representational paradigm of the world as 
independent of mind and made meaningful by the constructions placed on it by 
mind, is made explicit by Hegel to show that what we take to be the means by 
which we acquire our knowledge (the Understanding), falls far short of 
explaining how knowledge actually arises. Although it may be thought that an 
epistemology simply describes how knowledge arises, much more is in fact 
involved than appears to be the case. This becomes clear once we make 
explicit the additional weight of what has to be carried by the very delimitations 
that we assume in order to explain how knowledge is possible. 
Working in the spirit of Hegel's critique of the Understanding, Robert 
Brandom and John McDowell develop a different ontology in which 
mindedness and world are not separated as they are in conventional 
epistemology. Their concerns and the arguments now current in philosophy are 
far removed from the concerns of post-Vygotskian research.28 However in 
connection to my claim that the philosophical background of Vygotsky is 
27 See below 
28 However, this is not as far removed from post-Vygotskian research as it appears, as David 
Bakhurst has written on the links between McDowell's work and that of Ilyenkov, a 
philosopher working in the Vygotskian tradition. It is interesting to note that McDowell 
supervised Bakhurst's thesis on Soviet philosophy at a time that he was preparing work 
resulting in his own book Mind and World. McDowell and Brandom's work are also connected. 
McDowell credits Brandom's writings and conversations with shaping his own thinking and 
singles out a seminar on Hegel's Phenomenology o/Spirit that he attended in 1990 relating that 
'the effect is pervasive; so much so that I would like to conceive .. . [Mind and World] as a 
prolegomenon to a reading of the Phenomenology much as Brandom's forthcoming Making It 
Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment' (McDowell, 1996, p. ix). 
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significant for his work, I also want to indicate how a lack of familiarity with 
these arguments has consequences for contemporary post-Vygotskian research. 
Of particular relevance to the thesis is the recent work of Robert 
Brandom, introduced in Chapter 1, and specifically the argument he develops to 
examine what is distinctive about human knowing, as opposed to a mechanical 
form of 'knowing'. Since his argument also approaches the matter from a 
Hegelian direction and it IS the aim of this thesis to expose some of the 
Hegelian dimensions of the work of Vygotsky, Brandom's arguments are 
doubly pertinent. 
The previous chapter considered the critique of abstract rationality 
levelled at Vygotsky. At the heart of this critique is a tension between the 
notion of 'universal abstractions' unable to give due credit to local meaning-
making on the one side and the attention to the mediational means which are 
understood to playa role in the genesis of mind, on the other. To consider this it 
is useful first of all to note the compelling case of Vygotsky for conceiving the 
mind as social. Put briefly Vygotsky stresses that: 
1. what becomes intramental is initially intermental; 
2. human beings possess the unique ability to mediate their existence and 
to create stimuli in order to determine their own behaviour; 
3. when tools/signs/words are used, the development of their meaning has 
only just begun; and 
4. higher mental functions cannot be understood as originating in lower 
ones. · 
The first point above implies a strong position on the sociogenesis of mind 
because it claims external activity is internalized not just as a form of 
knowledge but as a means by which higher mental functions, such as conscious 
attention and voluntary memory, are formed and come into play. The 
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sociogenetic approach to mind raises a number of problems because so little 
about the social dimension of mind is settled as theory. Although Vygotsky 
brought together and studied important ideas bearing upon a sociogenetic 
approach, the formulation of sociogenesis remains unsettled. 
One aspect of the problem of explanation in a sociogenetic account of 
mind is illustrated by an example relating to the role of mediation in a child's 
learning given by Valsiner and Van der Veer. They comment: 'It is an 
interesting question whether mediated processes need to be social in the sense 
of having an interpersonal origin. Likewise, one might ask whether all cultural 
transmission requires mediation in the Vygotskian sense' (Valsiner and Van der 
Veer, 2000, p. 371). They discuss two ways in which a child's external relations 
with other people can later be used to control its behaviour internally. There is 
a difference in the examples they use. The first is the well-known example of a 
baby gesturing inanely. The child's movements are made meaningful by the 
interaction of the adult who by treating the movement as significant (even 
though it bears no significance or meaning) responds to it differentially. This is 
the common example given to illustrate the first development of language for a 
child. The second example is that of a child crossing the road, whereby the 
instructions 'look right then look left' are repeated by the children to 
themselves, once alone. Though an apparently trivial comparison, Van der 
Veer and Valsiner's point is that in the former case the mediation of meaning is 
interpersonal in the sense that the baby's actions are made meaningful 
externally via intermental activity, whereas in the latter the child simply adopts 
the same pattern of action as the adult and may have no mediational 
interpersonal dimension. The actual way in which the intramental becomes 
intermental is not understood and various authors have attempted to address 
'the internalisation problem' and limited empirical examples are available. This 
thesis does not deal specifically with the problem of providing an account of 
sociogenesis but is concerned with the implicit assumptions of a philosophical 
character, of attempts to supply it. 
A major component of any account of the sociogenesis of mind (whether 
of higher mental functions or language) is the explanation of meaning. The 
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concept 'representation' plays a key role in accounts of how meaning arises. An 
initial response is to think of meaning as in some way located within an 
artefact, sign or mediating tool, which variously stand in place of something in 
the world and 're-presents' it. Through re-presentation, the same effect occurs 
as would result from interaction directly with 'natural' objects or phenomena in 
the world.29 Of course any process of representation is generally understood to 
be far more complex than one of simply standing in place of, or reproducing, an 
object already in existence. But it is not clear exactly what this complexity 
actually entails. 3o Brandom remarks that a representationalist paradigm reigns 
supreme in much contemporary thought and this, he maintains, delimits the way 
we think about certain questions. 
A central argument of this chapter is that the representationalist 
paradigm referred to by Brandom underpins much of the discussion of 
Vygotsky with consequences for the way in which sociogenesis is theorised. It 
plays a decisive if undeclared role in the conceptualisation of pedagogy in 
contemporary schooling. It has consequences for the way that constructivist 
positions are taken in relation to the active participation of learners, both in 
their learning and also more radically in the constitution of knowledge. This is 
considered in the latter part of this chapter. The excursion that this thesis takes 
into Hegel's philosophy in Chapter 5 provides a basis for comprehending the 
different philosophical frame, which unlike the one considered here, did 
actually influence Vygotsky. 
The issue of immediate concern here is the influence on schooling and 
pedagogy that is exercised by the underlying representationalist paradigm. This 
paradigm, it must be stressed from the start, retains a dualism at odds with the 
standpoint that Vygotsky developed under the influence of German idealism. 
Without a due regard to the philosophical background of Vygotsky's work and 
the particular light it sheds on the potential of his contribution, it is 
29 Or, in the ~ase of Saussurian linguistics, between signifier and signified. 
30 A tradition of semiotics and linguistic analysis has been influential in maintaining a 
representationalist paradigm concerned with this matter. 
46 
understandable that readings arise which are at odds with the position he took 
on such crucial issues as reason and instruction. 
Wertsch's prolific writings since the 1970s which have brought the ideas 
of Vygotsky to a wider audience (during the period that Vygotsky's work was 
introduced to a wider Western audience) are one example of a reading that finds 
Vygotsky's use of reason, at certain points, highly problematic. As pointed out 
in Chapter 2, Wertsch presents Vygotsky as an ambivalent rationalist, 
oscillating between a caricature of Enlightenment abstract and decontextualised 
reason on the one hand and a more personal, contextually based construction of 
sense and meaning on the other. 
Two arguments of Wertsch illustrate how his working within a 
representationalist paradigm colour the criticisms he makes of Vygotsky. At 
first sight the suggestion that Wertsch's criticisms inhabit such a paradigm 
appear unwarranted, for the very point of his criticism of Vygotsky is to take 
issue with the claim that language represents an objective world. My argument 
is that Wertsch retains elements of dualism that belong to a representationalist 
paradigm and as such retains the position he criticises in Vygotsky. To make 
the point in a different way: once a foundational project of knowledge is found 
untenable and with it, the idea that the concepts, words and sentences we use 
can represent or capture an independent world objectively, the common 
response has been to withdraw to a modest position, which restricts knowledge 
to the individual local and contextual meaning-making of participants. Attention 
to local meaning-making and withdrawal from an interest in knowledge and 
meaning transcending the 'context' of production,31 pervades much post-
Vygotskian research. My argument is that Vygotsky's understanding of reason 
was not the one ascribed to him by Wertsch, who fails to appreciate its Hegelian 
provenance. Hegel was as fully aware of the limitations of a foundational 
project as any contemporary thinker, moreover, and here he differed from 
contemporary research; he was aware that this foundational project went hand 
in hand with the representational paradigm I am taking up here. As a result, he 
31 The discussion of the transfer problem in the previous chapter deals with this issue of whether 
or not knowledge can be understood as transcending the contexts of its production. 
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avoided the conclusion to which so much contemporary thought appears drawn, 
namely that knowledge itself has no secure basis or, what is to say that same 
thing, that it can only ever have local standing. Contemporary thought has 
avoided the difficulty and because of this has ended up in a position in which 
the difficulties involved in the establishment of knowledge are avoided rather 
than confronted, with the result that the possibility of knowledge is called into 
question. Although Hegel offers a quite different appreciation of 'abstract 
rationality' this is lost to much contemporary work due in part to the alignment 
of Hegel with Marxism and specifically the failures of Soviet practice. Chapter 
5 and 6 consider this issue in more detail. In completing Kant's project to 
comprehend the conditions of our knowing, Hegel took a different approach 
from the one that retained representationalism as a default position.32 Hegel's 
work is generative in that it works through the assumptions of our claims to 
know to show that each claim holds more than what is immediately apparent 
within it. 33 It is significant that while a critique of universal (abstract or 
decontextualised) rationality is made (by Wertsch and others), the common 
underpinnings of what is being attacked, is actually supposed by those making 
the attack (i.e. an implicit dualism retaining a form of the myth ofthe Given). 
Central to Wertsch's position that Vygotsky was an ambivalent rationalist 
is the claim that Vygotsky operates with 'an assumption that language and 
meaning are basically concerned with referential relationships between signs 
and objects' (Wertsch, 2000, p. 20). This characterisation of Vygotsky's 
understanding of meaning and Wertsch's supposed lack of regard for 
Vygotsky's concern with 'the problem of consciousness' is at odds with the 
philosophical underpinning of Vygotsky's work. There is sufficient evidence in 
Vygotsky's published works to show that he conceived meaning in a more 
32 Evidence of this paradigm is present even in Kant's work where the presupposition of a 
distinction between the world as we know it and the world in itself sets up problems involving 
representation. According to Bernstein when he dealt with 'spontaneity and receptivity, 
phenomena and noumena' it appears that 'Kant at times, seems to reify these distinctions, to 
make them into rigid dichotomies that leave us with all sort ofaporiai' (Bernstein, R.1. 2002, 
p.10). 
33 In McDowell's sense, Hegel exorcises the questions rather than answering them but in 
exorcising them provides what can stand as an answer (McDowell, 1996, p. xxiii). 
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complex way than arising from a word (sign) in reference to an object.34 In part 
Wertsch recognises this, but only to present Vygotsky's position as ambivalent. 
The philosophical underpinnings ofVygotsky's work can be found implicitly in 
specific arguments and explicitly in his stated debt to Spinoza and Hegel. 
Although I am taking issue with the characterisation ofVygotsky by Wertsch et 
al. my argument is less concerned with the position these commentators take 
Up,35 than the way that the dualism implicit within it, leads to an under-
theorisation of human freedom. It is important to stress the extent to which 
Wertsch aims to avoid the limitations of Cartesianism in formulating his 
account of the sociogenesis of mind. But in his attempt to avoid 
'methodological individualism,36 he attributes agency to mediational means 
(including language) and by doing so remains within a 'representationalist 
paradigm' . Wertsch draws attention to the dangers of oscillating on the one 
hand between a position that emphasises the tool or the other hand the 
individual, as the progenitor of meaning (Wertsch, 1999). However, even 
though Wertsch and others are predisposed to seeing the formation of 
knowledge as an organic process, their treatment of mediating means as 
external objects with causal efficacy introduces an element of Cartesian 
mechanics into the argument. Or to be more precise, it leaves in their argument, 
an element of Cartesian mechanics, which due to a lack of attention to the 
distinction between causes and reasons, is untransformed. One area of work 
particularly notorious for its failure to make a distinction between causes and 
reasons is that of Artificial Intelligence research, where agency is as easily 
attributed to a machine as to a human, and it is surely not coincidental that 
Wertsch concedes that the formulation of mediational means as carrier of 
agency, lends itself to the possibility that machines might properly be conceived 
as intelligent (Wertsch et ai, 1993). 
34 In fact, Rene Van der Veer writing in Understanding Vygotsky suggests that Vygotsky 
emphasised meaning over the sign and that the claim that 'Vygotsky developed from a period 
in which he concentrated exclusively on the sign to a more mature understanding of the 
relevance of word meaning' does not do justice to Vygotsky's position (Van der Veer and 
Valsiner 1993, p. 65). 
35 This position is reasonable given the 'representationalist frame' in which the issue of abstract 
rationality is considered. 
36 Wertsch quotes Lukes for a defmition of methodological individualism: 
'explanations . ... couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals' (Wertsch, 1998, p.19). 
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3.2 Robert Brandom 
We may now tum to Robert Brandom as his work is especially relevant to the 
distinction between causes and reasons. By a cause I mean a relationship in 
which no conscious purpose on the part of the agent is involved. The agent 
causes the result without conceptualising what it is - whether this is a bee 
building a hive, rain causing com to grow or an alann alerting us to a fire. To 
take this latter example, an alarm may be far more effective in perceiving the 
dangers of a fire and sounding the alert than any human being. But when a 
human being shouts 'fire!' he or she is always doing more than simply making 
a warning noise. When a child of five (as opposed to a much younger child 
whose uttered sounds are only just beginning to operate as language) shouts 
'fire!' he or she knows its implications. He or she appreciates the consequences 
of the exclamation 'fire!' and what follows from such an utterance. Brandom 
uses this example to illustrate his claim that human beings act and communicate 
inferentially. His point is that what distinguishes the human form of knowing 
from the type of knowing we might ascribe to a machine is the Sellarsian point 
that knowing for a human being, consists not merely in expressing a response 
but in knowing what follows from it - knowing the implications, or what 
Brandom calls the 'giving and asking of reasons' (Brandom, 2000, p. 163). As 
he puts it 'even non-inferential reports must be inferentially articulated' and this 
point is crucial to any understanding of human intellect: 
One of the most important lessons we learn from Sellars's masterwork, 
'Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind' (as from the 'Sense Certainty' 
section of Hegel's Phenomenology), is the inferentialist one that even 
noninferential reports must be inferentially articulated. Without that 
requirement we cannot tell the difference between noninferential 
reporters and automatic machinery such as thermostats and photocells, 
which also have reliable dispositions to respond differentially to 
stimuli. 
(Brandom, 2000, p. 48) 
I have just mentioned an alarm perceiving a fire. This is already an 
anthropomorphism which Brandom takes care to avoid. He talks of machines 
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'responding differentially to stimulus' by which he means they respond 
mechanically to a stimulus. The use of the phrase 'responding differentially' in 
place of 'perceiving' or 'knowing', is of crucial importance for it introduces a 
distinction that is hidden by our anthropomorphic use of language. The stimulus 
in this case - the fire - is a cause of their response; in the case of the human 
being who sounds the alarm the fire is the reason for their response. The human 
perceives the fire as fire; that is to say that unlike a machine it has a concept of 
fire as part of a system of concepts. For Brandom making a report as a human 
being is not merely to 'respond differentially' it is inferring rather than merely 
representing, since 'even non inferential reports must be inferentially 
articulated' (Brandom, 2000, p. 47). This emphasis on inference is drawn from 
Hegel's analysis of what Sense Certainty entails, and in keeping with Hegel, 
Brandom argues that 'in order to master any concept, one must master many 
concepts' (Brandom, 2000, p.49). For Brandom, the responses that humans 
make involve an understanding of significance that is only possible by already 
appreciating other concepts. Where this is not the case, i.e. in the response of a 
parrot or machine, even though the response still may be the same, i.e. 'fire', 
then the human is not behaving as human. This position might seem to leave us 
with a 'chicken and egg' conundrum, i.e. how can you know something before 
knowing the means of knowing it (i.e. to know one concept you must know 
many concepts)? Vygotsky has an answer to this question when he considers 
the question of method and this will be considered in chapter 5 on Spinoza. But 
at this stage it suffices to say that it depends on a holism that rejects dualism. 
Brandom deals with this by explaining that grasping concept-use arises from 
the know-how gained by involvement in social practices. In this he shares with 
Vygotsky an emphasis on the sociogenesis of meaning. The argument here is 
the same as that of Vygotsky: 'we must seek the psychological equivalent of the 
concept not in general representations ... we must seek it in the system37 of 
judgements in which the concept is disclosed' (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 55). 
Brandom contrasts holism about concepts with the atomism that results when 
concepts are understood in terms of 'differential responses', by which he means 
non-human responses. 
37 This use of the word 'system' has led to the accusation of abstract rationality, i.e. the idea 
that meaning of scientific concepts is determined within a system. 
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Wertsch's claim that Vygotsky believed meaning to result from the 
referential relationship of word to object is coupled to a further claim that for 
Vygotsky 'the development of meaning is a matter of increasing generalisation 
and abstraction' (Wertsch, 2000, p. 20). Wertsch finds evidence for both these 
claims in a reading of Vygotsky's work in Chapters 5 and 6 of Thinking and 
Speech - for example in relation to Vygotsky's discussion of the role of the sign 
in the child's development of both spontaneous and scientific concepts. Two 
aspects concern Wertsch: one is the emphasis that Vygotsky places on the 
relationship of word to object; the second is on what Wertsch describes as 
decontextualisation.38 These aspects of Vygotsky's discussion are judged by 
Wertsch as an extension of Enlightenment traditions of abstract rationality and a 
commitment to universal reason. Wertsch has a specific understanding of 
reference and abstraction in relation to Vygotsky. In support of his argument 
and to illustrate the one-sidedness of Vygotsky's view, Wertsch draws on 
Taylor's distinction between designative and expressivist approaches to 
meanmg. Wertsch presents the former as characteristic of the Enlightenment 
and the latter of Romanticism. He reiterates his representationalist 
underst~ding of language when he writes that: 'This view of meaning is 
grounded on the assumption that language functions primarily to represent an 
independent reality' [my italics] and quotes Taylor to the effect that '[W]e 
could explain a sign or word having meaning by pointing to what it designates, 
in a broad sense, that is, what it can be used to refer to in the world, and what it 
can be used to say about that thing .... we give the meaning of a sign or a word 
by pointing to the thing or relations that they can be used to talk about' 
(Wertsch, 2000 p. 26). Wertsch argues that the relationship between word and 
object in the designative approach is quite consistent with Vygotsky's account 
of meaning in relation to scientific concepts. The argument here is that 
Vygotsky shared this view of the relation of word to world even though the 
explanation of reference is antithetical to the Hegelianism evident in 
Vygotsky's writings. The point that Vygotsky stresses when he speaks of 'a 
3& The reference here is to schooled knowledge as decontextualised knowledge. 
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system of judgments' is that the idea of 'general representations' is inadequate 
to express what a concept is in thinking: 
According to our hypothesis, we must seek the psychological 
equivalent of the concept not in general representations, not in 
absolute perceptions and orthoscopic diagrams, not even in concrete 
verbal images that replace the general representations - we must seek 
it in a system of judgements in which the concept is disclosed. 
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 55) 
Brandom is concerned to develop a theory of meaning that does not take 
'representation as its fundamental concept' and he, like Taylor,39 explains 'the 
notion of representational content is most often unpacked in tenns of what 
objects, events or states of affairs actually causally elicited the representation' 
(Brandom, 2000, p. 25). In common with post-Vygotskian researchers, 
Brandom argues against a mentalist order of explanation which privileges mind 
as an original locus. This anti-Cartesianism is common in work that attempts to 
use Vygotsky's ideas. However, Brandom adds a further dimension by 
approaching the 'contents of conceptually explicit propositions or principles 
from the direction of what is implicit in practices of using expression and 
acquiring or deploying beliefs' (Brandom 2000, p. 4). This represents a step 
towards overcoming the dualism which any retention of the representational 
paradigm retains. The prioritising of what is implicit in the practice of making 
explicit, is at odds with the characterisations by Wertsch of Vygotsky's use of 
word as referring to objects and coincident with the idea of development in 
Vygotsky's examination of the development of concepts in children. Where 
Wertsch sees the movement in the development of concepts as evidence of 
39 Wertsch relies on Charles Taylor's philosophical work in his characterisation ofVygotsky as 
an Enlightenment abstract rationalist. My argument is that this characterisation ofVygotsky 
depends upon implicit dualist presuppositions which inform the way that the philosophical 
tradition is read. It is interesting to note that Taylor's critical reading of McDowell 's Mind and 
World retains a form of dualism in that he is concerned that by taking issue with the idea that 
the content of experience is non-conceptual, McDowell denies the idea of a Heideggerian 
'undelimited background'. Taylor wants to recognise the pre-conceptual or non-conceptual as a 
form of 'knowing' (Taylor, 2002, p. lll). However McDowell fields Taylor's criticism by 
pointing out that: 'Taylor works with a notion of conceptual capacities according to which they 
are in play only when things come into focus. ' " Taylor does not emphasise my insistence that 
actualisations of conceptual capacities must be seen as manifestations of life as opposed to 
operations of a pure intellect' (McDowell, 2002, p. 283). 
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Vygotsky's hierarchical idea of knowledge and reason, Vygotsky's emphasis is 
on the alterations of practices which allow the child to move from operating 
with concepts as complexes, then as pseudo concepts and finally as scientific 
concepts. At each point a concept's character (everyday/scientific) is due to the 
form of its use. Paralleling Taylor's contrast of designative and expressive, 
Brandom characterises two traditions. He counter poses mind as mirror 
(enlightenment) and mind as lamp (romanticism) to get across the different 
ways in which mind and epistemology are understood. He juxtaposes 
representation and inference and in criticising representation (and the baggage 
carried with it) he argues that in human practices, representation is always 
inferential even though we may not be aware of it. The point that representation 
cannot be separated from inference is crucial since it is key to Brandom's 
concern to distinguish human knowing from any other types of 'knowing' and 
the point clarifies the distinction. 
The conflation of machine and human intelligence is a crucially important 
problem facing post-Vygotskian research. The attempts to develop a mechanics 
of mind with causal explanations of its production fail to distinguish human 
activity from the behaviour of machines. Representation and inference are not 
polar opposites but implicated in each other. Wertsch makes use of Taylor's 
distinction between designative and expressive for a different purpose than the 
one intended by Taylor and this is more than a trivial point. Taylor gives an 
account of modern philosophy as a precursor to an account of Hegel's synthesis 
of the tensions between the designative and expressive, while Wertsch implies a 
contrast between the authoritarianism of the designative and the greater 
sensitivity of the expressive to individuality.40 
40 To some extent the way in which Wertsch presents the problem is the reaction against a 
correspondence view of truth. Curiously, although Hegel's critique of epistemology exposes the 
inadequacy of both correspondence and empiricist view of knowledge, it happens that 
ultimately Hegel's philosophy subsumes these positions. Within Hegel's philosophy they are 
quite different from the way they are commonly conceived. 
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3.3 Theorising mediational means within a representationalist paradigm 
At first sight, it appears counter intuitive to argue that much contemporary 
Vygotskian research particularly North American research41 works within a 
representationalist paradigm. Most researchers in a Vygotskian field would 
refute what they see as a representational approach, namely one which seeks 
meaning in the relationship between our representations and the world. 
However, although a correspondence view of truth, or a mirror view of nature 
has been widely rejected by researchers, the rejection of the representionalist 
paradigm supporting these views is incomplete. The rejection of (universal) 
scheme and (empirical) content (Davidson, 1984) does not lead to a rejection of 
the relationship itself and the relation is retained even if the poles are 
transformed. The argument here is that exactly the same relations pervade 
explanations which draw on Vygotsky's ideas, as those relations that pervade 
the classical designatory approach they oppose. That is, explanations in terms 
of the causative power of tool, signs, discourses (or the power of constructivism 
in creating knowledge) ignore the essential element of any account of 
sociogenesis and that is human agency, understood not merely as another cause 
in the equation but as inhabiting and acting in a quite different space - that is -
a space ofreasons.42 
To illustrate this point here are some examples of the notion of 
causation that I am describing. I should first caution, that in all of the attempts 
to account for meaning used, there is a clear recognition of the contribution of 
human 'agency'. However, this agency is insufficiently theorised due to the 
representational paradigm in which the ideas are presented. Many post-
Vygotskian researchers consciously avoid either cognitivist or 'rationalist' 
accounts of human agency and this position is particularly driven by the way in 
which the 'discovery' of sociogenesis would seem to lend itself to a more 
41 It should be noted that while much of the research discussed here it is not exclusively North 
American, equally within North America there is research that does not fit this pattern. 
42 Aside from the issue ofhurnan freedom, the other major element missing from explanations 
is history. For Hegel freedom and history were inextricably interconnected. 
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egalitarian and humane approach to human ability and intelligence. Hence both 
cognition and reason are sidelined and the emphasis is shifted to the 
sociogenetic means or mechanisms. It can be noted that the Russianlcultural-
historical appropriation is somewhat different. 
It is important to point out that researchers concerned with theorising 
mediational means do not openly embrace the representational paradigm I am 
attributing to them. On the contrary they reject it, as they do not subscribe to the 
idea that representations stand for external objects/the world. Instead the wish is 
to deny what may be termed !oundationat'3 claims to knowledge and to 
concentrate instead on the multiplicity (and even relativity) of meaning-making. 
But as I have argued - this position still retains the relation characteristic of a 
representational paradigm. 
The focus of research for commentators rejecting the idea of universal 
knowledge has shifted to the 'making of meaning' via resources, tools, 
language and artefacts. And once meaning is understood as something that is 
made rather than already present waiting to be revealed or read off from the 
real, then the 'means' of meaning construction come to the fore and are 
formulated as the key to understanding how meaning arises. The crucial 
recognition that thinking, intellectual activity and learning are not simply the 
outcome of cognitive process but rather are: (1) supported by various material 
means, or (2) developed as well as being sustained by such means, has crucial 
implications for education policy at a number oflevels.44 
43 The termfoundational has different meanings. Here as an object of criticism of those 
theorising mediational means it signifies claims to knowledge derived from given and certain 
starting points. For other aspects of this idea see below. 
44 The implications are particularly important when research funding is directed specifically to 
achieving outcomes intended to inform policy. Moreover such funding is commonly aimed at 
short-term outcomes to respond to election cycles. Systems of education have been constructed 
on the basis of the expectations of the leamer's potential and knowledge of appropriateness of 
conditions of learning and teaching. The history of education in England can be presented as a 
narrative of successive conceptions of suitability according to the reigning conception of both 
ability and possibility within the remits of education funding. Thus the attempt to design 
contexts for learning which take into account information which will allow the enhancement of 
educational opportunity and efficiency, is important for research concerns, particularly where 
research funding is determined by policy and the pressure on researchers to deliver amenable 
accounts is difficult to resist. 
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A number of attempts within education research have been made to 
account for meaning in different contexts and thereby inform policy with the 
aim of making classrooms, or what have more broadly been called 'learning 
environments', more effective. An influential body of work is devoted to the 
theorisation of meaning through modes other than language. Until recently 
attention to meaning outside text-based language has been limited and interest 
in the various modes through which communication occurs has become an area 
of interest to many researchers concerned with accounting for meaning by 
examining the means of its construction. For example Jewitt and Kress build on 
Halliday's social semiotic approach to communication, to analyse multi-modal 
representation. The aim is to extend the application of Halliday's social 
semiotics of written language to all 'modes,45 of communication including 
gesture, visual, bodily movement etc. They explain Halliday's social semiotic 
theory as follows: 
He argues that in verbal interactions we have at our disposal networks 
of options (sets of semiotic alternatives) of the meaning potential of 
the culture, which are realised in sets of options of fonnal/material 
means, the modes of our multimodal approach. For him, the semantic 
system of language (his approach focuses on language) reflects the 
social function of the utterance as representation, as interaction, and as 
message, which are realised by the lexico-grammar of the language. 
The principal assumption is that language is as it is because of the 
social functions it has evolved to serve: it is organised to serve the 
interests of those who use it in their social lives. In other words (our 
'other words') language can be understood to be the result of constant 
social/cultural working on or 'shaping' of a material medium (sound in 
the case of language-as-speech) into a resource for representation, 
which displays regularities as mode, the (material yet 
socially/culturally shaped) resource (as signifier-material) for meaning 
in the constant new making of signs. 
(Jewitt and Kress, 2002, p. 279) 
This passage has been selected because of its concern with representation and 
the shaping of a 'material medium' into a 'resource for representation'. 
According to a social semiotic approach, it is in representations that we can 
discern meaning. To appreciate the power of representation as a concept for 
dealing with meaning, it is only necessary to consider the design of 
advertisements. However, I want to take issue with the use of the concept of 
representation in this way. Although the value of examining the way in which 
45 Mode in this context has a teclmical meaning developed by Halliday and Kress. 
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artefacts convey meaning cannot be denied I want to caution that a dimension 
of analysis is under-theorised in accounts, which start with representation and 
the dimension is crucial to an understanding of human freedom and how 
knowledge is conceived. Kress adds, to Halliday's account of language as a 
material mode for communicating meaning, a concern with the motivated use of 
signs where the relation between the form chosen to represent and the meaning 
intended for communication is not arbitrary. Motivated users of signs choose 
plausible representational resources to communicate their intent. In this view 
there is due recognition of the agency or free action of the user but it is in 
relation to choosing an appropriate representational resource. Agency is 
assumed. Thus the (Cartesian) individual chooses the material sign and 
meaning resides in the mode chosen (visual, gestural) or is carried by the mode 
(Kress et a12001, pp. 1-6). 
The difficulty of accounting for agency m research whose aIm IS to 
theorise meaning, is the location of meaning. The previous example shows how 
Jewitt, Kress and Halliday deal with representational resources as carriers of 
meaning (i.e. meaning is attached to the representational resource) and credit 
users with exercising agency in their choice of means. Agency is exercised by 
the way in which the user chooses and the purposes to which (s)he applies the 
representational resource and this in tum transforms its meaning. 
Writing, from a sociocultural perspective, Wertsch is concerned to 
formulate an account of meaning which arises from 'agent-acting-with-
mediational-means' (Wertsch, 1998) such as artefacts, tools or language. An 
account of how artefacts/tools/language contribute to thinking is still at an early 
stage of research. Wertsch schematises the different ways in which the 
mediation of mind with tools contributes to thinking: 
1. by allowing an activity to be achieved which could not be achieved 
without the use of a tool (e.g. a technique for multiplication, a map 
allowing navigation); 
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2. by enabling a group to perform an activity together which could not 
be performed by its members acting individually, through offloaded 
cognitive effort into shared mediating devices (e.g. Hutchins' work 
on the navigation of ships into port as an illustration of a 
'sociotechnical system'); 
3. by developing particular ways of functioning mentally. 
Again the direction of research is to comprehend meaning as representation. 46 
Attempts to theorise the way that mind is sustained and developed by cultural 
artefacts, whether words or tools, concentrate attention on the representational 
aspect of the tool or word. This involves an attempt to designate its contribution 
to the development of meaning. The meaning of the tool and the role that it can 
play is ascribed to the tool itself. Wertsch sets down some basic claims about 
'mediated action and cultural tools'. One claim is that 'mediated means are 
associated with power and authority' (Wertsch, 1998, p. 25). 'Mediated means' 
carry particular 'affordances' of meaning which have consequences for their 
use. In addition, they express the power of particular interest groups. His claims 
are an attempt to pin down the way in which tools themselves act. However, 
one difficulty of an account of how the use of tools realises meaning, is that an 
understanding of human agency is necessary in order to make a judgement 
about the contribution that tools make in fashioning any outcome. In the 
absence of an appreciation of the distinctive character of human agency in the 
creation of meaning, agency can be ascribed to anything that appears to exert 
effect. Although Wertsch intends to account for meaning in a more complex 
way than a mere ascription to tools and uses the phrase 'individuals-operating-
with-mediational-means' to recognise human engagement in meaning-making, 
46 Both dictionary definitions of the word 'mean' and the study of meaning (semantics) refer to 
signification, signify, significance or sign. This indicates the presence of one thing that stands 
for another. These dictionary definitions do not indicate the more sophisticated sense that can 
be derived from Kant's philosophy and which necessarily involves human activity. Of course, 
we can talk of a sign meaning something, independently of any judgment (i.e. the 'giving and 
asking for reasons' in Brandom's sense). But then the term 'meaning' is being used to express 
something quite different. An example from nature is of an insect or plant without sting or 
poison, imitating those with sting or poison. The markings act as a sign/signal to predators and 
have the same result as that of the markings of the genuinely dangerous species. One stands in 
place of another. In this instance the use of sign is coincident with the stimulus/response of the 
'differential response' of a fire alarm referred to by Brandom. 
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he is in danger of falling prey to the methodological individualism that he 
claims his approach overcomes. No matter how much he alerts us to the error of 
explanations that concentrate either on the tool alone or the agent (arguing that 
such explanations are faced with either methodological individualism or 
reductionism) (Wertsch, 1999) he still theorises 'mediational means' as having 
agency in their own right - to carry and constrain meaning. His particular 
conception of meaning and its relationship to representation is crucial to his 
analysis of Vygotsky in so far as he sees Vygotsky's conception of meaning as 
an issue of ambivalence or 'two minds' (Wertsch, 2000). 
Where Wertsch tends towards an idea of 'containment' (e.g. affordances 
which privilege certain activities over others or ventriloquate specific interests) 
for explaining how tools carry meaning, Wells takes issue with the idea of an 
artefact representing or containing knowledge. 'At first sight, it might appear 
that knowledge is to be found in the artefacts that are the outcome of 
representational activity. . .. [ e.g.] texts and other visuographic artifacts, 
... manuals, charts and diagrams, theoretical papers .. .' (Wells, 1999, p. 72). But 
he continues by arguing that this view of knowledge is untenable on the 
grounds for instance that a text does not 'contain knowledge' unless one can 
distinguish its script from markings of ink. But more than this, an interpretive 
framework is necessary to make sense of a script. He argues that knowledge is 
not in the texts 'but in what writers or readers construct as they use texts as 
external tools to mediate their own mental activity of representing and 
knowing' (Wells, 1999, p. 73). Having rejected accounts which place weight on 
tools as carriers of meaning, Wells responds to the dualism underlying attempts 
to explain meaning, by denying the existence of any knowledge beyond that 
arising from particular readings. Wells adopts a position on knowledge that 
emphasises constructivism and rejects the idea of the existence of knowledge 
beyond individual/local construction. 
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He expresses what is involved in specifying the ontological status of knowledge 
as follows: 
Insofar as the import of talking about knowledge being distributed is 
to emphasize that the key unit of analysis is not the particular 
individuals engaged in the activity, still less the representations said to 
be 'contained' in their minds, but rather multifaceted networks of 
practices the constitute activity, in which the nonhuman 'actors' are as 
integral as the human ones, this move constitutes an important 
corrective to the Cartesian view of knowledge as being located in 
disembodied individuals (Wertsch, 1998). However, I find it 
confusing to be told that knowledge is in artefacts as, for example, 
when Cole and Engestrom write: 'the cultural environment in which 
children are born contains the accumulated knowledge of prior 
generations' (1993, p.9) - though perhaps 'contains' here is intended 
to be taken metaphorically. However this is not Pea's intention when 
he claims that 'tools literally carry intelligence in them' and 
'knowledge is often carried in artefacts as diverse as tools and 
notational systems' (1993, pp. 53-4). This seems to me to be 
hyperbole. 
(Wells, 1999, p. 75) 
While he is comfortable with the idea of 'nonhuman actors', Wells rejects the 
containment of knowledge or intelligence in artefacts. However, there is an 
element of contradiction in Wells' argument. On the one hand he wishes to 
maintain that meaning only arises in the 'constitutive activity' of actors and 
therefore cannot be said to reside in a text, yet on the other hand he credits 
'non-human actors' with an equally integral role in the constitution of 
knowledge. 
Sloman, writing from the background of computer SCIence, offers a 
definition that would not be at odds with the 'containment' argument that Wells 
rejects but which Wertsch's account of artefacts/tools suggests. Sloman looks 
for 'a label to cover all the various kinds of information stores, irrespective of 
what their structures are, or how they are created, or whether we are aware of 
using them or not' (Sloman, 1996, p. 119). He finds the word 'representation' 
comes closest to meeting these requirements. Working in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence, his aim is to broaden the notion of information beyond one 
involving conscious use. He suggests as an all-encompassing definition 'that 
there is a more general notion of representation, which covers all states or 
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structures that store or contain information used to control internal or external 
behaviour, whether in humans or in other natural or artificial behaving systems' 
(Sloman, 1996, p. 118). He analyses representations as 'information bearing 
control states' (Sloman, 1996, p. 118). However, by theorising information in 
this way it is difficult to distinguish human and machine action. Sloman's use 
of the phrase 'information bearing control states,47 to explain representation, 
succinctly expresses an idea central to artificial intelligence research (and more 
specifically to programming), i.e. that a certain set of conditions will elicit or 
cause a predictable set of outcomes. Two points follow by conceiving 
representations in this way: first, there is an idea of containment - the 
storinglbearing of information by the representation - implying that meaning is 
contained by the representation and second, agency is accorded to 
representations. Even though the power of a representation as 'information 
control state' is influenced by the context of use, the possibility of an overly 
determinist explanation of human action arises. The possibility of considering 
the distinctive nature of human utilisation of information (as knowledge) and 
the necessary involvement of freedom is lost. 
The difficulty of providing a mechanics of mind for post-Vygotskian 
research is that it involves fundamental questions concerning the nature of 
meaning, knowing and agency for which there are no settled answers. But the 
vacuum this leaves at the heart of research has not prevented it from 
formulating arguments which have direct consequences. The urgency to 
assume answers to these questions is posed by the key role that schooling is 
perceived to play in social mobility/justice and the recognition that there is a far 
greater possibility of developing intellect than had been appreciated. The idea 
implicit to a sociogenetic approach - that mind is not just developed but created 
by social activity - places far greater responsibility on educationalists to 
understand factors key to the development of intellect, than a view of mind 
consisting of innate potential only able to be developed within limited 
parameters. Yet even though major questions of meaning, knowing and agency 
47 Sloman includes in his catch-all use of the tenn 'representation' 'infonnation states of simple 
homeostatic devices, like thennostats' and 'more complex representations . . .involved in the 
control of internal or external behaviour in a human brain ... such as those encoding information 
about the grammar of our language' (Sloman, 1996, p. 118). 
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are unresolved, theoretical positions are adopted which have direct 
consequences for the practice of schooling, in particular positions adopted on 
knowledge and the role of the teacher. 
Both Wertsch and Wells are troubled by a school curriculum based on 
'decontexualised rationality' which does not involve the learner in making 
herlhis own meaning but prioritises a particular way of making meaning. 
Wertsch views the 'privileging' of particular mediational means (ways of 
solving problems), found in traditional schooling, as indicative of an 
extraordinary authority accorded to abstract rationality since the Middle Ages. 
He attempts to establish a direct link between his criticism of pedagogical 
practices that privilege abstract or decontextualised rationality and Toulmin's 
argument about the received view of Modernity developed in his volume 
Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Toulmin refers to Descartes' 
teachings that the 'demands of rationality impose on philosophy a need to seek 
out abstract, general ideas and principles, by which particulars can be connected 
together' (Toulmin, 1992, p. 33) and Wertsch restates Toulmin's summary of 
the received view that 'abstract axioms were in, concrete diversity was out' 
(Wertsch, 1998, p. 67). Wertsch argues that: 'the received view is routinely 
appropriated by people in our sociocultural setting and .. . results in viewing 
certain utterances and arguments as convincing despite the many critiques of 
this tendency' (Wertsch, 1998, p. 67). Wertsch is interested in the way that 
individuals make sense of problems which leads them, as he sees it, to 
privilege abstract rationality over the variety of ways of meaning-making 
available. 
3.4 Constructivism 
The attention to the process of meaning-making itself rather than to the 
outcome of such a process is often expressed in terms of Constructivist 
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theory.48 Since Piaget and the 'cognitive tum', Constructivism has been a major 
force in educational research. What it succeeds in doing is: designating learning 
as an active process where meaning is acquired through a process of meaning-
making rather than through simple transmission of knowledge or a behaviourist 
conditioning of response. Given its emphasis on genetic epistemology, 
constructivism seems ideally suited to a Vygotskian approach to education. 
Leslie Smith has written authoritatively on the similarities between Vygotsky 
and Piaget. However Smith does not explore the philosophical differences 
which distinguish each author so that although it is possible to find statements 
suggesting that each agree, their different understandings are not revealed. 
Given this seeming similarity between the two authors it is not unexpected that 
constructivism drawn from Piaget should inform readings of Vygotsky's work. 
The influence of constructivism and its conception of mind and world are 
pervasive in both popular expositions as well as Vygotskian interpretations. For 
this reason it is helpful to present two versions to expose the underlying 
philosophical assumptions. Constructivism/constructionism and their implicit 
assumptions have implications for the way that Vygotsky is read. 
Some of the extreme polarisations of constructivist positions can be 
viewed as an outcome of the problem of understanding what 'objective world' 
entails within a foundationalist49 tradition of epistemology. The response to this 
tradition has consequences for interpretations of Vygotsky. Constructivism as 
48 Although there are important differences between the terms Constructivism and 
Constructionism they are used interchangeably here as both terms appear in this thesis only in 
so far as they represent the dualism under consideration. Gergen comments on their 
interchangeable usage: '[Constructivism] is a tradition ... represented in recent psychology by 
such figures as Jean Piaget, George Kelly, and Ernst von Glasersfeld. Constructivists propose 
that each individual mentally constructs the world of experience. In this sense the mind is not a 
mirror of the world as it is, but functions to create the world as we know it. From this 
perspective there could be as many realities as there are minds to conceptualise or construe . 
.. . the constructivist perspective is similar to the constructionist in the emphasis it places on 
human construction of what we take to be "the real". It is largely for this reason that many 
scholars will use the words" constructivism" and "constructionism," interchangeably . ... for 
constructivists the process of world construction is psychological; it takes place "in the head". 
In contrast, for social constructionists what we take to be real is the outcome of social 
relationships' (Gergen, 1999, pp. 236-237). 
49 By using the shorthand 'foundationalist tradition' here I mean to capture the tradition that 
Hegel criticises in the Phenomenology - both dualism and representationalism are necessary 
elements in a foundational approach to knowledge. 
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well as Constructionism are often counterposed with realism (Parker, I., 1998, 
Gergen, K., 1999). Hence the realism evident in Vygotsky's use of the phrase 
'scientific concepts' is seen as evidence of a lack of appreciation on his part of 
multiple avenues of meaning-making in favour of didactic methods. In 
summarising Wertsch's account of Vygotsky's description of the development 
of concepts, Confrey is led to write critically: 'This [Vygotsky's] is a strikingly 
nonconstructive description and an example of the realist commitment that 
seems to underlie Vygotskian psychology' (Confrey, 1995, p. 191). The 
statement of Wertsch's he refers to claims that 'Complexes are "no longer 
related on the basis ofthe child's subjective ties or impressions, but on the basis 
of objective [my italics] connections that actually exist among the objects" 
(Wertsch, 1985b, p.101), (Confrey, 1995, p. 191). At issue here is the 
distinction between the constructive power of human beings and the idea of an 
objective world. A lack of appreciation of the philosophical argument behind 
these characterisations leads to a limited view of how Vygotsky might have 
conceived of the relation of mind to world. 50 The fact that levels of construction 
and embeddedness are not parallel has not received adequate attention in the 
development of situated cognition theory. The possibility that a material history 
was 'constructed' at some previous point5! may, at a current point, mediate (i.e. 
constrain), is excluded from many applications of situated cognition theory. 52 
The Constructivism that frames discussions of Vygotsky is infused with a 
Cartesianism that contains meanini3 within observable human activity. The 
illustration given earlier of the difficulty of accounting for the location of 
meaning and knowledge, operates with undisclosed philosophical assumptions. 
50 For example, Ilyenkov's work on the question of the ideal sheds different light on the 
question of subjective and objective and ideal and real. 
51 For example, the teclmologies developed through long periods of history framing certain 
questions, problems and results (Hutchins, 1999). 
52 The dualist frame of human activity and the Kantian 'thing-in-itself looms over any working 
through of these questions. 
53 The problem of meaning is to locate how meaning arises, where it is located, what process 
provides meaning. A simple realist solution is the correspondence theory of truth i.e. that our 
representations reflect an independent world that is real. Once this position is undennined the 
question of meaning comes to the fore. A postmodem position on this issue is to maintain that 
there are an infmite variety of ways of 'making meaning' with no one taking precedence over 
another. 
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Implicit assumptions, which are party to a Cartesian position on world and 
mind, remain despite the apparent rejection of Cartesianism. One such 
assumption is the characterisation of world that accompanies an emphasis on 
constructivism. Namely a world devoid of meaning without the contextually 
sustained activities of participants. For this argument to hold an assumption is 
necessary of the world as a given outside of and separate from human 
construction. Of course this seems the very opposite of the position adopted by 
many constructivist, i.e. everything is socially constructed. But the argument 
here is that party to this position, of the 'social construction of everything', is 
agnosticism in relation to the knowability of such a world or even, in the 
extreme, its existence. The attempt to be agnostic about any idea of world 
outside of human construction does not remove specific assumptions remaining 
implicit in and key to any argument developed. Two examples from Kenneth 
Gergen and Robert Reich are provided to illustrate the type of agnostic 
positions held. In the first case Gergen takes an explicit epistemological 
position, in the second Reich unthinkingly describes an externality in popular 
imagery: First, Gergen takes up critically the same approach to representation 
and the relation of word to world, as that of Wertsch, considered earlier in this 
chapter. However Gergen emphasises perspectivism, i.e. that there is no 
position from which truth is available. He deals specifically with the concept of 
representation insofar as he attacks the relation of signifier to signified, of word 
to world. However the position he develops, as a result of his rejection of a 
representationalist approach, does not take issue with the idea of representation 
as such (as Hegel does) but argues instead for an infinite variety of relations 
(representations). As a result he remains within the very representationalist 
paradigm he criticises: 
As we found, however there is no privileged relationship between 
world and word. For any situation multiple descriptions are usually 
possible, and in principle there is no upper limit on our forms of 
descriptions. Nor did we find any ultimate means for ruling among 
competing descriptions, of declaring one as corresponding more 
'truly' to the nature of reality than another. 
(Gergen, 1999, p. 34) 
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This approach to knowledge has practical implications for schooling. Gergen's 
approach to the question for example is representative of influential ideas which 
though it is no part of their intention, effectually undermine knowledge by 
relativising it. In discussing progress and science Gergen writes: 
There is no convincing account of how an array of syllables (scientific 
theory) can increasingly 'capture the contours' of what exists ... there 
are important advantages in abandoning the view of science as a 
march to the truth. The claim to vertical movement progress in 
scientific understanding has no grounds. As we move from 
Aristotelian physics to Newtonian mechanics and then atomic physics, 
we come no closer to the truth. We simply move from one domain of 
meaning to another. 
(Gergen, 1999, p. 239) 
This type of position has a powerful appeal at present. But when it is subjected 
to detailed philosophic examination serious flaws in its structure are exposed. 
Consider Davidson's treatment of it. For Davidson, the giving up of 
dependence on the concept of an un-interpreted reality does not mean 
relinquishing the notion of truth (Davidson, 1984). On the contrary, given the 
dualism· of scheme and content what we get according to Davidson is truth 
relative to scheme. Without the dualism of scheme and content which for 
Davidson is dogma - relativity goes by the board. The crux of Davidson's 
argument is that a relativism is nothing but an aspect of the dualism of scheme 
and content, where scheme is understood as distinct from content and is applied 
to content externally to give it shape. To repeat then according to Davidson, 
once a dualism of scheme and content is adopted relativism follows virtually 
automatically since it is the scheme which is posited as the ground for making 
sense of the world. 54 Davidson also points out that, where the scheme is the 
context from which the content is constructed the idea of truth is not avoided 
but remains, although as relative to scheme. Davidson's analysis applies not 
only to Gergen but also to all theorists who believe that the question of truth is 
one of objectivity. What Davidson's argument shows is that the problem of 
truth is not simply one of objectivity, since the problems that are believed to 
54 By utilising Davidson's argument here, I do not mean to imply that 'scheme' is restricted to 
the use that Davidson makes of it. The relation of scheme and content could still hold even 
where scheme involves non-textual forms of meaning-making. 
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arise with objectivity also arise if knowledge were produced contextually and 
validated by local warrants. 
It is important to make the presuppositions implicit in this type of 
constructivist argument, explicit. The flaw with this type of constructivist 
argument is that, in the critique of any possibility of representation of an 
empirically given realm, constructivists continue to hold to a form of the 'myth 
of the given' from which to build their critique and in so doing are faced with 
junking rationality, progress and truth. By contrast to Gergen, who is prepared 
to reject concepts such as rationality, progress and truth out of hand, Robert 
Reich has no such stated intention. As an advisor to the Clinton Administration 
and Secretary of State for labour, in the USA, Robert Reich has been 
influential: indeed Bruner refers to Reich's book The Work a/Nations as a work 
that 'could serve as a policy document in our times' (Bruner, 1996, p. 33). In 
this book Reich popularises the argument about the importance of the 'symbolic 
analyst' as the way of mitigating the declining position of the U.S. economy in 
an increasingly glob ali sed market. Reich's polemic on the need for education to 
produce 'symbolic analysts' (learners active in the conceptualisation of the 
knowledge) depends, in part, on the claim that we are now part of the 
'knowledge age' where 'data ... will be available ... at the touch of a computer 
key' (Reich, 1992, p. 229). Reich uses the contemporary rhetoric concerning 
new technologies to make his case about the importance of recognising specific 
powers of transformation and synthesis possessed by the 'symbolic analyst'. 
Corresponding to this analyst, and it is here that the constructivist elements of 
Reich's thought become apparent, is a concept of the world as devoid of 
meaning bearing no particular truth apart from that arising from constructive 
intervention. For when Reich writes: 'Consider first the capacity for abstraction. 
The real world is nothing but a vast jumble of noises, shapes, colours, smells 
and textures-essentially meaningless until the human mind imposes some order 
on them' (Reich, 1992, p. 229) he is giving expression to a dualist default 
position, commonplace in contemporary thought. 55 
55 This dualism entails the 'myth of the Given'. 
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To sum up, once a dualist view of a world devoid of the conditions for 
meaning is adopted, responsibility for meaning rests with the human activity of 
abstraction. The possibility of meaning arising in a historical process, whereby 
nature is transformed through human activity, simply does not arise. There are 
two aspects to the implicit philosophy underpinning much post-Vygotskian 
research. First a common sense dualism that the world external to our thoughts 
and immediate activity is devoid of meaning until the point of construction -
Reich's 'buzzing confusion' and second that meaning is limited to the 
constructive activity of individuals. 56 The first operates with precisely the type 
of epistemological Given which Sellars criticises while the second, with a 
denial of meaning in the world, which McDowell posits as crucial. 
3.5 Schooling, constructivism and knowledge 
Constructivism is influential in the appropriation of Vygotsky, yet at the same 
time a tension arises as a result of the importance Vygotsky attached to 
instruction. This tension occurs particularly in the interpretations of ZPD (Zone 
of Proximal Development) and therefore has featured prominently In 
Vygotskian approaches to pedagogy. By introducing the idea of a 'zone' of 
development Vygotsky recognised not only that learning did not consist of 
discrete events within a process, but also that knowledge itself consisted of a 
continuing process (i.e. arose in mediation - nothing is immediate).57 One 
reason for introducing this concept was to credit the developmental aspect of 
conceptualisation. Although the example Vygotsky provides barely does justice 
to the idea of a ZPD, it begins to explain what is at issue. Vygotsky uses the 
example of two children of the same age, performing at the same level in a test 
(summative assessment) to show that a full indication of ability is not provided 
56 This would seem to suggest an emphasis on human freedom, as the individual is viewed as 
the ground of meaning. This might appear to contradict what I am claiming, i.e. that human 
freedom is neglected. However the point that I am making views freedom as historical and as 
such neither a matter of a Cartesian will or of causal effect from an epistemological Given. 
57 It is difficult to do justice in a few sentences to what mediation means. See entry in Inwood 
(1995) A Hegel Dictionary, pp. 183-186. 
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by this form of assessment. 58 The inadequacy of this form of assessment is due 
to the fact that at any given point in time one child may already have reached a 
higher level of development, but not yet be at the point of making that higher 
level of 'concept readiness' explicit. The recognition that the acquisition of 
knowledge and understanding is the subject of a continual process of 
development, however, does not lead to the conclusion that an infinite variety 
of ways of knowing are possible. For fundamental to Vygotsky's use of the idea 
of a ZPD is that the process of 'becoming' (constituent of all knowledge), is not 
open-ended. What brings a concept to fruition is the intervention/interaction of 
an abler peer or adult. Hence the idea of a 'zone' recognises the bounded 
character of knowledge which is both realised by the frame in which it is 
articulated and in the absence of such a frame, would not be realised. 59 The 
emphasis on the intervention or instructional frame of an adult gives weight to 
instruction not commonly found in constructionist approaches to pedagogy. 
Thus while the idea of a ZPD opens the way to viewing knowledge as fluid and 
constructible it does not foreclose on the importance of the transmission of 
knowledge between generations. 
By contrast to Vygotsky's view of knowledge, the interest in 
constructionism and constructivism in the current period has led to a focus on 
knowledge-construction, knowledge as a plural ('knowledges') and relativistic 
approaches to knowledge. The idea of a developmental aspect to meaning in 
any process of learning introduces the issue of the source of that meaning. For 
example a Platonist view of mathematics considers mathematics to exist 
independently of human construction whereas a social constructionist position 
would see mathematics as a system of operation manufactured by human 
beings. 
Implicit epistemology has definite policy implications. The aim of 
diminishing the authority of the teacher and crediting the learner with the ability 
58 For a full consideration of assessment and its importance as a tool for developing learning 
rather than only assessing learning, see Black and Wiliam 1998a, 1998b. 
59 Unless, that is, it were realised by the 'boundedness' of a dualist world which provided sense 
data - a given. 
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not just to learn through constructing their own meaning, but to make new 
knowledge, and the unproblematised emphasising of 'collaborative 
communities' are all coupled to particuliar epistemological assumptions. 60 The 
work of Hatano, Wells and Jaworski corroborates this claim. Their work is 
presented here only to illustrate the possibility of a one-sided emphasis on 
active constructive aspect of knowledge that by implication avoids 
consideration of knowledge beyond individual construction. As such the 
presentation does not attempt to do justice to their contribution but merely to 
attend to the way in which their work can be influential in diverting attention 
from a focus on knowledge per se. 
Firstly Hatano, whose argument illustrates issues in the application of a 
Vygotskian approach to pedagogy. Hatano aims to develop (through 
Vygotsky's work) a more constructionist approach in applications of 
Vygotsky's work to schooling in contrast to interpretations of Vygotsky that 
favour a more instructional approach (Hedegaard, 1990, 1998, Davydov, 
1984).61 The difficulty with arguments pitted against 'instructional approaches' 
is that the term 'instruction' is used pejoratively, to refer to a transmission 
model of learning and approaches that hold that there is a body of knowledge 
which should be taught to successive generations. The instructional approach is 
seen to correlate with the failures of the practice of mass schooling 
(transmission approaches) and in tum this results in the adoption of a particular 
stance on knowledge. Hatano argues that a Vygotskian conception of 
instruction has been interpreted within an empiricist frame in the US, so that it 
coincides with 'conventional didactic teaching including 'rote, drill and practice 
instruction' (Hatano, 1993, p. 154). He continues' ... Vygotskians have been 
busy criticizing Piagetians' "romantic child-centered constructivism" without 
clearly differentiating their conception from transmission (Hatano & Newman, 
1985)' (Hatano, 1993 p. 154). Although Hatano is careful to state that he is 
offering just one interpretation it is clear that his argument for a more 
60 This would seem to be at odds with the claims of writers who aim to be agnostic on 
epistemology. However, their lack of commentary on epistemology does not prevent their 
having a default position by default. 
61 A difficulty here is the meaning of 'instructional' and the extent to which this refers only to a 
passive caricature of a learner or to an approach which emphasises a core body of knowledge. 
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constructivist version depends upon the caricature of the instructional approach 
that he sets up. This caricature is commonplace, posing constructivism as an 
alternative to a traditional transmission model of teaching. To make his point 
clear Hatano sets up, what he admits to be, 'the so-called Vygotskian 
conception of knowledge acquisition by instruction ... [in] a somewhat 
caricatured form ... ' (Hatano, 1993, p. 154). His typification brings to the fore 
what he sees as a central issue - the emphasis on the teacher's authority as 
knowledge expert rather than the child's own construction of a problem. 
According to this schematised version of a Vygotskian approach: 'Knowledge 
to be acquired by the learner (a less mature member of society) is possessed by 
the teacher (a more mature member) usually in the form of a set of skills or 
strategies for solving the target problem ... ' (Hatano, 1993, p. 154). It is 
necessary to bear in mind here that Hatano is aiming to show how, even with an 
avowedly Vygotskian approach, teachers still perpetuate a form of 
transmission. He describes the method used as one in which the teacher 
demonstrates how to solve problems, while the learner takes over steps 
involved in the solution as the supporting role of the teacher becoming less and 
less important (Hatano, 1993). Although he recognises that this is only one 
possible interpretation, he still wishes to condemn acquisition by instruction 
which he claims has hidden empiricist assumptions. These he details as: 1) the 
learner being passive and not needing to understand the meaning of the skills 
being taught or construct knowledge that goes beyond them; 2) only the 
interaction with the teacher allows the acquisition of knowledge; and 3) the 
teacher acts as the only source of information and evaluation. For Hatano, this 
set of assumptions defines a transmission model. Hatano uses Palinscar and 
Brown's research on joint problem-solving (reciprocal teaching) as a method of 
comprehending a text, to indicate his concern that so-called Vygotskian 
approaches still place emphasis on the teacher's authority rather than upon the 
leamer's own knowledge-construction. In regard to Palinscar and Brown's 
example of reciprocal teaching, Hatano states that 'if the strategies are acquired 
because of the teacher's authority [my emphasis] ... rather than to enhance 
understanding ... then "reciprocal teaching" is not based on a constructivist 
approach' (Hatano. 1993, p. 158). There are two problems here, first what 
Hatano calls the 'authority' of the teacher and second, the conception of 
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constructivism and its location in contemporary criticisms of abstract 
knowledge. Both have consequences for how teachers interpret and legitimate 
their practice. 
Hatano's aim is to bring a constructive dimension to the Vygotskian 
legacy as he sees it, to revise the 'transmission skills' framework, and to extend 
the conception of learning by instruction. He argues that the conception of 
learners in his caricature of Vygotsky's approach does not fit well with 
evidence which shows humans as active beneficiaries of interactions with 
people and natural and artificial environments. Hatano's response to 
deficiencies in North American schooling, is to provide a 'reinterpretation of 
Vygotsky's theory as exemplifying "realistic constructivism" ... an idea that 
knowledge is constructed by learners themselves under a variety of 
sociocultural constraints' and he argues that this 'can legitimately be called a 
radical extension of the Vygotskian conception' (Hatano, 1993, p. 155). 
The aim of this constructivist reinterpretation of Vygotsky illustrates a 
widely experienced uneasiness with Vygotsky's position that there is a body of 
knowledge that is passed on to the next generation, and an equally widely 
experienced desire to give weight to meaning-making and knowledge 
construction of learners themselves. But what meaning should be attached to 
the phrases 'constructed by learners themselves', and the 'teacher's authority'? 
Such phrases are taken as prescriptions for giving priority to learners own 
construction of knowledge and reducing the role of the teacher, to a 'facilitator' 
of the child's own constructions (Cobb, 1994). 
The opposition of a teacher's authority to a learners' meaning-making and 
knowledge construction also plays a central part in the work of Gordon Wells, 
only where Hatano wants to bring a radical reinterpretation to Vygotsky to 
incorporate constructivism, Wells sees Vygotskian theory as already social 
constructivist (Wells, 1999, p. xii). However, Wells is critical of what he sees as 
Vygotsky's 'overly optimistic belief in the superiority of scientific rationalism 
and an unquestioning acceptance of the progressive and benign consequences of 
schooled instruction' (Wells, 1999, p. 325). Wells argues against the design of 
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curricula which are independent of the 'needs and aspirations of learners'. This 
is a tricky area due to the highly politicised nature of what is involved in 
responding to 'the needs of individual learners' in the current period. On the 
face of it, any educator can claim to be responding to the needs of learners if 
education is achieved, and it would seem peculiar not to assign the term 
education to a practice that helped learners to learn, although many 
commentators attribute schooling with covert aims far removed from 
education.62 How far 'access' should be interpreted in terms of fulfilling student 
demands when such demands are not made out of independent interest but in a 
context in which achievement is measured in a specific way and demand driven 
by objectives that may be quite separate from student learning, is highly 
problematic. At times Wells' interest in 'inclusion' appears unaware of the 
possibility that knowledge (and also the process of education) might be 
'counterintuitive' coming into conflict with what learners (at one point in time) 
perceive to be their aspirations. To a large extent the issues at stake in Wells' 
investigation into an effective pedagogy, are a matter of emphasis and 
dependent upon the way that the issues are interpreted by practicing teachers. 
Certainly Vygotsky would be in agreement with Wells that a learner needs 
to be fully engaged and actively thinking/constructing if learning is to occur. 
Vygotsky criticises the: 'wholly abstract thinking [which] is entirely 
incomprehensible to the student, and in the Tsarist school produces naked and 
dry literalism, i.e. an infinite propensity for verbal formulations and for verbal 
definitions without any effort to penetrate into essentials, and instead of a 
knowledge of subject matter, there was a knowledge of words' (Vygotsky, 
1997c, p. 173). However, this did not lead him to conclude that the curriculum 
should be built around the 'aspirations' of learners. Vygotsky's approach to 
knowledge was different from that of Wells. For Vygotsky the issue was to find 
a way to design curricula so that learners would be in a position to exercise 
thinking in coming to know a substantial body of knowledge. In this sense the 
attribute of 'effective practice' was not to work for collaborative meaning-
62 For instance Braverman's (1974) characterisation of education as limited to basic skills, 
conformity to the rules of society and obedience in contrast to Pippin's (2000) claim that liberal 
education is one in which learners, in acquiring knowledge also understand the reasons for 
holding such knowledge. 
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making where meaning is constructed by members of the class, but to set up 
obstacles designed to assist thinking to develop so as to approach deeper 
understanding of existing knowledge.63 
By contrast, Wells assumes a 'community' exists m any classroom, 
through which the valuable principles of dialogic pedagogy can be realised by 
joint activity working towards shared goals. 
He argues that there is an automatic link between learning and the 
development of identity, with the implication that schooling (learning in the 
ZPD) is responsible for identity development: 'the whole person [my emphasis] 
is involved in activity undertaken with others, interaction in the zpd necessarily 
[my emphasis] involves all facets of the personality' (Wells, 1999, p. 331). The 
assumption of an immediate link between the 'whole person' and the 
experience of learning is conflated with a further more sociological claim that 
'because individuals and the social world are mutually constitutive of each 
other, transformation of the learner also involves transforming the communities 
of which he or she is a member' (Wells, 1999, p. 331). 
There is an easy slippage, in educational practice, from Wells' integration 
of learning with the development of individual identity to an idea of 
'inclusivity' entailing commonly defined values and accepted modes of 
behaviour, attitude and temperament. Wells' claim that a classroom can be a 
'collaborative community' where by implication goals are shared, is 
contestable. In a later work (Wells and Claxton, 2002, p. 5) Wells, recognises 
that the participants in collaborative activity may not share identical goals or 
beliefs (though a degree of overlap is necessary for collaboration) and that 
disagreement is valuable.64 The appropriation of terms such as 'community', 
'collaboration' 'individual purposes' to an outline of education practices raises 
more questions than it answers. Similarly an emphasis on the development of 
63Vygotsky's approach does not deny that learners are active in coming to know, but holds that 
learners are not creating knowledge. 
64 The activity theory of Engestrom makes conflict key to development, albeit at an early stage 
of a process ofDWR (Developmental Work Research). For Engestrom, the 'double-bind' 
generating an impasse in activity, provides the focal point for 'expansive learning'. 
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'the whole person' and 'identity' can be read as entailing the responsibility of 
educators for the development of individual learners in every aspect of their 
being. In mass schooling this easily slides into the monitoring of attitudes and 
behaviour patterns. Walkerdine has made a convincing criticism of the way in 
which primary classrooms became arenas for increasing social control under the 
guise of a more humane and child-centred approach (Walkerdine, 1984). She 
draws on a Foucauldian perspective to argue that what appear as strategies of 
freedom - a pedagogic practice which will set children free - are really 
'administrative apparatuses for providing techniques of social regulation' 
(Walkerdine, 1984, p. 163). 
The importance Wells attaches to the value of collaborative activity leads 
to seeing the teacher, 'rather than being primarily a dispenser of knowledge and 
assigner of grades [as one who] sees him or herself as a fellow learner whose 
prime responsibility is to act as leader of a community committed to the co-
construction of knowledge' (Wells, 1999, p. 331). The emphasis is on the 
construction of values and knowledge, whereby teachers support and guide 
students as they 'create their own alternative versions of the future' (Wells, 
1999, p. 332). Wells' educational prescriptions and ideals are informed by an 
explicit rejection of any idea of te/os in development; this he shares with many 
post -Vygotskian researchers. He outlines three factors since Vygotsky's death 
that provide 'grounds for challenging what many now consider to be an overly 
optimistic belief in the universal superiority of scientific rationalism': 1) the 
criticism of the hegemony of technical rationality; 2) the challenge from 
cultural anthropologists 'to reject the view that treats the trajectory of European 
cultural history as the point of reference for evaluating other cultures'; and 3) 
'the influx of immigrants from a range of different cultures has led to a de facto 
multiculturalism that is demanding a re-evaluation of the assumed superiority of 
white, male, middle-class values and, hence, also the technical-rationality on 
which it is based' (Wells, 1999, p. 325). Each of these factors has led to a 
questioning of knowledge and the directing of attention to the constructive 
activity of groups of individuals. 
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Questions of realism and knowledge are fundamental for curricula and 
institutional design in education. A further example illustrates the part played 
by epistemology in Wells' theory of education. Wells refers to his colleague 
Bereiter's use of Popper's discussion of 'third-world objects' as an illustration 
of the type of erroneous conceptions of knowledge that educators can subscribe 
to. Bereiter writes of knowledge objects such as numbers, Newton's second law 
and Puccini's Madam Butterfly as having 'the characteristics of real objects, 
except for being immaterial. They have origins, histories; they can be described 
and criticized, compared with others of their kind. They can be found to have 
properties that their creators or previous generations were unaware of [Bereiter, 
1994, p. 22]' (Wells, 1999, p. 73). Incidentally, the idea that knowledge objects 
may have properties that their creators are unaware of is the same point made 
by Ian Hacking below. Wells disagrees with Bereiter's claim that knowledge is 
independent of the construction of individuals at anyone point in time. He lays 
what he perceives to be the error in Bereiter's argument, at the door of a 
particular version of representation. For Wells the flaw in Bereiter's position is 
due to his retaining the idea of representation of 'something' whilst rejecting 
the idea that representations match objects in the world: 
The mistake, I think is in assuming that, because a text or musical 
score is a representational artifact, there must be an object that exists 
to be represented; and then, because this object - unlike its 
representation - does not exist in the material world, in arguing that it 
must therefore be located in a different world - a World 3. 
(Wells, 1999, pp. 73-74) 
Here agam Wells shows the influence of linguistic discourse analysis and 
constructivism in his account of the problem of knowledge in general and 
schooled-knowledge in particular. 
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In the following passage, it is the conception of knowledge, rather than the 
poverty of a representationalist paradigm, which is at issue: 
.. .it may sometimes be convenient to speak as if ideas, theories and 
concepts had an autonomous and immaterial existence - provided that 
such terms are recognized for what they are, that is to say, as synoptic 
constructs that function as shorthand expressions in particular genres 
of theoretical discourse [my emphasis]. In general, however, this way 
of speaking can be seriously misleading. Serious not simply because it 
misrepresents the way in which knowledge is constructed and used, 
but serious also in its consequences for the way in which, in schools 
and other educational institutions, knowledge, by being reified, 
becomes a commodity to be transmitted to students and its possession 
subsequently assessed and quantified. 
(Wells, 2002, P 113) 
What Wells is critical of, is that 'Separating 'the "message" from the form in 
which it is realised, as Popper does, ignores the process by which a theory or 
any other putative third world object is developed' (Wells, 2002, p 113). For 
Wells, knowledge can be explained only by reference to the discourse and 
genres through which it is produced. But the nature of the form in "the form in 
which it is realised" is not established. Although Wells credits that knowledge 
develops over different time scales his prime concern is to combat an approach 
to schooling which views knowledge as a product which can be 'transmitted'. 
So whilst he mentions that knowledge is constituted over centuries, his aim is to 
emphasise that all knowledge is constantly reconstituted and transformed by the 
activity of individuals in a social context. Where Wells gives credit to the idea 
that science develops in history due to a historical process involving the 
development of technologies and social forces, then he would not be in 
disagreement with Popper or Hacking for that matter. However, Wells appears 
to retain the representational relation criticised by Brandom. Having rejected 
the idea of an artefact representing a real object, he maintains an ideal/real 
dualism whereby a theory can only be understood as a relation between one set 
of signifiers and another:65 
65 Wells states that he is using the form of dialogue to develop a theory of knowledge and infers 
that his words are provisional and exploratory. 
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However, the fact that we can use the metalinguistic term 'theory' as a 
way of referring to the current textual end product of this constructive 
process of synoptic abstraction does not mean that there is a 
corresponding immaterial object that then exists, independent of the 
linguistic formulation and argumentation through which it was 
constructed. .. .So when Popper argues that the unexpected new 
problems to which new theories give rise are 'in no sense made by us; 
rather they are discovered by us; and in this sense they exist, 
undiscovered, before their discovery' (Popper, 1972, pp.160-161), I 
find his claim to be at best hyperbolic, and at worst confusing. 
(Wells, 2002, p. 114) 
Where Bereiter and Popper hold a view of knowledge that cannot be reduced to 
the meaning-making of individuals at specific points in history, Wells finds 
himself in the position of having to counter his rejection of 'discovery' as 
opposed to construction, with an argument for the local situated knowledge 
construction of the classroom, 'knowledge does not have an existence apart 
from the situated acts of knowing in which it is constructed, reconstructed and 
used' (Wells, 2002, p 116). Again the issue of epistemology is crucial in 
influencing the position adopted by Wells. Arguments concerning appropriate 
pedagogy are inevitably politicised and Wells' position on knowledge is formed 
in the context of North American schooling where States prescribe educational 
content, in a draconian way, even down to the textbook used in teaching. Wells' 
attempt to develop a theoretical framework for handling the idea of knowledge 
was developed in part as a response to a report on the role of schooling prepared 
by an educational association in one of Canada's largest provinces. He cautions 
that his contribution forms part of an ongoing dialogue rather than presenting 
definitive conclusions (Wells, 1999, p. 52). Wells sees 'the view of knowledge 
as having an independent existence that can be transmitted through texts of 
teacher exposition, is one of the chief impediments to creating classrooms as 
'knowledge building communities' (Wells, 1999, p. 52). In this situation it is 
not surprising that once a view of knowledge as the outcome of accurate 
representations of the world is rejected (the mirror view of nature) the 
alternative seems to be the continual reconstitution of knowledge via the 
activity of participants in a particular social context. But the problem with 
recourse to such a position, is the tendency to diminish the role of the teacher as 
authority or to value texts in their own right. 
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At the extreme, approaches adopted in the name of constructivism, have 
the most serious consequences for education. The following anecdote 
illustrates the extent to which a rejection of the possibility of knowledge 
existing beyond individual construction, is pervasive in schooling. The 
anecdote was related to Barbara Jaworski by Rita Nolder from her experiences 
as a mathematics advisory teacher and is used by Jaworski to advocate a 
particular approach to mathematics education. As the anecdote shows how 
slippage occurs when epistemological presuppositions are not made clear, it is 
worth relating the anecdote in full: 
In a class of 11 year olds working with SMP, the teacher was 
going around helping students. Rita, feeling redundant, was listening 
to two boys working with the SMP book on angle. They were looking 
at a diagram of two triangles (i) with angles of 45,45,90 and (ii) with 
angles of 30, 60, 90. 
One boy said to the other "This one's a triangle [the first], and 
this one isn't [the second]". The boy speaking seemed to have some 
image or concept of a triangle which included the first triangle, but not 
the second. Now, Rita believed that both objects were triangles. The 
boy made his construction according to his own experience. So did 
Rita. We might say that the boy was wrong and Rita was right. But 
this is to make judgements about truth without taking into account the 
circumstances from which the statements arise. What was the boy's 
experience which led to his statement? Why did he believe that the 
second shape was not a triangle? 
The context in which a statement is made is crucial to the 
validity of the statement, and it is very difficult to say therefore when 
any statement is true without knowing this context. We might, for 
example, be tempted to say that an object with angles adding up to 
more than 1800 could not be a triangle. However, a triangle on the 
surface of a sphere could fit this criterion. In plane geometry we might 
feel happy with the statement that the angles of a triangle add up to 
180°. So, to understand the boy's statement in Rita's anecdote, it 
would be helpful to locate the discourse in a wider context, although 
this might be quite difficult to elicit. 
A consequence of pupil talk and teacher listening is that the 
teacher is able to glean a sense of the origins of pupils' ideas and to 
challenge these in some way if it seems appropriate .... Rita might have 
asked the boys why the second figure was not a triangle, and could 
have followed up her question with further examples and situations for 
the boy to consider, possibly extending his experience and causing 
him to modify his knowledge. This might be described as 'challenging 
the student's misconceptions', but if there are, 'mis'conceptions, what 
then is a conception? Is this some form of knowledge which the 
'mis'conception is not? Can a conception be independent of the 
person or circumstance of the conceiving? 
(Jaworski, 1993) 
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These questions raised by Jaworski reveal the degree of conflation of different 
issues in the development of concepts. 66 The interest in working dialogically 
with the pupils' own conceptions, is given priority over any concern to ensure 
that the pupils are able to distinguish clearly between correct and incorrect 
knowledge. Indeed, the extract is used by the author, to question whether there 
can be a form of knowledge against which a misconception can be compared. 
The agnosticism with respect to epistemology at the heart of constructivism is 
stated explicitly: 
Noddings' response to questions such as this is to recognise that 
constructivism cannot of its very nature make any statement about the 
status of knowledge, and so she claims that constructivism is post-
epistemological. Von Glasersfeld, in the same volume, accepts 
Noddings' position and modifies his own language, talking of 
constructivism as a theory of knOWing rather than a theory of 
knowledge. 
(Jaworski, 1993) 
The preceding anecdote is used only to illustrate the sort of discussion arising in 
mathematics education in the context of constructivist ideas. An understandable 
concern of educationalists (Hatano, Wertsch, Jaworski) in the context of the 
limitations of state schooling, is to redress the poverty of a 'transmission' 
approach to the knowledge by putting in its place a powerful emphasis on the 
creative dimension involved in any form of understanding. A problem arises 
though when all creativity is put on a par or all considered to warrant the term 
creativity. The issue of how powerful theories with major applications are 
developed in the minds of particular individuals is not dealt with by viewing all 
human activity as creative even though it may happen that a child (lacking 
relevant knowledge) may make a comment that coincides with a major theory-
e.g. that only triangles in Euclidean geometry have angles that add up to 180 
degrees. However, there is far more to the realisation of an original contribution 
than the coincidence of a critical statement and the boy's 'experience' 
mentioned earlier. The idea that an alternative geometry might validate the 
boy's conception of the second triangle as 'not a triangle' or prevent it from 
66 In this development no conception of history is present. 
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being described as a 'misconception', misunderstands what is involved in 
knowledge. Because universality is sidelined by the importance of recognising 
human activity in a context, well-meaning arguments are led into absurd 
conclusions. Cobb comments on 'the "political correctness" that frequently 
surrounds constructivism in maths and science education' (Cobb, 1994) and 
argues for the importance of going beyond purely psychological and 
individualist constructivism to view learning maths at least in part as 
enculturation into an intellectual community. He also makes the point that 
students construct their own ways of knowing in the most authoritarian 
pedagogic situations, hence the ability to construct is only furnished by 
particular contexts. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The previous discussion has considered the extent to which attempts to offer 
explanation of the failure of schooling in terms of the transmission of 
decontextualised rationality, have turned to a communitarian constructivism as 
an alternative. However, this alternative is not unproblematic and there are 
significant points to take into account. Two points are relevant here: the 
conflation of individuality and identity with the practice of schooling and the 
subsumption of knowledge to local construction. Richard Sennett has a 
different version of identity and Ian Hacking a different version of texts and 
knowledge. A different sense of individuality is found in Richard Sennett's 
conception of public life. For Sennett a serious problem for contemporary 
society is the loss of public life of which the classroom is an instance (although 
Sennett himself does not give this example). For Sennett, individuality and 
personality are enhanced by the possibility/opportunity of the full development 
of discrete ways of acting in discrete circumstances. 
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The space, which sustains these discrete ways of being, anses out of the 
conventions and rules bounding activity in the public context: 
Convention itself is the single most expressive tool in public life. But 
in an age wherein intimate relations determine what shall be 
believable, conventions, artifices, and rules appear only to get in the 
way of revealing oneself to another; they are obstructions to intimate 
expression. As the imbalance between public and intimate life has 
grown greater, people have become less expressive. With an emphasis 
on psychological authenticity, people become inartistic in daily life 
because they are unable to tap the fundamental creative strength of the 
actor, the ability to play with and invest external images of self. Thus 
we arrive at the hypothesis that theatricality has an equally special, 
friendly relation to a strong public life. 
(Sennett, 1977,p. 37) 
There is a separation 'between public and intimate life' which is assisted by the 
conventions, artifices and rules which facilitate expressiveness. The idea of 
identity and activity which underlies Sennett's account of public life is quite 
different from that implicit in Wells' argument. Sennett's account of identity 
and activity stands in sharp contrast to that which holds that identity arises in a 
community holding shared goals and working towards a common 
understanding. 
Turning now to what Ian Hacking has to say about text and knowledge, 
another aspect of Wells' work. Hacking addresses the question of relativism 
which results from an awareness of the different valuations of artefacts and 
texts in different contexts and periods of history. But unlike Wells, who claims 
that meaning can only be credited to individuals at a particular point in time, he 
presents a narrative to illustrate the argument that meaning can be carried 
beyond the locale of any collection of individuals. 
The narrative involves a collection of Chinese porcelain, traded by August 
der Stark in the 18th century; this collection was the stunningly beautiful 
product of techniques of glazing in the style called 'the green family'. Hacking 
tells how August de Stark's love for his china was so great that he built a palace 
to house it but how later the collection was dismissed as of no more value than 
'a collection of dolls'. For a century it was left in a crowded cellar. Then, at the 
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end of the nineteenth century, the porcelain was returned to light and delighted 
and amazed scholars before being housed in cellars again during the Second 
World War and then again returned to an appreciative public gaze (Hacking, 
1995, p. 238). For Hacking the adventures of the Chinese porcelain illustrates 
an argument against both relativism and the idea that a work of art has no 
intrinsic value. The story of the porcelain can be related as: 
... a human tale of wealth, lust, changes in taste, destruction, survival. 
Only a sequence of accidents created the Chinese export trade of 
objects suited to a certain European fashion for chinoiserie around the 
1700s, and then brought such characteristic examples under one lavish 
roof, saw the lapse from public taste, witnessed a revival, a firestorm 
and a return . . .In short there were periods of admiration and times 
when these pieces were despised, unlit and unloved. 
(Hacking, 1995, p. 238) 
The fact that different periods invest the green family porcelain with a 
different aura leads to the 'crass' conclusion that '[eJvidently there is no 
intrinsic value in this stuff, it goes up and down in the scale of human 
admiration as the wind blows' (Hacking, 1995, p. 238).67 But Hacking argues 
against the position preferring, as he says, the empirical claim supported by 
historical evidence that 'there will be generations that rediscover [the 
porcelain]. It will time and again show itself (Hacking 1995, p. 238) even 
though to do so, particular conditions may apply. His point is that 
'[ a ]chievements created by humans have a strange persistence that contrasts 
with fashion' (Hacking 1995, p. 239). 
Hacking makes essentially the same argument in relation to texts when 
he reports the comments of his undergraduate students about their introductory 
philosophy course. '''Gee what a great course" was followed by "But you could 
not help it... What with all those great books, I mean like Descartes .. .''' 
(Hacking, 1999, p. 239). Hacking modestly reports that he gives terrible 
lectures, and tells his students that he does not understand Descartes but knows 
that '[i]t does not matter. Descartes speaks directly to these young people, who 
67 The term crass is actually used by Hacking to describe his own statement, but in fact he 
believes the statement does justice to the relativist position. 
84 
know as little about Descartes and his times as I know about the green family 
and its times. But just as the green family showed itself to me, directly, so 
Descartes shows himself to me' (Hacking, 1999, p. 239). Even though many 
students may have thought Descartes and Sartre were contemporaries, 'the 
value of Descartes to these students is completely anachronistic, out of 
time ... Descartes, even more than Sartre, can speak directly to them across the 
seas of time' (Hacking, 1999, p. 239). Hacking also gives the example of 
Hegel as someone who 'once again shows himself who speaks 'directly ... after 
decades of oblivion' even though during his absence, he 'dominated the 
formation of Dewey, and perhaps that of Pierce, and also the young upstarts 
Moore and Russell who laid waste to him within a few years' (Hacking, 1999, 
p.240). 
Hacking's appreciation of texts is totally different to that of Wells. For 
Wells the text68 is dependent for its meaning on the successive subjective 
constructions placed upon it, whereas for Hacking the text retains its value, 
which is to be re-discovered. A text can be read differently from one period to 
the next but this different reading does not create new meanings ex nihilo. 
Hegel's text is generative in the sense that it discloses more knowledge with 
more reading and also more knowledge is available in the text as history allows 
it 'to show itself (Hacking).69 The different position taken by Wells, Jaworski 
and Hatano on the one side and Sennett and Hacking on the other have 
profound implications for education since they imply quite different positions 
as regards to the attitude of educators towards knowledge and to the role of the 
teacher as authority or facilitator. The representational paradigm is unable to 
deal with issues of meaning without oscillating between either attributing 
meaning and/or agency to artefacts/tools, or reducing meaning to the 
construction of individuals and thereby losing any sense of 'universalising' 
knowledge. 
68 Wells is normally referring to texts which bear no comparison to the texts that Hacking has in 
mind (school classrooms texts versus Descartes Meditations). 
69 Similarly a scientific theory or mathematical formula is generative beyond it's original value 
and purpose. 
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It is important to note that in his criticism of the pervasiveness of the 
concept of representation in attempts to deal with meaning, Brandom introduces 
a Hegelian dimension. Hegel exposes the fallacies of a way of thinking that 
does not recognise the underlying epistemology with which it operates.70 
According to Brandom: 
a representational paradigm reigns not only in the whole spectrum of 
analytically pursued semantics ... but also in structuralism inheriting 
the broad outline of Saussure's semantics, and even those later 
continental thinkers whose poststructuralism is still so far mired in the 
representational paradigm that it can see no other alternative to 
understanding meaning in terms of signifiers standing for signified 
than to understand it in terms of signifiers standing for other signifiers. 
(Brandom, 2000, p. 10) 
His point is that even though a verSIOn of the correspondence VIew of 
knowledge according to which a signifier represents an object/event is rejected, 
the paradigm is frequently left untouched.71 It follows therefore that the 
implication of a critique of the failure of signifier to represent an external world 
leads to the relativist positions that the knowledge available for human beings 
arises from the relation between one signifier and another. Postmodernism has 
replaced signifiers standing for signified with signifiers standing for signifiers -
but it has not broken decisively with a representationalist paradigm, that still 
operates implicitly. Instead of unearthing the pre-suppositions of representation, 
it retains representation as a relation between representations. In effect it 
continues the limitations of the Understanding, which Hegel exposed in his 
critique (Hegel's critique is considered in Chapter 6). 
The importance of the representational paradigm is not limited to agency, 
freedom and the under-theorisation of human activity, it also has an ethical 
dimension. Referring to Sellars, Brandom insists that what distinguishes a 
70 Hegel's exposure of what is involved in our way of grasping the world compels consideration 
of human freedom. Thought and freedom are thus inextricably linked. For Spinoza the 
development of intellect and freedom are one and the same. 
71 Correspondence view of truth as one which presupposes that representations map 
isomorphic ally on to the world. 
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human from a non-human knower (which only responds differentially) is 
normativity - the giving and asking of reasons. This giving and asking of 
reasons is a necessary element of human knowing which is always conceptual 
and as such different from non-human knowing such as is apparent in the report 
of a parrot screeching 'red' in response to a red object. The normativity 
immediately locates epistemology in ethics, but not ethics in the way that it is 
commonly thought of, i.e. an external code that can be approved or 
disapproved, accepted or rejected. To put it another way values are not 
separated from facts. All knowing takes the form of judgments that one ought to 
make. According to Brandom following Hegel and before him Kant, human 
knowledge and judgement go together and the Humean distinction between fact 
and value is groundless.72 
In effect, Brandom's interest lies in the priority of inference over 
reference. This inversion of the conventional order of explanation gives a 
different weight to factors involved in the development of meaning, 
emphasising human agency and history rather than artefacts or representational 
resources. A commonsense understanding of the word 'history' is that which 
goes before and has an effect on that which comes after, but this understanding 
leads to problems with the concepts of progress and development of which 
writers in the post-Vygotskian research field are wary. This will be discussed 
further in Chapter 7. Only one aspect of this very large and complex area needs 
to be mentioned here. From the point of view of Hegel, history is not a matter 
of antecedents to any current state, but of a holism which, in contrast to 
dualism, attributes activity with consequences, but eschews the type of direct 
causal relation that is commonly assumed in explanation.73 The theorisation of 
72 However, advocates of a fact/value distinction are not completely mistaken in their attempt to 
keep values separate from facts. The argument that values intricately combine with facts does 
not necessarily entail that the values are ones that individuals have added consciously (actively). 
The values are implicit in the very process of thinking, i.e. to perceive something is to 
distinguish it as significant - to relate it to other concepts, i.e. place it in a space of reasons . 
This is quite different to the position that most provokes negative response from those who 
advocate a fact/value distinction in popular discussion, e.g. when an individual labels a 
particular scientific theory as subscribing to a particular set of moral or immoral positions. 
73 The argument made by Bakhurst that Vygotsky's view of higher mental functions could not 
be reduced to their primitive antecedents, is a case in point. An account of higher mental 
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events is an open question in which a distinct area of scholarship is devoted to 
historiography. My argument is that the dualism implicit in conceptualisations 
of human meaning-making (semiosis) effects the theorisation of issues which 
are crucial to education. Positions adopted on knowledge, and the role of the 
teacher, have practical positions on policy for schooling.74 
Although the subtleties of philosophical argument needed to unearth the 
presuppositions of representationalism are not easily accessible, the work not 
only of Sennett and Hacking but also of contemporary philosophers such as 
Brandom and McDowell have a bearing on practical questions of education, 
research and policy. Every position on knowledge, learning and pedagogy has 
presuppositions about the nature of knowledge. Approaches to pedagogy are 
informed by epistemological presupposition as well as research. 
Where these epistemological presuppositions are not worked through 
there is a tendency which is apparent in much recent work to take knowledge 
which can be separated from individual contexts and generalised across a 
variety of domains, to be questionable because it is decontextualised: associated 
with this tendency is the critique of the 'Enlightenment project' interpreted as 
one of knowing and manipulating the world. This 'project' has been fiercely 
criticised in several quarters and the criticisms have been recruited by 
researchers in education to legitimate a relativist and contextualist approach to 
knowledge. It has become fashionable to rescind the term 'truth' and to speak 
of knowledge(s) in the plura1.75 Much of criticism of the enlightenment project 
functions (intellect) cannot be made simply from neurophysiology, developmental biology or 
child development. 
74 A trivial example of this form of explanation or account, though one with impact in UK 
education departments is the requirements from the key agency auditing teaching quality 
(QAA) that course bibliographies are 'up to date' and older texts for literature published before 
2000 are dropped. This creates a climate of opinion in which newer is viewed as better. 
Paradoxically this outlook implies a theory of progress which those who favour newer over 
older publications would often reject out of hand. In this context it is interesting to note that 
there is public acknowledgement that the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) has had a 
detrimental effect on the quality of published work over the last decade as academics attempt to 
fulfill output requirements. 
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is phrased in terms of individual rights, multiculturalism and equality.76 What 
education research has lost in the process is the enthusiasm and the grounds for 
examining the political order of far greater importance for education than 
pedagogic strategy. 
It is interesting to note that the ideas discussed above can fit different and 
even opposed political agendas: Kirshner and Whitson point out that the 
research on situated cognition has been adopted by advocates of market 
vouchers whose views about the funding of public education stand in sharp 
opposition to those who develop these ideas in education in the first place 
(Kirshner and Whitson, 1997, p. viii).77 The attack on decontextualised 
knowledge may be conceived as an attack on authoritarianism and abstraction 
but it can easily be construed opportunistically as grounds for cutting 
programmes for formal education or grounds for reducing actual education to 
the most narrow programmes of training. Lave has contrasted the success of 
learning in everyday contexts (as purposeful and motivating) to the inert 
knowledge of formal schooling. In doing so, sadly, it is possible that this type 
of position may, like Adam Smith's invisible hand, contribute to an end that is 
no part of its intention. 
In turning to Hegel, this thesis signals an alternative position, which, 
while it retains the traditional concept of knowledge, neither ignores nor denies 
the diversity of routes by which knowledge arrives. For the moment however it 
is not Hegel alone that we tum, but to Hegel and Kant as reflected through the 
work ofVygotsky and Piaget. 
76 The 'Science wars ' and the 'Culture wars' have been a part of a continuing debate which has 
influenced approaches to curricula and, at a deeper level, shaped ideas about knowing and 
knowledge. 
77 , ... situated cognition theory . .. has served as a powerful platform for analysing the pressing 
problems and possibilities of schooling and schools .. . But such research has subsequently been 
co-opted to argue for literal apprenticeships in the United States ... and to advocate market-
driven vouchers as a way to eliminate public education' (Kirshner and Whitson, 1997, p. viii). 
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Chapter 4 
Vygotsky-Piaget - a case of different philosophies 
4.1 Introduction to philosophical background 
The preceding chapter has set out the problem of decontextualisation as it is 
posed in relation to Vygotsky's work. It has taken issue with the way in which 
causality is assigned to context in the formation of mind and has attempted to 
show that too many of the terms used in this area are taken as unproblematic. 
This chapter and the next continue the argument by exposing the philosophical 
tradition informing Vygotsky's work. Their aim is to make explicit vis-a-vis 
Vygotsky's work what many commentaries upon it leave unsaid, namely that it 
has a definite philosophical provenance which conditions and shapes its 
arguments. 
It is often difficult to attribute a clear influence on an author of any 
particular philosophy but one of Vygotsky's strengths was his use of named 
sources. They earned him no credit in the Soviet Union where Stalinism 
imposed a narrow caricature of Marxism as the criterion of theory. Vander 
Veer and Valsiner (1993) have contributed most to an excavation of the 
influences on Vygotsky and although their work has established his debt to 
Hegel and Spinoza, there is little to explain in detail exactly what this debt 
comprises (Bakhurst, 1991, Robbins, 2001, Van der Veer, 1984, Bronckart, 
1996, Brockmeier, 1996, Kozulin, 1990). 
This chapter uses a comparison of Vygotsky's and Piaget's work to pose 
the question of different philosophical approaches. Both Vygotsky and Piaget 
offered forms of genetic epistemology.78 Genetic epistemology - the attempt to 
78 Kitchner notes that although Mark Baldwin was responsible for the creation of a field termed 
'genetic epistemology' it was Piaget who became most closely identified with it. However, the 
view that empirical psychology is relevant to normative epistemology has received little 
attention even thought it holds considerable philosophical promise. This is in part due to the 
mistaken view that Piaget was only doing child psychology (Kitchener, 1994). 
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understand the development of knowledge as paralleling the development of 
faculties was particularly important for Piaget: 
The fundamental hypothesis of genetic epistemology is that there is a 
parallelism between the progress made in the logical and rational 
organisation of knowledge and the corresponding formative 
psychological processes.79 
(Piaget, 1970, p. 13) 
The formulation of this parallelism has played a fundamentally important 
role, but Vygotsky took it a step further and linked it to the sociogenetic 
development of faculties and knowledge. In Piaget 'the flow of construction is 
from one's interactions with one's nonhuman environment toward an exchange 
with others. In Vygotsky, the flow of conceptual development is reversed' 
(Confrey, 1995, p. 202). This reversal of the flow by Vygotsky, relates to an 
argument concerning the space of reasons mentioned in Chapter 1 and 
considered later. By contrast to the comparisons between Vygotsky and Piaget 
which are commonly made from the point of view of psychology, attention here 
is directed to the less well aired but no less important, philosophic differences 
between them. This chapter and the next two put these differences in context by 
considering points in parts of the philosophy of Hegel and Spinoza which are 
relevant for Vygotsky's conception of mind and world and its differences from 
that of Piaget. As has been said in Chapter 1, the commentaries on Vygotsky 
have not always been attentive to this. 
The importance of the philosophical background to Vygotsky's work 
cannot be underestimated. The contrast between Vygotskian and Piagetian, 
positions which is presented in many discussions as an internal dispute within 
educational research about learning, is a moment in the classic debate in 
European thought between Cartesian dualism and the reworking of the classical 
Aristotelian rejection of empiricism contained within De Anima. Discussion 
within education research about scientific concepts, the nature of knowledge 
79 Piaget was interested in the way that representational systems are built by the manipulation of 
objects developing mental operations. 
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and the process by which knowledge can be learnt, mimics issues that have 
been worked over centuries of philosophic dispute. Joseph Dunne's (1993) 
detailed consideration of philosophical issues, stemming from educational 
questions, provides clear evidence of the extent to which questions of education 
have a philosophical dimension. 80 Many of the presuppositions of educational 
theory are drawn from a dualism that posits the minds of learners as comprising 
distinct and separate capabilities with which an educator interacts. This process 
is understood predominately in a cognitive way, independent of context. 
Educational theory is steeped in a Cartesian conception of consciousness. One 
of the problems is we are living in a cultural and intellectual milieu which 
despite protestations remains irrevocably dualist and with the best will in the 
world, it is very difficult to step outside presuppositions that are continually 
renewed by everyday practice. 
The issues involved here are philosophic but this does not preclude them 
from having important practical implications. For instance, the differences in 
the conceptualisation of consciousness has implications for the understanding 
of constructivism and universal knowledge and hence for pedagogy. The 
difference between Vygotsky and the early Piaget and its philosophic 
dimensions involving egocentrism and concept development, have not yet been 
fully explored in educational theory. 
Both thinkers were fully aware of the philosophical context of their work. 
Piaget's work, for instance, was deeply entrenched in philosophy. Brockmeier, 
who has pointed out how 'Piaget never lost sight of the philosophical dimension 
of psychology' (Brockmeier, 1996, p. 125) comments on Piaget's retreat from 
the metaphysical issues of his youth (Bergsonian) and' ... the emergence ... ofthe 
omnipresence of reference to Kant. '[For Piaget] the main issue .. .is nothing 
other than the construction of the categories of understanding in The critique of 
80 Dunne's work, which is primarily concerned with the Aristotelian questions of techne and 
phronesis has, because of the nature of these concepts, a direct bearing on the question of 
rationality. In Back to the Rough Ground he develops a careful consideration of 'the nature of 
rationality in teaching and ... the nature of any rational practice' (Dunne, 1993, p. 3). 
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pure reason,Sl (Bronckart, 1996, pp. 92-93). Piaget took over the term 'genetic 
epistemology' from Baldwin to show how the acquisition and growth of 
knowledge is possible rather than merely resting with epistemology's concern 
to show only how knowledge, rather than its growth, is possible. 
An earlier version of genetic epistemology can be found in the last chapter 
of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (book 2 chapter 19, 99b 15-100a 8) which 
deals with Plato's argument in the Meno, that learning and the acquisition of 
new knowledge are impossible because all learning presupposes knowledge. 
Known as 'the Learning Paradox' (Bereiter, 1991) in modern times, this raises 
the question of the identity of thought and being - how mind and world can in 
any way be connected. One underlying purpose of this thesis is to show how 
overcoming this modern version of the Learning Paradox, requires moving 
thought from ideal contemplation to material activity by overcoming Cartesian 
dualism. To understand this move it is necessary to understand the importance 
of philosophy as thought working on itself (thought thinking itself). 
At a time when education research is predominately concerned with the 
details of policy for immediate implementation, the fact that every position has 
its own domain of enquiry that necessarily involves philosophic issues of 
relevance beyond education is pushed aside as lacking practical urgency. This is 
what makes Vygotsky's debate with Piaget significant, namely that it shows 
that by opening or foreclosing avenues of enquiry the philosophic traditions 
underlying apparently straightforward positions have the greatest possible 
practical significance. Vygotsky's confrontation with Piaget not only 
exemplifies his involvement in a particular philosophical tradition but it also 
can account for the innovative and original nature of his work. A 
comprehension of the philosophical influence on his work also enables a 
defence of his interest in what has come to be mis-termed abstract or 
decontexualised rationality. 
81 Piaget occupied the Chair of Philosophy of Science at Neuchatel 
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4.2 Vygotsky-Piaget 
Vygotsky introduces his comments on Piaget's work in chapter 6 of Thinking 
and Speech as an aside to his discussion of the nature and development of 
'scientific concepts'. He notes that his distinction between everyday and 
scientific concepts is initially a heuristic device and that a task of the research is 
to clarify the differences between these types of concepts as they develop in the 
process of concept-formation (Vygotsky, 1987, p.172). 
Vygotsky refers to Tolstoy to illustrate the weakness of thinking about 
concept development in children and to raise the issue of learning scientific 
concepts. Endorsing Tolstoy'S position that concepts cannot be taught directly, 
he argues that the learning of concepts entails a 'complex and delicate' 
developmental process. Although he accepts Tolstoy's argument that crude and 
direct interference damages the delicate process, like trying to build the full 
flower from the petals extracted in the bud, he argues that 'a complex, more 
direct method of instruction will lead to development to higher levels' 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p.171). For Vygotsky, Tolstoy's belief in naturalist 
development 'exaggerates the distance between instruction and development' 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p.171). 
Two conclusions relevant to modern education theory can be found in 
this area of Vygotsky's work: 1) formal intervention has productive and unique 
consequences for development; 2) the process of concept formation is of greater 
complexity and subtlety than is often imagined by a conventional empiricist 
epistemology. 
Vygotsky uses Tolstoy'S commentary on a child's learning to develop 
his argument concerning concept development. He makes the distinction 
between everyday and scientific concepts, defining everyday concepts as what 
Tolstoy had in mind 'because they emerged from the child's everyday life 
experience, we will refer to the latter as "everyday''' (Vygotsky, 1987, p.172). 
Vygotsky comments that a distinction between everyday and scientific concepts 
is often ignored even though it is possible to make a variety of distinctions: 
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heuristic, theoretical and empirical. In Piaget's case a distinction is made 
between different types of concepts, but although Vygotsky acknowledges this, 
he remains critical of Piaget's account of how a child learns concepts. He finds 
errors and contradictions in Piaget's argument, in particular his limited 
explanation of consciousness. It is these errors and contradictions in Piaget's 
work which Vygotsky points to, that expose the radically different 
philosophical frames which underpin their work. 
4.3 Scientific/everyday concepts 
Three examples are used here to illustrate the philosophical difference between 
Vygotsky's and Piaget's approaches to the relation between everyday and 
scientific concepts: the meaning and place of inner speech and the idea of 
development. All these matters are interlinked. The argument here is that 
certain characteristics of Piaget's explanation can be understood as a reflection 
of a presumed Kantian framework which contains the following elements: 
opposition as distinct and separate; the separation of different processes from 
one another and the supposition of an individual, mentalist model of 
development. 
Firstly as regards everyday and scientific concepts: Vygotsky takes issue 
with Piaget's assumptions about a child's use of concepts. Piaget is concerned 
with the way in which a child's thought differs from an adult. Vygotsky 
comments that Piaget inclines towards asserting that only the child's 
spontaneous concepts (Piaget's term for what Vygotsky calls 'everyday') 
reflect the character of the child's thought. Rene Van der Veer notes that by 
spontaneous concepts Vygotsky meant those 'that are acquired outside of 
specific instruction' (Van der Veer, 1993, p. 270). As they are mostly taken 
from adults, but are not introduced in a systematic fashion, Vygotsky preferred 
to call them everyday rather than spontaneous since this usage avoided the 
impression that the child acquired them spontaneously. This is significant not 
only for the understanding of 'knowing' as different for Piaget and Vygotsky 
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but also for the coincidence between their concepts of 'knowing' and their 
different epistemologies. 
For Piaget the Kantian idea of receptivitl2 is pivotal, receptivity being 
the idea that at one level a form of knowing arises merely by the mind 
interacting with the world. For Vygotsky who rejected the stark dualism of 
mind and world, all knowing (concept acquisition),83 occurs in a context/frame 
which is part of the world that humans inhabit (monism and the space of 
reasons). This includes both learning at the level of what Kant has called 
receptivity and at a deeper level where a more conscious construction takes 
place. 
As regards non-spontaneous concepts, different conditions hold: 'Once 
the idea that non-spontaneous concepts do not reflect the child's thought, there 
exists an impassable solid barrier that excludes any mutual influence' 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 174). Vygotsky argues that 'Piaget contradicts his own 
argument that the child reworks the concept in learning it' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 
174). According to Vygotsky, Piaget does not appreciate that it is a child's own 
characteristics of thought that are expressed in non-spontaneous concepts as 
well as in spontaneous concepts. The significant point here is that for Vygotsky 
non-spontaneous concepts (the concepts of science and abstract thought) still 
express the characteristics of an individual's own thought in their development 
in that they arise dialogically, building on the form of thinking which exists for 
the individual at the current point in time. There is no break in the way in which 
an individual grasps new concepts. 
82 For an introduction to the concept of receptivity see Caygill (1995) "Receptivity involves the 
'capacity' [of the subject] to be affected by objects (CPR A 261B 42). It forms one of two 
sources of knowledge ... namely the 'capacity for receiving representations (receptivity for 
impressions)', which is accompanied by the 'spontaneity of concepts' (A 501B 74) .. .in 
combination with spontaneity it allows the generation of knowledge" (Caygill, 1995, p. 350). 
83 The conflation of the concept acquisition to knowing is quite intentional and in keeping with 
Sellars' claim that knowing something is to place it in the space of reason. The danger here of 
overly rationalist account is more apparent than real. Much research (Dennett, 1993, Damasio, 
2000) has focused on how the body 'knows something' in advance of the mind, or where there 
is a form of 'knowing' which is not 'articulateable', though still functioning as a form of 
knowing. The point here is that knowing relates to an ongoing process not a fixed state through 
which concepts develop. 
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In effect it is the dualism at the base of Piaget's thinking that Vygotsky 
attacks. Vygotsky rejects a monologic conception of reason and his approach 
presupposes the dialogic origin of scientific concepts. The issue of whether 
Vygotsky entertained a logocentric and monologic conception of reason has 
been commented upon by various authors such as Wertsch (1991, 1992, 1996, 
2000), Lemke (1999), Wegerif (1999), Wells (1999) and see in Chapter 2 
earlier. This issue of how reason/rationality is understood and located within 
current debates extends beyond the field of education. Commentaries on 
Chapter 5 and 6 of Thinking and Speech make the case that while Vygotsky had 
not worked with a dialogic notion of concept development in Chapter 5, in 
Chapter 6 he had entertained this dimension of thought (Minick, 1987). To 
some commentators (Wertsch, Lemke) this appears simply as ambivalence. 
However what they do not take proper account of when considering Vygotsky's 
work is the philosophical frame in which he worked. This is the central theme 
of this thesis - to demonstrate that the philosophical frame both explicitly stated 
and implicitly present, in Vygotsky's work, calls into question the criticism that 
he adopted a crude conception of abstract rationality and more generally that 
this line of criticising fails to do justice to the potential of his arguments. The 
dialogic ongm of scientific concepts IS implicit m Vygotsky's 
SpinozistlHegelian conception of the development of concepts. 
Vygotsky's discussion of Piaget's work demonstrates the difference 
between their philosophical frameworks. Piaget's concept of opposition, 
expressed as part of his argument about the development of scientific concepts, 
is one in which the elements that comprise opposition are distinct and separate 
as opposed to moments that are mutually exclusive and mutually dependent at 
the same time. By contrast to Piaget, Vygotsky posits the formation 
(determination) of one concept as the negation of another. Vygotsky remarks on 
how Piaget 'sees only the break, not the connection. As a consequence he 
[Piaget] views the development of concepts as a mechanical combination of two 
separate processes which have nothing in common and move as it were along 
two completely isolated or separate channels' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 174). 
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Vygotsky argues that as a consequence of this approach adopted by Piaget: 
the process involved in socialization of thought that we fmd in 
instruction (among the most important processes in the child's 
development) turns out to be entirely independent of the child's own 
internal processes of intellectual development '" [ and reciprocally] the 
socialisation of the child's thought [via instruction] is represented as 
unconnected with the internal development of the child's 
representations and concepts. 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 174) 
Of importance here is the way m which different philosophical positions 
encourage different VIews of the development of intellectual faculties. 
Moreover the positions, adopted on the basis of different philosophical 
positions, have practical implications. The limitations of Piaget's Kantian 
position have real world implications: the emphasis upon the 'child's own 
internal process of intellectual development' is not without consequences when 
used to inform practical application. For instance it was the Piagetian emphasis 
on the individual spontaneity of the child which had consequences for the 
implementation of the computer environment 'Logo', developed by Seymour 
Papert and his team. By producing a physical image of instructions which the 
child had inputted into a computer, Logo was expected to provide enormous 
opportunities for a child's intellectual development by supplying a means to 
model thinking. The idea was to create an environment which, in keeping with 
Piaget's ideas, would enable children to build their own intellectual structure 
via activity in the simulated Logo world. 84 Papert's confidence in the 
children's spontaneous ability to learn from a creatively constructed 
environment was drawn from Piaget's Kantian understanding of a child's 
spontaneous development and maturation in a rich environment. Successive 
research to examine the successes and failures in the use of Logo have 
supported Vygotsky's emphasis on the role of instruction by highlighting 'the 
crucial influence of the teacher in the learning of Logo' (Hoyles and Sutherland, 
1992, p. 141). Papert's project entails a particular notion of Constructivism -
84 Bruner writes that 'Too often, human learning has been depicted in the paradigm of a lone 
organism pitted against nature ... in the Piagetian model where a lone child struggles single-
handed to strike equilibrium between assimilating the world to himself or himself to the world' 
(Bruner 1985, p. 25). Although Bruner's view has been disputed by Leslie Smith (1995, p. 6), 
my point remains that Papert retained an overall individualist emphasis holding to the view that 
a children could develop their own cognitive structure independently, through activity. 
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'constructionism'. Constructivism is a widely used concept within education 
research, taking a variety of forms. Steffe and Gale (1995) in a reader entitled 
Constructivism in education dealt with no less than six different versions of it: 
social constructivism, radical constructivism, social constructionism, 
information-processing constructivism, cybernetic systems, and sociocultural 
approaches to mediated action. 
With a different concept of development in mind, Vygotsky takes issue 
with the way that 'Piaget represents the child's mental development as a 
process where the characteristics ofthe child's thought die out' and goes on to 
explain that for Piaget: 
The developmental process is not represented as the continual 
emergence of new characteristics of thought of higher, more complex 
and more developed forms of thought on the foundations of more 
elementary and primary forms of thought. Rather development is 
portrayed as a process through which one form of thought is gradually 
and continually being forced out by another. 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 175) 
and he continues: 
What is new to development arises from without. The child's 
characteristics have no constructive, positive, progressive or formative 
role in the history of his mental development. .. it became clear that the 
relationship between instruction and development is presented as one 
of antagonism in the process of formation of the child's concepts ... the 
child's thinking is placed in opposition to the adult's thought. One 
does not arise from the other; one excludes the other. .. One must be 
done away with so that the other can take its place. 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 175) 
The notion of one form of thought ending and another beginning without the 
two coexisting and interpenetrating, is exactly the type of dualism that 
Vygotsky resists. It is clear that Vygotsky has a different understanding of 
opposition/negation from the one he attributed to Piaget, one that bears the 
hallmark of Hegel's concept of Aufhebung. 
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It is necessary at this point to make a brief detour to signal one of the 
main concepts of Spinoza and Hegel as leading proponents of a definite and 
distinct tradition of Western thinking which stands apart from the empirical 
tradition. In the passages cited above the concept 'opposition' has a different 
meaning in the two traditions. When Vygotsky wrote of 'opposition' he drew 
from the Hegelian tradition where the concept (Aujhebung) has a more complex 
meaning than distinct elements clashing as externalities. Inwood explains that 
Hegel uses the term Aujhebung in all three senses of its meaning at once - 'to 
raise, to hold, lift up'; 'to annul, abolish, destroy, cancel, suspend' and 'to keep, 
save, preserve' (Inwood, 1995, p. 283). According to Inwood, 'Aujhebung is 
similar to determinate [negation] that has a positive result. What results from 
the sublation of something, e.g. the whole in which both it and its opposite 
survives as moments, is invariably higher than, or the [truth] of, the item(s} 
sublated' (Inwood, M., 1995, p. 284). Blanck notes that the related term 
'supercede' is commonly translated into Russian with the aid of the word 
skhoronit which has both a negative and positive meaning: liquidation and 
conservation .. . ' (Blanck, 1992, p. 46). It is in this Hegelian sense that Vygotsky 
understands the term 'opposition' in his discussion of Pia get. 
Returning to the relation of everyday to scientific concepts; for Vygotsky, 
this is not one of separation, but of the repositioning that arises when a child 
uses a word for a different purpose and as a result, in a new sense. However as 
the old meaning is retained in the new, the new is therefore not entirely novel. 
Consequently what is involved is not only a merely different understanding of a 
new concept, but also crucially a new element of conscious awareness - an 
ability to act in the world in a new way. Vygotsky drew from Shifs research 
that showed that there is a higher level of conscious awareness in the use of 
scientific than in the use of everyday ones. In the child the weakness of the 
everyday concept is the child's inability to operate with it in a voluntary 
manner, its strength is its saturation with the immediate perceptual experience. 
For instance the concept brother can be used appropriately as a term of 
reference, but the child may not automatically be in a position to understand it 
as part of a system of other concepts which give it meaning. According to 
Vygotsky: 'The child formulates Archimedes' law better than he formulates his 
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definition of what a brother is' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 178). In this example 
Vygotsky argues that the concept brother and the concepts involved in 
Archimedes' law, are learnt in different ways. The concept brother has already 
completed much of its developmental path and is saturated with the child's rich 
personal experience before the child has need to use the term in a scientific way 
(by defining it). In the case of Archimedes' law, the concept has barely begun 
such saturation with content when the teacher starts to introduce it as a 
scientific concept. For the school-aged child 'the weakness of the everyday 
concept lies in its incapacity for abstraction, in the child's inability to operate 
on it in a voluntary manner. ... In contrast, the weakness of the scientific 
concept lies in its verbalism, in its insufficient saturation with the concrete' 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 169). 
The distinction between Vygotsky's and Piaget's notion of different 
kinds of concepts parallels the distinction between their philosophical 
approaches to the relation of theory to practice or of rationalism to empiricism. 
As already noted according to Vygotsky, Piaget separated the different kinds of 
concepts more starkly than himself. For him they have a much greater degree of 
co-dependence. 
Piaget's Kantianism has quite different educational implications from the 
Hegelianism of Vygotsky. Moreover Kant's elaboration of the process of how 
knowledge is possible leaves terms separate and unrelated. Faculties of mind 
are distinguished in order to comprehend their different functions in thought. 
According to Kant these faculties are spontaneity and receptivity, concept and 
intuition. Each in its own tum explains a different mode in which knowing 
arises and distinguishes conscious knowing in the case of spontaneity85 from 
the passive reception of information in the case of receptivity. 86 
85 A confusion may arise here from the use of the term 'spontaneity'. The Kantian usage is 
technical, referring to a conscious form of knowing, it is almost the exact opposite of the more 
common usage that is found in the English translation of Pia get and Vygotsky. In the latter case 
spontaneity refers to a lack of consciousness in the use of a concept. 
86 There is a difficulty with a categorical presentation of Kant within the overall argument of 
the thesis, due to the variety of scholarly readings of the tensions which exist within his work. 
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Returning to Vygotsky's discussion of everyday and scientific concepts, it 
may be noted that the child's 'incapacity of abstraction' of everyday concepts 
and 'insufficient saturation of the concrete' of scientific concepts, raises for 
Vygotsky exactly the same issues as Kant. Kant addresses the problem of 
overcoming the gap between mind and world arising from dualism with his 
often quoted reference to a dove in flight which wishes the air was removed so 
that it could fly with less resistance, not appreciating that it is the very 
resistance of the air that sustains its flight. The reference is to the limitations of 
a common understanding of thought as completely separate from and bearing 
no relation to the world that it represents. But for Vygotsky the inadequacy of 
'thought without content' and 'intuitions without concepts' is resolved, not by 
the assumption of common modes of understanding inherent in human nature, 
but by social development. And although Vygotsky's discussion of the different 
modes of knowing relates expressly here to the school aged child, the 
underlying argument, though it appears by its location in a discussion of Piaget, 
to be restricted to children, has wider application to thought in general. In 
particular, once the idea of the concept is understood dynamically rather than as 
a static representation of the world, that is as a tool, which is modified 
according to context of development and application, then what is initially 
posed as an issue for child development becomes relevant to the use of concepts 
by adults. 
An issue at the heart of the discussion of scientific and everyday 
concepts is the way in which concepts (words) are understood. The creation of 
scientific concepts i.e. their systematicity, plays a direct role in the formation 
and development of spontaneous concepts since spontaneous concepts are 
deployed in an already existing space of reasons and not formed in a void. Van 
der Veer notes that when Vygotsky speaks of everyday/spontaneous concepts 
he understands a child being inducted into usage by an adult. The adult draws 
on a different conceptual structure and positioning from that of the child. Thus 
while the child may have his own relation within a 'space of reasons' in which 
to use the concept and within which the concept has meaning for him, he is 
drawing on a term that has meanings and locations of which he is not yet 
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aware.
87 Consequently, he moves within a domain (a space of reasons) that is 
not yet fully his own. 
A 'historical' approach is evident throughout Vygotsky's writing. In his 
discussion of scientific concepts he criticises the view that scientific concepts 
may be learnt in a completed form, and emphasises that in such a VIew 
'scientific concepts do not have their own internal history' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 
169). He notes that the development of scientific concepts is not accomplished 
simply by teaching them to the child and by the child's learning of them. He 
argues from research that it is known that the concept is not just a set of 
associative connections but a 'complex and true act of thinking' (Vygotsky, 
1987, p. 169). Although educational research may take account of this point, it 
is difficult to avoid (particularly in thf'! practice of teaching within mass state-
funded schooling) the assumption that a concept has been taught if pupils claim 
that they have understood it. The process of development of taught concepts is 
not only difficult to take account of, in a system of monitorable results, but it is 
also possible that where such a system exists, with results sometimes being 
monitored even on an hourly basis, no development can take place at all. 
Pupils' apparent failures are attributed to a failure of ability to develop concepts 
rather than to the lack of opportunity for concept development. By the 
development of concepts what is meant here is not only a fonnal understanding 
of the concept but the ability to situate it within a system of concepts. 
A crucial point for Vygotsky is that word meanmg IS a process of 
development, irrespective of age. When a child learns the meaning of a word, 
the development of its meaning, rather than being completed, has only just 
begun. Moreover its meaning is not learnt as a result of the direct transmission 
of a concept as empty verbal form, to be committed to memory, in which the 
87 In Brandom's terms, to use a concept (word) is to be involved in 'the game of giving and 
asking of reasons' (Brandom, 2000, p.192). That is not necessarily in a formal and explicit 
sense (i.e. in that the 'space of reasons' is present regardless of conscious awareness). In 
Vygotskian terms the child's utterance (as soon as it is more than noise) participates in the game 
of giving and asking of reasons in that the utterance is meaningful. It is meaningful, to the 
extent that the child had reasons for the use ofthe 'noise'/utterance by virtue of having a sense 
of what follows from and what supports the utterance (even if this sense arises externally and is 
not all of the child 's own making). 
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word is taken over in memory but not by thought. Meaning involves the 
development of a series of functions; voluntary attention, logical memory, 
abstraction, comparison and differentiation. Such complex mental processes, 
Vygotsky stresses, cannot simply be learned, since the word acts within a 
system as a tool and performs more than merely a representational function. 
The tendency to abstract the concept of thinking from the world in which 
it takes place and the forms through which it is expressed finds its origin in 
Descartes' dualism. Vygotsky continually attempts to explain mind (thinking) 
and world in a different way. He uses the Hegelian terminology of becoming in 
an attempt to retain the complexity of what is easily misunderstood as a simple 
relation of representation between thought and word: 'thought is not expressed 
in word, but is completed in the word. One might therefore speak of the 
becoming (the unity of being and non-being) of thought and word' (Valsiner 
and Van der Veer, 1991, p. 370). 
4.4 Consciousness 
Vygotsky's discussion of scientific concepts and their relation to everyday 
concepts cannot be separated from the deeper questions of consciousness and 
will. Consciousness is a problematic concept which is understood in a variety of 
ways reaching from on the one extreme simply having the capacity to pay 
attention to metacognition on the other.88 For Vygotsky consciousnesses was an 
unsettled question, and, then as now, one on which researchers and 
commentators are still working. But one thing we can say here is that in 
keeping with his rejection of Cartesian dualism, he does not see consciousness 
as a state of mind apart from the objects and activities of consciousness. For 
Vygotsky to be conscious is to be conscious of something - either an object or 
an activity. As part of the issue of consciousness Vygotsky is particularly 
88 It can also be understood as the opposite of unconsciousness though Vygotsky makes it clear 
that when he speaks of conscious awareness he is not using the tenn this way. He notes that 
'Freud's research establishes that the unconscious --which is carved out from consciousness--
emerges comparatively late' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 190). For Freud unconsciousness arises 
symbiotically with consciousness, and does not exist simply in opposition. 
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concerned with 'conscious awareness' which he designates a level of 
consciousness arising as a distinct aspect of consciousness as an activity, rather 
than a level present as a simple natural attribute: 'Conscious awareness is an act 
of consciousness whose object is the activity of consciousness itself (Vygotsky 
1987, p. 190). Vygotsky links conscious awareness to scientific concepts: 
Scientific concepts have a unique relationship to the object. This 
relationship is mediated through other concepts that themselves have 
internal hierarchical systems of interrelationships. It is apparently in 
the domain of scientific concepts that conscious awareness of concepts 
or the generalization and mastery of concepts emerges for the first 
time .... Thus conscious awareness enters through the gate opened up 
by the scientific concept. 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 191) 
By changing the relation to the object, new possibilities for action arise: 'To 
perceive something in a different way means to acquire new potentials for 
acting with respect to it. At the chess board to see differently is to play 
differently' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 190). 89 Vygotsky remarks that in Piaget's 
thought, it is not possible to find 'the thought that "spontaneous" is a synonym 
for "lack of conscious awareness'" when referring to concepts. He continues: 
Only within a system can the concept acquire conscious awareness 
and a voluntary nature. Conscious awareness and the presence of a 
system are synonyms when we are speaking of concepts, just as 
spontaneity, lack of conscious awareness, and the absence of system 
are three different words for designating the nature of the child's 
concept. 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 191) 
This concept of conscious awareness is totally different from merely being 
aware: it is the capacity to reflect on the process of reflection. Ilyenkov (1977a, 
89 Vygotsky is influenced by Spinoza's argument in the Ethics. Spinoza discusses how our 
common sense Cartesian understanding of freedom effects the ideas we have leading us to 
experience greater pain or sadness than is necessary. By repositioning elements involved in an 
affect (e.g. by re-assigning what we link together) the strength of affect may be altered. 
Proposition 48 states 'Love or hate - say, of Peter - is destroyed if the sadness the hate 
involves, or the joy the love involves, is attached to the idea of another cause, and each is 
diminished to the extent that we imagine that Peter was not its only cause' (Spinoza, 1993, 
p.1l4). 
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pp. 38-39) discusses the capacity not just to experience the rays of the sun on 
our eyeball, but to have a concept of the sun, projecting the rays. In other words 
we can conceive the sun apart from the effect it has on the rods and cones at the 
back of our eyes, and thus 'see' the sun as more than what would simply be the 
experience of a biochemical process. 
For Vygotsky 'at one and the same time, generalization implies the 
conscious awareness and the systematisation of concepts' (Vygotsky, 1987, 
p. 191). Vygotsky argues that what Piaget failed to see was that the empirical 
laws and regularities, which he drew from his work with children, only applied 
within the domain of children's unsystematised thought. Piaget had not 
appreciated the possibility that the child's lack of systematisation was 
dependent on the location of the child's thinking activity and was not a quality 
of the child's thought as such. Vygotsky argued that 'the capacity for deduction 
is only possible within a definite system of relationships among concepts' 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 192). Within a system, sensitivity to contradiction was 
possible. 
Margaret Donaldson and her colleague's replication of Piaget's experiments (to 
demonstrate the conservation ability and egocentrism of the child) achieved 
different results to Piaget because they introduced what effectually was 
systematic meaning into the test. However, this was not exactly the way in 
which they interpreted the success of their results. In Children's Minds, 
Donaldson explains the success of Martin Hughes' redesign of the 'mountain 
task' in terms of the fact that it 'requires the child to act in ways which are in 
line with certain very basic purposes and intentions {escape and pursuit) .. .' 
(Donaldson, 1978, p. 24). She saw it as introducing the motives and intentions 
of the characters involved in the task. However, it could equally be argued that 
Hughes' replication introduced not merely context that provided purposes and 
intentions but also the systematicity necessary to allow the child to make 
decisions according to a meaningful system of relations. If Brandom's point 
about the inferential character of any representation is taken seriously then what 
the children were offered in Hughes' task was the visibility of the 'reasons that 
follow from' and the 'reasons that are implied by', the task's events. The 
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evidence in the Hughes' experiment indicated that the vast majority of children 
were able to 'de-centre', unlike the egocentric children evident in Piaget's 
experimental results. 
Piaget's use of the category of egocentrism is profoundly conditioned 
by dualism and as Vygotsky rejects this dualism so also he rejects Piaget's use 
of egocentrism. Vygotsky's critique of Piaget's designation of egocentrism as 
evidence of a child's incapacity to think abstractly is based on his argument that 
conscious awareness is sustained by the location of concepts in meaningful 
relations to one another. In the case of scientific concepts, meaning is 
developed by the location of concepts to one another rather than by direct 
reference to the world. An ideal type of this self-reference is mathematical 
equations where the structure and the interrelation of its parts defines the values 
of the tenTIs. 
The difficulty of providing an example of an analytic statement, such as 
that found in mathematics, is that this is exactly the type of example which 
leads some commentators on Vygotsky to fear that he is concerned with an 
abstract rationality which denies the dialogic construction of knowledge 
(Werstch, 2000, Wegerif, 1999). This fear appears to be substantiated as the 
study of mathematics has exposed flaws in the Platonist position, that 
mathematics directly reflects the truths of reality. Much of the discussion about 
reason and relativism has occurred within the mathematics education 
community and this has resulted in extreme and influential fOnTIS of 
constructivism (von Glasersfeld, 1995). In philosophy the questions posed by 
the incapacity of mathematics to reflect the truth of reality directly are 
considered under the rubric of the epistemological status of analytical 
statements. This in fact is a set piece of philosophy. Quine's (2001) classic Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism exposed the failure of the separation between analytic 
and synthetic statements - the claim that some statements are true by definition 
while others are true as matters of fact. Vygotsky's text diminishes this 
problem: for the rejection of the Cartesian mind/world separation cuts the 
ground from under the analytic/synthetic distinction as the analytic can arise 
synthetically. However, it is not the contribution that Vygotsky's text can make 
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to philosophy that is of concern, but the importance of philosophy to the 
fonnation and shaping of Vygotsky's thought. Here in particular it is important 
to note that the Vygotskian notion of scientific concepts carries an immense 
wealth of meaning steeped in a long philosophical tradition.90 
To provide some basis for understanding what scientific concepts might 
mean in the light of this tradition, a brief digression is necessary. As we have 
seen, Vygotsky used the systemic relation of concepts and the possibility of 
conscious awareness (reflection on the way in which thinking proceeds), to 
criticise Piaget's understanding of the relation between egocentrism and 
thought in the child: 'We found the source of the lack of conscious awareness 
of concepts not in egocentrism but in the absence of system in the child's 
spontaneous concepts'(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 193). To appreciate his argument it 
is necessary to grasp how Vygotsky understood science and the relation of 
concepts to the world. This matter is broached at the end of this chapter. But 
first we will consider Vygotsky's ideas of the sociogenesis of mind. 
4.5 The sociogenetic constitution o/mind 
The sociogenetic constitution of mind is inextricably tied up with the question 
of foundationalism and there is evidence to show that for Vygotsky, 
foundationalism was constituted by history.91 His understanding of Hegel 
would have led him away from the sort of abstract knowledge and 
decontextualised rationality that he has been criticised for. There is no way as a 
follower of Hegel that he could have embraced such a position, because Hegel 
rejected these ideas more uncompromisingly than any other. 
The dualism of mind and world and the idea of thought as the pure 
contemplation of matter underlie common sense to such an extent, it is difficult 
90 What is not taken account of in critique of Vygotsky is that scientific concepts grasp the 
historical development of science. To have achieved this scientific concepts are themselves the 
result of scientific development. 
91 In a sense it could be described as an 'anti-foundational foundationalism'. 
108 
not to view thinking as an ideal activity totally separated from what is being 
thought. But once this separation is overcome, thinking and the object of 
thought no longer reach towards their object across a void but becomes a 
thinking of that object or, to look at things from the other side, thinking 
becomes a material activity. Being a material activity means being a moment of 
the social order or the impossibility of human thought outside of society. 
Vygotsky makes the radical point that social relations or relations among 
people genetically underlie all higher mental functions. 
The implication of this point is that every aspect of the activity of 
thinking - that is the means of thought as well as the material of thought - arises 
socio-genetically. Since this implies that mind itself is sociogenetic and as such 
distinctively human, it entails more than a position on the nature/nurture issue, 
which presupposes a capacity to think as a datum, and then considers the extent 
to which the development of this capacity depends on external or social 
conditions. As Davydov puts it, no human mental functions are given at the 
time of birth but only arise cultural-historically (Davydov, 1997, p. xxix). 
Vygotsky came to the conclusion that the study of children's behaviour needed 
radical review to show that even the most elementary functions were mediated 
from birth, ' ... even the most elementary functions, even those that arise at the 
earliest stage of man's life, possess a mediative, i.e. specifically human, 
structure' (Davydov, 1997, p. xxviii). Vygotsky's appreciation of what Hegel 
called 'the Understanding' (a matter that will be dealt with later) alerted him to 
all the difficulties of this approach: 
The social nature of each higher mental function has thus far escaped 
the attention of investigators who did not think to represent the 
development of logical memory or voluntary activity as part of the 
social formation of the child because in its biological beginning and in 
the end of mental development, this function appears as an individual 
function; only genetic analysis discloses the path that unites the 
beginning and end points. 
(Vygotsky, L. 1999, p. 41) 
The actual movement through which higher mental functions are determined by 
social genesis is understood little more than it was in Vygotsky's lifetime. In 
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part this is because these functions in their completed forms present themselves 
as individual and, even more to the point, are almost compelled to present 
themselves in society as though they were individualistic and natural due to the 
social conditions of modem society. Vygotsky was well aware of the significant 
change in the direction of research to address this area: 'The internalization of 
socially rooted and historically developed activities is the distinguishing feature 
of human psychology, the basis of the qualitative leap from animal to human 
psychology. As yet the barest outline of this process is known' (Vygotsky, 
1999). In taking this completed form, in which higher mental functions present 
themselves as the object of analysis, social science, including psychology, tends 
to remain implicitly Cartesian despite the exponential increase of interest in 
Vygotsky's ideas over the last 30 years. 
4.6 Sociogenesis 
Issues of sociogenesis have been raised in connection with Artificial 
Intelligence research and comparisons have been made with human 
intelligence. Andy Clark who has worked in the field notes that: 'biological 
systems profit profoundly from local environment structure' (Clark 1997, p. 
220-221). As an illustration he uses research into how some fish are able to 
exceed their natural swimming efficiency by 100 percent by exploiting the 
natural fluid dynamics of water (swirls, eddies and vortices) to 'turbocharge' 
their propulsion. Since it involves actively creating vortices e.g. by flapping 
their tail etc. the use of external conditions is more than an opportunistic 
exploitation of what is given. As Clark puts it: 
The environment is not best conceived solely as a problem domain to 
be negotiated. It is equally, and crucially, a resource to be factored 
into the solutions. This simple observation .. . has some far reaching 
consequences . ... ours are not the brains of disembodied spirits .... they 
are essentially the brains of embodied agents capable of creating and 
exploiting structure in the world ... . we must begin to face up to some 
rather puzzling [metaphysical] questions. .. . the traditional divisions 
among perception, cognition and action look increasingly unhelpful. 
(Clark, 1997, pp. 220-221) 
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Suggesting a bootstrapping or snowball effect in the development of mind, 
Clark writes that simple 'external props enable us to think better and hence to 
create more complex props and practices which in tum "turbo charge" our 
thought a little more.' (Clark, 1997, p. 62) Commenting on conceptions of 
planning and problem solving, Clark criticises the idea that a plan, as 
'determined by internalised sequences of instructions' (Clark, 1997, p. 63), 
should contain all the actions necessary to achieve its goal since this implies not 
only a representational conception of knowledge but also one in which each 
representation is isomorphic with the world. This view of planning, he argues, 
is inadequate because it overlooks the 'complex interplay between the plan and 
the supporting environment [which] ... goes well beyond the obvious fact that 
specific actions, once performed may not have the desired effect' (Clark, 1997, 
p.63). 
Although trivial in themselves, the examples that Clark gives indicate the 
importance of factors often not taken account of. Take his example of repairing 
an alternator. In dismantling an alternator to repair it, the spatial properties of 
the workspace are utilised to assist computation. Pieces of the alternator are laid 
out in a grouped or linear array to help in selecting for reassembly. 'We manage 
our physical and spatial surroundings in ways that fundamentally alter the 
information-processing tasks our brains confront' (Clark, 1997, p. 63). Another 
example Clark gives is writing. He argues that instead of understanding writing 
as perfonning a representational activity, we can more usefully treat it 'as an 
environmental manipUlation which transforms the problem space of the brain' 
(Clark, 1997, p. 63). In this connection it is interesting to note that recent 
arguments in philosophy on the use and content of concepts, have moved away 
from representationalism to inferentialism. 
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As noted in chapter three, the most notable exponent of this view is Brandom: 
the meaning of linguistic expressions and the contents of intentional 
states, indeed awareness itself, should be understood, to begin with, in 
terms of playing a distinctive kind of role in reasoning .. . The master 
idea that animates and orients this enterprise is that what distinguishes 
specifically discursive practices from the doings of non-concepts-
using creatures is their inferential articulation .... My hope is that by 
slighting the similarities to animals which preoccupied Locke and 
Hume and highlighting the possibilities opened up by engaging in 
social practices of giving and asking for reasons, we will get closer to 
an account of being human that does justice to the kinds of 
consciousness and self-conscious distinctive of us as cultural, and not 
merely natural, creatures. 
(Brandom, 2000, p.35) 
In distinguishing humans from animals, Brandom, by implication, also 
distinguishes humans from machines as knowers. Clark may be right when he 
argues: '[Environmental] structures, moulded by an iterated sequence of brain-
world interactions, can alter and transform the original problem until it takes a 
form that can be managed with the limited resources of pattern-completing, 
neural network style cognition' (Clark, 1997, p. 220). But this bears no relation 
to the distinction that Brandom draws between instrumental and the human 
knowledge with which Vygotsky was specifically and exclusively concerned. 
Having introduced Brandom however briefly into our discussion, it is important 
to mention another development in contemporary philosophy that bears directly 
on this problem, namely the 'space of reasons' as conceived by Sellars. Again it 
is important to remind ourselves of what was said earlier. Significantly both 
Brandom and Sellars, like Vygotsky, attach decisive importance to Hegel. 
This distinction between knowing in a human sense and mechanical or 
digital forms of knowing bears also on the issue of scientific activity. If we 
reject a view of knowledge which describes representationally, a separate and 
distinct world in which fact and value are separated, then a totally different 
understanding of the relation of laws to events must follow; in other words a 
totally different understanding of what science is. The expression of the 
regularities from which the laws of science take their construction, already 
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presuppose an enonnous effort of human intervention; since nature does not 
present regularities directly to the observer in a ready made fonn (Hacking, 
1983 , Cartwright, 1983, Bhaskar, 1978). As Bhaskar puts it, the relation 
between laws and events is not one of constant conjunction rather what we do 
in science is produce regularities: Drawing on Bacon, Bhaskar uses the analogy 
of 'twisting the lion's tail'. This issue is returned to in Chapter 7. 
4.7 Conclusion 
At the end of the section on consciousness earlier we said that in order to grasp 
Vygotsky's understanding of consciousness it was necessary also to understand 
his ideas of science and development. These ideas together with free will have 
already been raised in this chapter. The point we need to stress now is that none 
of these concepts as Vygotsky understood them, that is: Consciousness, Free 
will, Science, Development, can be understood apart from one another. Each of 
these is related to the other three. For example consciousness is stimulated by 
externalities when our responses are not passive, that is to say when we act 
using concepts which have a systematic relation to one another. For Vygotsky 
systematically related concepts of this type, which incidentally are not 
representational, are characteristic of science. The possibility of acting, rather 
than merely behaving, arises through the human capacity to formulate scientific 
concepts or to put it another way to develop what Spinoza called adequate 
ideas. This is a matter for the following chapter and the concepts of activity 
and passivity are considered in the next chapter. 
For the moment it is important in drawing this chapter to a close to 
underline how Vygotsky's criticism of Piaget brings to light the differences of 
philosophic approach employed. On the one side there is the Kantianism of 
Piaget, on the other the influence of Spinoza and Hegel. From the standpoint of 
the latter the dualism that stems from Descartes and orders common intuition 
today is rejected out of hand and with it many issues which appear self evident 
in contemporary research. Just one of these we may mention here as it has 
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particular significance for the interpretation of Vygotsky. It is the idea first that 
there was a homogenous body of thought from the mid-17th to the end of the 
18th century that can be classed as Enlightenment thought and second, that this 
body of thought was committed to abstract rationality. No stronger critics of the 
concept of abstract rationality can be found than Spinoza and Hegel, namely the 
philosophers from whom Vygotsky drew his inspiration and under whose 
influence he shaped his theories. 
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Chapter 5 
Spinoza and free will 
5.1 Freedom 
The social character of thought as discussed in Chapter 4, raises the issue of 
free will. Vygotsky's understanding of free will derives from Spinoza. His work 
is peppered with references to Spinoza, who, according to his childhood friend 
Dobkin, was his favourite philosopher. In the preface to The Psychology of Art, 
submitted as his doctoral thesis, Vygotsky noted his debt to Spinoza: 'My 
intellect has been shaped under the sign of Spinoza's words, and it has tried not 
to be astounded, not to laugh, not to cry, but to understand' (Vygotsky, 1971). 
In volume 6 of the collected works in the section The Teaching about Emotions, 
Historical Psychological Studies, there is an extended discussion of the 
difference between Spinoza and Descartes. This section highlights the elements 
of Spinoza's philosophy that were relevant to Vygotsky. The chapter will 
develop three themes involving the issue of free will, necessary to an 
understanding of Vygotsky's work. They are: 1) his distinctive idea of freedom 
understood as self determination; 2) the distinction between this idea of 
freedom and a common-sense concept of free will; 3) arising out of this notion 
of free will the issue of determinism and determinist readings of Marx. 
Free will in Spinoza is not separated from his idea of truth. An 
appreciation of this lack of separation is necessary to grasp Vygotsky's 
epistemological stance. The latter part of the chapter will extend the discussion 
of free will into Spinoza's idea of truth. For Spinoza truth is necessary to 
freedom as the two are inextricably linked together. Truth is the outcome of 
adequate ideas and free will only arises when humans are active rather than 
passive. In tum this is only possible when they have adequate rather than 
inadequate ideas. This is a deeper, more ontologically embedded notion than the 
simplistic idea that the possibility of free-action depends upon sufficient 
knowledge. 
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This link between adequate ideas and free will is fundamental for Vygotsky. 
Inextricably related to his argument about the development of intellect is the 
possibility of theorising freedom in a quite different way to the one entrenched 
in our common sense of how we act in the world. 
Vygotsky was acutely aware of the issue of free will, which was of central 
importance in his thought: ' ... we have tried to show ... the development of 
freedom of action is directly functionally dependent on the use of signs' 
(Vygotsky, 1999, p. 65). On the question of free will he wrote: 
The philosophical perspective opens before us at this point of our 
study. For the first time in the process of psychological studies we can 
resolve essentially purely philosophical problems by means of a 
psychological experiment and demonstrate empirically the origin of 
the freedom of the will . .. We cannot help but note that we have come 
to the same understanding of freedom and control as Spinoza 
developed in his 'Ethics'. 
(Vygotsky, 1997b, p. 219) 
The phrase in this passage 'for the first time' is even more significant than it 
first appears since it implies that there is something in the modem period that 
gives issues discussed under the remit of philosophy a practical character that 
they had not had hitherto. In other words philosophy in the modern period has 
become practical knowledge. On the matter of freedom Vygotsky turned to 
Engels' argument about the implacability of necessity: ' ... Engels places in one 
order the control of nature and the control of self. Freedom of will with respect 
to one and the other is, for him as for Hegel, understanding necessity.' 
(Vygotsky, 1997b, p. 218) But he went beyond Engels to criticise Descartes 
who, ' ... cannot always make a clear distinction between passions of the soul 
and passions of a soulless machine' (Vygotsky, 1999, p. 176). 
The common conception of will as freedom from restraint seems at odds with 
the idea of necessity. However, as intellect is a key aspect of will for Vygotsky 
and intellect is by its nature restrained - what in the Vygotskian literature is 
known as embedded - then the coexistence of freedom and restraint is not a 
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problem. A significant contribution of Vygotsky's was to see how mindedness 
is formed and sustained by mediation with artefacts in a social domain. 
Vygotsky opposed the idea of the mind as a metaphysical entity (soul) free to 
act on the world at will. Spinoza, as well as Hegel was particularly important 
for Vygotsky on this question of freedom: 
He [Spinoza] believed that human freedom was not, as was commonly 
held, indeterminacy of choice, but was self-determination, entirely by 
one's own nature, free from external compulsion. This for him was 
action proper, while determination by extraneous causes was passion, 
the subjection to which he called bondage. 
(Harris, 1992, p. 6) 
However, at the same time that Vygotsky grapples with a distinction between 
humans and animals which does justice to the higher ability of humans and 
which theological explanations of the soul attempt to capture, he also develops 
a framework that has the potential to be read deterministically. This issue of 
determinism was referred to in the previous chapter in connection with recent 
research in artificial intelligence drawing on the idea that the mind is developed 
externally: this research is easily led to a causally reductive notion of 
consciousness and agency. For Vygotsky determinism was a crucial issue: 
In the final analysis, the question is: does what is higher in man, his 
free and rational will and his control over his passions, allow a natural 
explanation that does not reduce the higher to the lower, the rational to 
the automatic, the free to the mechanical, but preserves all the 
meaning of this higher aspect of our mental life in its fullness, or to 
explain the higher, do we inevitably have to resort to rejecting the 
laws of nature, to introducing a theological and spiritualistic principle 
of absolute freewill not subject to natural necessity? In other words, 
the question is: is scientific knowledge of higher forms of conscious 
activity possible or impossible, is human psychology as a science, not 
as applied metaphysics as it is in all consistent idealists, beginning 
with Descartes, continuing with Lotze, and ending with Bergson, 
possible or impossible? 
(Vygotsky, 1999, p. 173) 
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5.2 Free will 
When considering the concept of freedom it is necessary to be aware that it has 
different meanings for different traditions. The sense in which we commonly 
think of ourselves as free actors owes much to Descartes' modernist separation 
of mind and world. To understand the sense of free will that informs 
Vygotsky's work it is necessary to get to grips with the sense of free will which 
derives from the work of Spinoza and Hegel. This is not easy to grasp, since it 
seems counter intuitive and goes against our sense of our activities as resulting 
directly from the exertion of our will.92 Moreover we inhabit a world whose 
social institutions and structures are premised on an implicit Cartesian notion of 
will (Ilyenkov 1976, Gergen, 1999). In our common sense conception, will 
presents itself to us as a capacity, a power vested within ourselves. This power, 
located in the soul, can operate on the world as an independent force, set apart 
from the world of matter upon which we act. Coupled to this everyday 
common-sense conception of freedom is the idea that free will is the 
unencumbered pursuit of the objects of desires and wants - 'free to consume 
what I like'. Presupposed here is that what I am, is what I desire (my identity is 
an outcome of my consumption patterns). There is no thought that desires may 
not be genuinely my own, i.e. not my own in the sense that they determine me 
externally. 93 
By contrast, Spinoza's conception of freedom is so different that some 
commentators have viewed him as a mechanical determinist without a notion of 
freedom at all. It is necessary to understand a number of elements of Spinoza's 
92 'Traditionally the will was taken to be a mental faculty responsible for acts of volition such as 
choosing, deciding, and initiating motion. This faculty of the soul or mind was taken as one of 
the most important, separating us from animals and inanimate objects' (Weatherford, 1995, p. 
910). 
93 Conceptions of freedom inform education practices. They can be understood as forming part 
of the 'folk psychologies' (Bruner, 1996) underlying pedagogic practices. For instance, some 
practices of 'child centred education' emphasising the 'rights' of children (another problematic 
area) to follow their own interests/desires/wants, are premised upon it. 
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philosophy to comprehend that he does indeed have a concept of freedom and 
thus to understand how it differs from the common sense notion of free will. 
These elements are: thought and extension as attributes of one substance; causa 
sui; adequate as opposed to inadequate ideas; and the distinction between 
passions and affects. Spinoza's treatment of theological questions led him to 
reject the dualist world view. He argued that as God is infinite he must be 
undetermined and, more than this, self-determined or causa sui. Through a 
lengthy argument, he concluded that there is only one substance consisting of 
an infinite number of attributes of which thought and extension are part. 
Everything which exists has a degree of self-determination - human beings have 
the highest possible degree. It is in self-determination that human beings exhibit 
freedom. A free agent is not one whose actions are undetermined, but whose 
actions are self-determined and self-determination arises only when we are not 
controlled by our passions. A passion is what Spinoza calls an affect produced 
by external causes rather than by our own power; when we are not controlled by 
our passions, we understand the reasons of our actions.94 Spinoza is often 
placed alongside the Stoics - certainly he shares with them a different sense of 
human existence and is not troubled by the anxiety of what the modem 
conception understands as free choice. The Stoics accept events that are 
unavoidable. For Spinoza we are free when we are guided by adequate 
knowledge rather than moved by external causes. To be guided by adequate 
rather than inadequate knowledge is to be free from external determination. 
94 On this matter, Freud has a debt to Spinoza for his practice of therapy. In discussing 
Spinoza, Moreau refers to Freud who, he writes 'in one of his interjections ... asserts that he 
[Freud] has always lived "in a Spinozist environment'''. Moreau goes on to argue that' ... a 
certain number of Freudian motifs recall the great themes of the Ethics without ever repeating 
them: fIrst of all, the idea that the psychological does not reduce to the conscious, and that 
events occurring in the psychological realm manifest themselves in the body' (Moreau, 1996, p. 
428). 
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As regards Descartes' notion of freedom as lack of compulsion by external 
cause, Spinoza writes (in correspondence) that: 
.. .if by a man who is compelled he means one who acts against his 
will, I admit that in certain matters we are in no way compelled and in 
this respect we have free will. But if by compelled he means one who, 
although he does not act against his will, yet acts necessarily, then I 
deny that we are free in anything. 
(Kashap, 1987, p. 168) 
This is a curious and unfamiliar notion of free will but it is a notion of freedom 
nonetheless. Freedom arises here because of necessity, not in spite of it. 
Spinoza continuously disputes the Cartesian conception of will grounded 
in a dualism of a material world and a wilful mind capable of free action in 
relation to it. He ridicules the common-sense notion of free will: ' ... so firmly 
are they persuaded that the body is moved by mere command of the mind, or is 
kept at rest, and that it performs many things which merely depend on will or 
ingenuity of the mind' (Spinoza, 1993, p. 86) and also denies it: 'The body 
cannot determine the mind to think, nor the mind the body to motion, nor to 
rest, nor to any other state (if there be any other), (Spinoza, 1993, p. 85). The 
belief that we have the power to act in the world free from any material restraint 
of our circumstance is caricatured by Spinoza as a metaphysical faith in will.95 
Vygotsky cites Spinoza's ridiculing of Descartes' metaphysical faith in will: 
Spinoza most acutely contrasts his thought with Descartes. Spinoza 
claims that Descartes ... significantly promotes the false opinion that 
affects depend absolutely on our will and that we can control them 
infmitely. Spinoza says that he cannot 'be surprised enough that a 
philosopher, having strictly held to reaching conclusions only on the 
basis of sources that are certain of themselves [Descartes said he 
wanted to build his philosophy only on the firm foundations of certain 
ideas] and claiming only what he recognises clearly and defmitely, 
and so frequently reproving the scholastics for thinking to explain 
dark things by hidden properties, how this philosopher accepts a 
hypothesis that is darker than any dark property.' 
(Vygotsky, 1999, p. 126) 
95 Indeed the very conception of a mind free from substance perpetuates this position. 
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In contrast to Descartes who assumed free will without accounting for the 
source of its power, Spinoza provided the argument that free will arises in the 
development of intellect and Vygotsky benefits from this insight. However, as 
previously noted, Vygotsky appreciated that any explanation of will that 
attempts to remove metaphysical or theological assumptions, risks determinism. 
Kashap points out that 'Descartes takes "the will" and "the understanding" to be 
distinct; for Spinoza the two are one and the same.' For Spinoza, 'the will and 
the intellect are nothing but the individual volitions and the ideas themselves. 
But the individual volition and the idea are one and the same' (Kashap, 1987, p. 
103). Kashap argues that because of the theory of what has been described as 
'parallelism,96 commentators such as H.H. Joachim have been led to remark 
that Spinoza makes 'the last vestiges of the popular conception of free will 
disappear' (Kashap, 1987, p. 106). Joachim is concerned that although Spinoza 
admits conscious desires he denies the reality of purposive action. However, 
Kashap remarks that Spinoza repudiates the charge that he reduces man to the 
level of plants or stones. Indeed the central concern of the Ethics is 
purposIveness and Spinoza made his concern with betterment through 
understanding quite explicit. What 'Spinoza discredits and contemptuously 
rejects, is action towards "ideals not yet real, but yet to be realized", or "action 
with a view to the attainment of an unpossessed "better'" (Kashap, 1987, pp. 
107-108). The point here, which also relates to the possibilities of policy for 
development, is that change can only be brought about from within in 
conjunction with the potential for development. Development cannot be 
imposed according to an abstract ratio whose 'ideals [are] not yet real, but yet 
to be realised.' 
Kashap offers an explanation of how Spinoza was able to hold the two 
seemingly incompatible views that every particular thing 'must involve 
reference to determining conditions outside its own nature' and that human 
beings as finite things can be said to direct their efforts 'purposefully towards 
96 Parrallelism is the term used to used to describe the simultaneous existence of the human 
mind and human body, without one being the cause of changes in the other. Kashap suggest that 
Spinoza's statement: 'The body cannot determine the mind to thought, neither the body to 
motion or rest. .. ' (EIII, 2) 'is the first of its kind in so-called modem philosophy which 
suggests a distinction between causes and reasons of human behaviour' (Kashap, 1987, p. 117). 
121 
an end of which they are conscious' (Kashap, 1987, p. 109). He suggests that 
the understanding of explanatory conditions do not preclude purposive and 
intentional action, for Spinoza. By taking over Spinoza's rejection of a mind-
body dualism, Vygotsky was able to frame his work in a context that allowed 
him to work with a notion of human agency which lies within a realm of 
determination yet has the possibility of freedom. 
For Vygotsky 'mastery' of external determinations are crucial; as for 
Spinoza an entity is free only when it is the cause of itself, when it is self-
determined. Self-determination is not possible through a pure act of will, but 
requires (indirect) mediation - the mind can be steered towards its intention. It 
is by placing the causes of thought in the realm of reasons as scientific concepts 
that ideas escape the realm of contingent determination and acquire positive 
potential for action. Psychological tools direct the mind and behaviour as 
technical tools transform the object. Speech used for others becomes speech for 
oneself. Behaviour is moved not by an innate metaphysical power - Descartes' 
will, but from reflexive interaction in the world. Vygotsky leaves no gap 
between mind and world; action creates mind as mind creates world. 
For Vygotsky, following Spinoza, the basis of freedom is man's ability to 
separate himself from his passions, from the contingencies of nature, and to 
make for himself a space within which he can determine his actions. Such 
actions are determined, not by causes which are completely external but by ones 
which lie within his sphere of efficacy.97 As noted in the previous chapter, it is 
possible to discern a concept of freedom in Vygotsky, as for instance when he 
discusses the sense in which consciousness is just assumed by Piaget. Whereas 
for Piaget, consciousness occurs in the child once the bankruptcy of his own 
thinking is evident, for Vygotsky, consciousness arises by the subjects' 
changing location in relation to external forms of determination. 
97 Vygotsky cites the case of Buridan's ass where the animal is unable to choose between the 
stimulus of two equal bales of hay and thus starves. He uses the tale to distinguish the 
possibility of freedom in human activity through the use of mediating artifacts. In the simple 
case of an inability to decide a human may toss a coin. No matter that the point is trivial, the 
human has an additional means of interaction with external determination which the ass lacks 
(Vygotsky, 1997, p. 46). 
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A further aspect of Vygotsky's disagreement with Piaget's Kantianism 
concerns existence. For Spinoza and also Hegel, to explain the existence of a 
thing it is also necessary to explain its genesis. A thing cannot be apprehended 
merely as it appears in existence. Genesis and the importance of history are 
considered in more detail in Chapter 6, which discusses Hegel's critique of the 
Understanding. For the moment it is enough to note that for Hegel there is a 
distinction between the actual and real in that what is real arises from a process 
of actualisation, and is not, therefore, what it appears to be at any given 
moment.98 Vygotsky looks to the unfolding of consciousness rather than its 
arbitrary positing in terms of the bankruptcy of egocentric thought. Vygotsky 
finds the genesis of consciousness in the development of scientific concepts. 
This was the argument (noted earlier) which Vygotsky used to criticise Piaget's 
failure to understand that the child's lack of conscious awareness was affected 
by his position in relation to what he was asked to understand, rather than to a 
conflict between his own childish concepts and those which gave him access to 
reality. 
To reiterate, human behaviour according to Vygotsky is neither controlled 
nor directed by immediate means based on pure acts of will, but is moved 
indirectly through the use of signs and tools. Modification of the world by 
human activity, creates an artificiality (or 'artefactuality') of conditions. Within 
such artificial and man-made conditions volition can be directed/mediated 
(caused) but in these circumstances the cause of an action arises through man's 
own creations/artefacts and not merely as response to external determinations. 
This provides for human beings the possibility of a universality not available to 
animals which do no more than respond directly to environmental 
determinations i.e. without conscious mediation or reflection. 
This aspect ofVygotsky's work is linked to Ilyenkov by Bakhurst. Ilyenkov 
captures the artistic moment of science when he writes that 'The capacity to 
98 One of the propagated misunderstandings of the term essentialism is that it refers to an 
intrinsic essence of all things understood as inherent quality or capacity. Moreover this inherent 
quality or capacity is understood in terms of individual objects or things, atomistically. 
However the concerns that critics have of any claim to defme what a thing is absolutely, ignores 
the use of essentialism as a term that refers to a process. 
123 
think is just the capacity to inhabit an idealized environment' (Bakhurst, 1991, 
p. 244). llyenkov draws also on Spinoza: 
'[As Spinoza correctly believed,] Thought prior to and outside of its 
spatial [external] expression in appropriate material fonus simply does 
not exist' (Ilyenkov cited by Bakhurst, 1991, p. 245). 
We think so much that we 'will' the world into existence, when we do not. 
Ilyenkov captures thoughts embedded (or better - embodied) character - yet 
universality, when he states that it is: 
the mode of action of the thinking body... '" the genuine, specific form 
of the action of the thinking body is its universality ... 
... Man - the thinking body - builds his movements according to the 
form of any other body. He does not wait until the insurmountable 
opposition of other bodies forces him to swerve from his path; the 
thinking body freely negotiates any obstacle of the most complex 
form. The ability actively to build one's action according to the form 
of any other body, actively to make the form of a spatial movement 
agree with the form and disposition of all other bodies, Spinoza 
considers the distinguishing feature of the thinking body, the specific 
mark of those actions that are called 'thought,' 'reason.' 
(Ilyenkov cited by Bakhurst, 1991, pp. 250_251)99 
As Bakhurst puts it: 'It is this ability to conform to the dictates of no particular 
situation, but of any, that Ilyenkov calls thought's universality . ... Thought 
embodies the permanent possibility of transcendence; it may always go beyond 
what it took to be its own limits' (Bakhurst, 1991, p. 251). 
While this bodily dimension of thought is absent from Piaget's characterisation 
of a contemplative mind, it is central to Vygotsky theory: 
Consciousness arises out of life and fonus only one of its features. But 
once awakened, thought itself defines life. Or more accurately, a 
thinking life defines itself through consciousness. As soon as we 
separate thought from life, from dynamics, and from necessity, we 
have deprived it of all reality; we have put off all paths to the 
clarification and explanation of the traits and chief purposes of 
thought: to define lifestyle and behaviour, to change our actions, to 
direct them, and to free them from the power of concrete 
circumstances. 
(Vygotsky, 1993, p. 237) 
99 Bakhurst notes that Ilyenkov's 'conception of thought largely emerges during his treatments 
of Spinoza' (Bakhurst, 1991, p. 251). 
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Following Spinoza, a crucial question for Vygotsky is, how to free ourselves 
from our concrete circumstances, from our passions; how to be free, not 
determined by external causes but to be a cause of ourselves (causa sui). 
According to Spinoza we are not able to control ourselves directly through a 
will not tied to matter; we can only achieve freedom by altering our position in 
relation to external determinations or as Vygotsky put it, by creating extrinsic 
stimuli. 
Spinoza explains the relationship of will and conscIOUS awareness as 
characteristic of concepts located in relation to one another, i.e. systemically. 
The more our actions are formed by adequate ideas (i.e. ideas where the genetic 
connections are understood explicitly) the more we are determinate of our own 
actions and we are said to be active. The more we act according to inadequate 
ideas (ones whose relations are unexpressed) we are said to be passive and as 
such our actions are not free: 
The physical and mental behaviour of a human being ... may be active 
or passive to various degrees. The more it stems distinctively or 
creatively from its own conatus, the more active it is; the more it is 
merely acted on by external things, the more passive it is. 
(Sprigge, 1995, p. 848) 
Spinoza calls the active behaviour of the mind 'adequate ideas', the passive 
behaviour 'inadequate ideas'. Adequate ideas necessarily constitute more 
genuine knowledge: 
Spinoza regards us in bondage so far as we are under the control of 
external things (in a sense which includes especially mental processes 
of our own that we do not properly understand) and as free to the 
extent that we meet life with creative understanding of what will best 
serve the purposes that adequate ideas will determine in us. 
(Sprigge, 1995, p. 848) 
Related to the Spinozist conception of freedom, gained by holding adequate 
ideas, is a totally different notion of truth from one that we commonly hold to 
(as the direct opposite of falsity and referring directly to something which is 
actual rather than actualising). 
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5.3 Spinoza and truth 
Spinoza insists that: 
error is always the privation of knowledge; to say that an idea or 
proposition is false is to say that it is relatively incomplete and 
fragmentary, and is therefore to say something about its lack of logical 
relation with other ideas; the falsity is corrected as soon as the idea is 
placed in cOlUlexion with other ideas in a larger system of knowledge. 
(Hampshire, 1992, p. 87) 
Every idea has its own ideatum (material parallel), and therefore what we 
understand as false belief is a matter of incomplete knowledge (Hampshire, 
1992). 
The materiality of thought is reiterated in the writings of scholars of 
Spinoza. Deleuze takes issue with the contemplative character of what it is to 
make something explicit. 'Explication far from amounting to an understanding 
that remains outside its object, amounts primarily to the objects' own evolution' 
(Deleuze, 1992, p. 18). From a Cartesian point of view and for those who adopt 
it as self-evident, these are difficult ideas. The notion of truth in Spinoza is 
fundamentally different from that of propositional knowledge, yet it is the 
assumption that Vygotsky is referring to propositional knowledge when he talks 
of scientific concepts, that leads commentators, such as Wertsch, to criticise 
him on the grounds of holding to a decontextualised form of rationality. 
Propositional knowledge is often used to mean that a statement corresponds to 
or pictures a truth of the world. However, once the dualist conception of mind 
and world is replaced by the idea of thought and extension as 'two sides of the 
same coin' - attributes of the same substance, - the question of the relation of 
thought to the world takes a different form. Truth is no longer something that 
can be ascribed to isolated facts. In his discussion of Deleuze, Hardt argues 
that: 'Along with Thomas Mark, a perceptive American commentator, Deleuze 
shows that Spinoza's theory of truth is an ontological theory of truth' (Hardt, 
1993, p.90). He continues: 'Mark explains that the traditional approach of 
Anglo-American and Analytical interpretations of Spinoza (Joachim, Stuart 
Hampshire, Alisdair MacIntyre) counterposes Spinoza to a correspondence 
theory of truth and in line with a 'coherence theory' where truth is defined as 
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coherence within the orderly system that constitutes reality' (Hardt, 1993, p. 
131). (This reading of Spinoza still sees thought as operating only within a 
realm of contemplation and rather than as a material activity). Hardt explains 
Mark's argument that by contrast to American and Analytical interpretations, 
'Spinoza is better situated in the much older epistemological tradition of truth 
as being. "If we want to see Spinoza's theory of truth within its proper 
historical setting we must not contrast the correspondence view of truth with the 
coherence view of truth, but rather with theories of 'truth of being' rather than 
'truth of things' i.e. as ontological truth'" (Hardt, 1993, p. 131). Hardt argues 
that Mark does not take this line of argument far enough when he satisfies 
himself with situating Spinoza in the 'Platonic tradition' as sufficient. Hardt 
continues that once truth is understood as ontological then an inextricable 
relationship exists between truth and power and Spinoza's rightful place is as 
Deleuze places him within a Nietzschean tradition (Hardt, 1993). Foucault 
draws from this tradition, when he argues that something is true because it is 
powerful not powerful because it is true. 
For Spinoza adequate ideas are true by virtue of their adequacy: 
Adequate ideas are expressive, and inadequate ideas are mute. In other 
words, the distinctive character of an adequate idea is that it tells us 
something about the structure and connections of being (or at least the 
attribute of thought) through a direct expression of its efficient and 
formal causes. From an ontological perspective, the inadequate idea 
tells us nothing because we cannot recognise its place in the 
productive structure of thought. 100 
(Hardt, 1993, p. 90) 
100 This relates directly to pedagogical approaches which attempt to make the development of 
any concept explicit to the learner. 
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Spinoza introduced a material and 'historical' element to Descartes' 
requirement of clear and distinct ideas (and in doing so paved the way for 
Hegel's historical concept of mind): 
A given idea of a circle may be clear and distinct, but it remains 
inadequate unless it explains the path of its own production. An 
adequate idea of a circle might for example, involve the idea of a fixed 
radius rotated around a central point; it expresses its cause. ... An 
adequate idea of justice would have to express the means by which we 
produce or construct such an idea; it would involve a genealogy of 
ideas that result in this idea. 
(Hardt, 1993, p.132) 
A description of a circle as a figure where all straight lines drawn from the 
centre to the circumference are equal would be inadequate since it expresses 
only one of its properties but not how the circle is produced and or how its 
essence can only be captured by expressing the elements intrinsic to its 
formations. For Spinoza the adequate idea of the circle is 'a figure described by 
a straight line wherein one end is fixed and the other is free. This clearly 
comprehends the proximate cause and states how the figure is brought about, 
and hence constitutes a proper definition' (Kashap, 1987, p. 6) . 
. .. Spinoza suggests that if the thing to be defined is a dependent or a 
created thing then its definition must specify the conditions or factors 
which explain how it comes to be (i.e. its immediate or proximate 
cause). The innermost essence of a thing that depends for its existence 
on conditions external to itself consists precisely in those conditions 
without which it could not be produced, or come to be what it is . 
... once the essential conditions for its production have been specified 
then it would be possible to infer all the characteristics or properties of 
a thing from such a definition. This ... clearly involves an unfolding of 
the very nature of the thing that is being defined. 
(Kashap, 1987, p. 5) 
This perception of truth is different from its everyday one: and it has particular 
significance for consideration of abstract rationality and constructivism. Once 
again philosophy intervenes in the discussion. Spinoza provides a different 
insight into the 'hermeneutic challenge of perspectivalism' raised in Chapter 4. 
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Brockmeier argues that Vygotsky shared the same Kantian starting point as 
Piaget, assuming that 'there is no absolute and objective cognition of the world 
as it really is' (Brockmeier, 1996, p. 140). Brockmeier's positioning of 
Vygotsky, however, presupposes mind/world dualism and is not sustainable 
when thought and extension are understood as attributes of one substance and 
when each idea has its own ideatum. The different idea of truth entailed in 
Spinoza's position allows precisely the opposite - the idea that absolute and 
objective cognition of the world is possible. Vygotsky's debt to Spinoza 
precludes him from subscribing to Piaget's Kantianism and to perspectivalism. 
This discussion of truth is not separate from freedom but dependent upon 
it. Kashap agrees with Hampshire that for Spinoza the fundamental term of 
evaluation is not good but free. This again goes against the familiar 
understandings of common sense. But it must be remembered that Spinoza 
rejected the Cartesian dualism in which these understandings are grounded. 
Spinoza does not subscribe to the Cartesian power of judgement. Kashap points 
out that, for Descartes, error depends on two factors in combination. These are 
the power of understanding and the power of will. Understanding only allows 
us to apprehend ideas but it does not affirm or deny them. Citing Descartes, 
Kashap notes the emphasis on free choice: 'The faculty of will consists solely 
in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do a thing' 
(Kashap, 1987, p. 99). Spinoza rejects the notion of liberty that Descartes 
imagines the mind to possess. For Spinoza liberty cannot be distinct from 
necessity. Hence free action for Spinoza is not a matter of choice or volition but 
of the mind's activity as opposed to its passivity. Activity for Spinoza 
concerned the quality of activity rather than its mere fact, i.e. the mind is active 
when its ideas are adequate and passive when its ideas are inadequate. For 
Spinoza we are said to act when we are the adequate cause of our actions that is 
when the ideas on which our actions are based on adequate ideas. This is a 
totally different sense of action from the common one which makes no such 
profound distinction. So many of the actions that we feel ourselves to be 
engaged would, if we take Spinoza's line of argument, be understood 
differently as vain less repetitions. Often such vain less repetitions perpetuate 
what they are intended to change. This, of course, is a standard 
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psychotherapeutic position, where an action that is claimed by a patient to be 
effective, is revealed to be preserving the situation that the patient wishes to 
change. For Spinoza such activity, though it comprises concrete actions, is not 
really activity at all; or it is, to be precise, because it is driven by inadequate 
ideas - it is passivity. The mind becomes active in relation to these passive 
'actions' once it is formed by adequate ideas and is the adequate cause of 
events. Action for Spinoza is restricted to what we are adequate cause of in the 
same way that we are active when our mind is composed of adequate ideas. 
Here agam freedom, truth and goodness are ontological rather than 
representations of states of the world. Their existence depends on aspect and 
activity rather than an assigned essence. This brings us back to the learning 
paradox and a different way of conceiving learning. 
To educate is to relocate ideas and this is different from what are termed 
child-centered approaches or traditional didactic approaches. The attempt to 
grow a higher understanding exclusively from children's experiences fails as 
completely as the attempt to implant a higher understanding without regard to 
these experiences. Bruner's attempt to explain how knowledge is already 
present in the child, shows the actualisation of the knowledge is a neither a 
reduction to, nor an ignoring of the particularities of the child. This sense of 
pedagogy as moving intellect is so different to one of techniques and style. 
Bruner comments on Vygotsky's fruitful idea of ZPD. Vygotsky describes the 
assessment of the mental development of children of the same chronological 
age. The assessment might reveal a similar mental age. He states: 
If I stop at this point, people would imagine that the subsequent course 
of development and of school learning of these children will be the 
same, because it depends on their intellect.... Now imagine that I do 
not terminate my study at this point, but only begin it...Suppose I 
show ... [these children] have various ways of dealing with a task. .. that 
the children solve the problem with my assistance. Under these 
circumstances it turns out that the fIrst child can deal with the 
problems up to a twelve-year-old's level. The second up to a nine-
year-old's level. Now are these children mentally the same? 
(Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 85-6) 
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Bruner locates what he describes as Vygotsky's 'stunning concept' of ZPD in 
Plato's discussion of a priori knowledge in the Meno. One of Bruner's 
arguments stresses that as novice learners we already know a great deal. The 
idea that we can only know what we already know is referred to as the 
'Learning paradox': how is it possible to know when knowledge already 
presupposes the means of knowing. Bruner explains that the idea of ZPD rests 
on 'the brute fact, perhaps first celebrated by Plato in the Meno where he 
discusses the young slave's apparent "knowledge" of geometry while being 
questioned appropriately by Socrates, that ignorant learners can do better in 
understanding a matter when prompted or "scaffolded" by an expert than they 
can do on their own' (Bruner, 1987, p. 4). In a later work he argues: 'In some 
deeper sense, grasping something abstractly is a start toward appreciating that 
seemingly complicated knowledge can often be derivationally reduced to 
simpler forms of knowledge that you already possess' (Bruner, 1996, p. 51). To 
illustrate his point Bruner gives the example of a Mystery story with note 
inserted in a text saying that the reader already holds all the knowledge 
necessary to solve the crime. He makes the point that an educator can lead 
children 'to recognise that they know far more than they thought they ever 
knew, but that they have to 'think about it' in order to really know what they 
know [to actualise the knowing]. And that, after all was what the Renaissance 
and the Age of Reason were all about! But to teach and learn that way means 
you have to adopt a new theory of mind' (Bruner, 1996, p. 52). 
5.4 Determinism and development 
The preceding discussion has attempted to illuminate elements of Spinoza's 
philosophy that are relevant to Vygotsky's approach to mind. However, a 
continuing theme in this thesis is the issue of determinism. In Chapter 2 it was 
raised in relation to attempts to provide 'a mechanics of mind'. In this chapter 
the issue of determinism is raised in attempts to provide a causal account of 
mind and will. 
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A difficulty in conceiving freedom is locating it within its relationship to 
determination. The 'Freedom and Determinism' debate has a long and 
distinguished history in philosophy. Once a theological conception of freedom 
is rejected - a mind made of some different substance than the world and thus 
able to transcend that world and the mechanical causes by which it moves -
then the alternative scientistic position appears only to offer an explanatory base 
in efficient causes. Where a causal explanation appears to offer the alternative 
to a metaphysical or mystical conception of freedom, it reduces human action to 
the mechanical and determined thus leaving no space for freedom or what 
seems more pertinent - a means for assigning responsibility. The difficulty of 
subscribing to causal explanations of agency as an alternative to a theological 
position is that in attempting to explain the sociogenesis of man it becomes 
viable to assign the causes of what a human being is to the environment that 
determines him. If such a thing were possible then the development of 
humanity ('the construction of socialist man' in Vygotsky's time) would be a 
matter of 'scientific data' used via policy to develop. However, this is a danger 
inherent in applications of Vygotskian theory where policy makers reqUIre 
precise information as to factors that account for different outcomes. 
These problems of determinist explanations anse In interpretations of 
Marx. The temptation is to see man simply as a product of his circumstances. 
This determinism plagued Vygotskians - it was the difficulty Leontiev and the 
Kharkov group had with Vygotsky as he appeared to retain a plane that was not 
explainable by tool use in an environment. 
The idea of economic determinism has been developed through a crude 
reading of Marx where a determinate relation is taken to existing between what 
became known as the base and superstructure model. Glassman provides an 
illustration of a typical case of a commentator on Vygotsky who misreads Marx 
and in doing so produces a particular interpretation of Vygotsky. In discussing 
Leontiev and Vygotsky's work, Glassman argues that their work contains the 
idea of the progressive evolution of social systems championed by Spencer and 
the social philosophy of Marx and Engels. 'Marx and Engels seem to have 
partially embraced Spencerism along with Darwinism ... the difference for Marx 
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and Engels was that, rather than seeing progress as driving activity, progress 
emerged out of activity' (Glassman, 1996, p. 311). 
The reading of Marx in this way influences interpretations of Vygotsky's 
work. The conflation of Marx's work to the practice of Soviet Marxism, 
commonly imposes reductive notions of progress and development that are then 
transferred to readings of Vygotsky. On many occasions Marx himself found 
the need to refute crude conceptions of his interest in Darwin's work. It was 
Spencer who used the phrase struggle for survival often wrongly attributed to 
Darwin, and DalWin like Marx, did not hold to the conception of progressive 
development often read into their work. 101 
Bruner, notes that Vygotsky 'did not subscribe to the Soviet Marxist 
dogma that then viewed man as a mere "product" of history and circumstance' 
(Bruner, 1987, p. 2). He also recognises the possibility in Vygotsky's work of 
conceiving freedom differently when he states: 'In the end Vygotsky flirts with 
the idea that the use of language creates consciousness and even free will' 
(Bruner, 1987, p. 2). 
Bruner's suggests that Vygotsky's interest in the place of consciousness in 
mental life put him at odds with Stalinist ideologues and offers the following 
explanation. According to Bruner, the 'battle of consciousness' became central 
to Soviet psychology only after the Stalinist suppression was lifted. Vygotsky's 
followers were lined up against the Pavlovians. However, an improvement of 
relations between the two sides could arise only when Vygotskian theory was 
restated in the language of the Second Signal System of Pavlov. The Second 
101 Marx writes in a letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, June 27,1870: 'Mr. Lange has made a great 
discovery. The whole of history can be brought under a single great law. This natural law is the 
phrase (in this application Darwin's expression becomes nothing but a phrase) "struggle for 
life", and the content of this phrase is the Malthusian law of population or, rather, 
overpopulation. Thus instead of analysing the "struggle for life" as represented historically in 
various defmite fonns of society, all that is done is to translate every concrete struggle into the 
phrase "struggle for life", and this phrase itself into the Malthusian "population fantasy". One 
must admit that this is a very impressive method - for swaggering, sham-scientific, bombastic 
ignorance and intellectual laziness. ' (Marx, 1934, p. 20) 
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Signal system incorporates the notion that language and concepts mediate 
human existence as a second signal rather than as a first signal where stimuli act 
on the nervous system directly. However the overly determinate implication of 
this model of signalling and an alternative means by which the sense of 
freedom in Vygotsky can do justice to his interest in the 'transcendent' quality 
of art, remains in question. 
The issue of determinism infuses much work in the Vygotskian field 
and it was there right from the start. The split between Vygotsky and his 
colleagues centred to some extent on this issue. Leontiev split with Vygotsky 
and other members of the group to form the Kharkov group. The split has been 
presented as a contrast between Vygotsky's emphasis on semiotic mediation 
and Leontiev wanted to focus on social activity. In his obituary of Vygotsky, 
Leontiev wrote that Vygotsky's ideas belonged to the past and that there must 
be a move away from semiotic mediation: the Kharkov group must distance 
itself from these ideas (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991). In 1939 Zinchenko 
wrote an article in which he argued the priority Vygotsky gave to semiotic 
mediation should be abandoned (Kozulin, 1990). Yet as we see in chapter 7 the 
issue of semiotic mediation was more than a matter of idealism and of sign 
versus the materialism of tool. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Here to bring this chapter to a conclusion we tum our attention to two further 
issues about determinism. The first concerns explanations of freedom framed 
exclusively in terms of causation; the second involves the issue of normativity. 
Both of these issues are of concern in appropriations of Spinoza and hence at 
one remove Vygotsky as well. 
A problem of determinism arises when explanations of freedom are 
addressed solely in terms of causes. Although Spinoza has suffered from being 
understood as a determinist, his working through of ideas offer the possibility 
of theorising freedom in a radically different way. 
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The situating of freedom within the free will-determinism polarisation has 
led those commentators, who hold a notion of freedom as freedom from 
necessity, to the conclusion that Spinoza has no notion of free will at all. Martin 
Jay sees Spinoza as a determinist who argues that free will was an illusion that 
'an understanding of logical necessity would dispel' (Jay, 1984, p. 29). The 
reading of Spinoza by Plekhanov and the interpretation placed upon him in 
Soviet Marxism supports Jay's interpretation. However, although a first 
reading of Spinoza indeed suggests a determinist and mechanical approach, it is 
possible to see in his working through of certain fundamental questions, a clear 
notion of freedom. Spinoza's use of the geometric exposition supports the 
impression that the argument is determinist in its conception. However, his use 
of this approach can be understood heuristically as a way of demonstrating that 
his argument is as systematic as Descartes even though it does not start from a 
Cartesian point of certainty (i.e. Spinoza's 'antifoundationalist foundationalism' 
as opposed to Descartes foundationalism). Stuart Hampshire comments that 
Spinoza's ' . . . metaphysics of the mind, which provides his scheme or outline of 
science of psychology, was certainly not simply mechanical or behaviouristic' 
(Hampshire, 1988 p.70). This judgement is made by many Spinoza scholars. 
Errol Harris points out that Spinoza denies that his theory subjects man to fate, 
arguing that he is not a mechanical determinist (Harris, 1992, p. 31). 
Ilyenkov argues that the geometric structure of Spinoza's argument 
should not be misread as proof of a determinist position: 
It is not so easy, however, to bring these brilliant principles out 
because they are decked out in the solid annour of the constructions of 
fonnal logic and deductive mathematics that constitute the 'shell' of 
Spinoza's system, its (so to say) defensive coat of mail. In other 
words, the real logic of Spinoza's thinking by no means coincides with 
the fonnal logic of the movement of his 'axioms', 'theorems', 
'scholia', and their proofs. 'Even with philosophers who gave their 
work a systematic form, e.g. Spinoza, the real inner structure of their 
system is quite distinct from the fonn in which they consciously 
presented it,' Karl Marx wrote to Ferdinand Lassalle. 
(Ilyenkov, 1977a, p. 29) 
What is important here is not so much whether Spinoza was a mechanical 
determinist or even whether Vygotsky was party to the determinist tendencies 
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of post-revolutionary Russia's attempt to implement policies for rapid 
development, but the extent to which a particular way of working through 
certain questions opens up new possibilities. Ilyenkov denies the reductive 
reading of Spinoza's idea; indeed the whole impetus of dealing with thought as 
an attribute of one substance prevents any reduction of thought to neurons or 
causal mechanisms in physiology. 
Where for Descartes, will and therefore freedom have no cause nor 
explanation, Spinoza has definite conception of freedom based on self-
determination. To be free for Spinoza is to be a cause of oneself. Will is not 
separate from intellect and nor from the adequacy or inadequacy of ideas. 
Freedom is found in necessity but in one that man mediates as his own rather 
than one that remains uncompromisingly external. The idea of freedom 
untouched by necessity is impossible. Vygotsky grasps this point as a way to 
understand freedom through mediation. Bruner recognises the beginnings of a 
theory of freedom in Vygotsky but also that he was unable to complete this 
task. The task is not even addressed within contemporary psychology. 
A further difficulty facing attempts to theorise freedom (and with it 
intellect) stems from the Cartesian dualism of a mind and world. Linked to the 
problem of consciousness and the question of human agency is the question of 
ethics. In the Cartesian model, ethics is relativised by the separation. A 
distinction which parallels the gap between mind and matter is implied between 
an evaluative and descriptive use of language. Following Hume, there is an 
unbridgeable gap between fact and value - the impossibility of deducing an 
ought from an is. Dualism entails a separation of the normative from the 
positive and a separation of reason from the passions. The critique of 
rationality, or more specifically abstract rationality, depends upon the 
assumption of the separation of a reason dealing with the facts of the world 
from the passions entwined with values and intentions. 102 
102 Curiously this is the exact opposite of the intended goal of those critiquing abstract 
rationality. Their purpose is to show that emotions or the affective dimension of thought is 
central to thinking. As a result there is a need to reject what they take (mistakenly) to epitomize 
abstract reason - thought devoid of affect. It can be argued that the separation of affect and 
reason which they criticize is a supposition of their own making. 
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Here is one of the crucial themes of this thesis, namely that the critique of 
Vygotsky on the grounds of abstract rationality fails to apprehend the 
philosophic tradition within which Vygotsky was working and quite apart from 
its own limitations really misses its target altogether. Given Vygotsky's interest 
in Spinoza, the brief discussion of Spinoza above is hopefully enough to show 
that the claims made by those who criticise Vygotsky for abstract rationality fail 
to do justice to the complexity of the issues involved. 
The argument here complements the argument of the preceding chapter 
since it shows that for Vygotsky following Spinoza the question of the intellect 
and the problem of freedom are part and parcel of one another. 
A moment ago we referred to the separation of positivity and normativity 
that stems from Hume, now it is important to mention that recent philosophy 
has laid the grounds for overcoming this separation. An important instance of 
this is McDowell's use of Sellars critique of the 'myth of the given' to 
formulate a position where reasons are in the world, laid down by our 
intentional activity: 
Thought can bear on empirical reality only because to be a thinker at 
all is to be at home in the space of reasons. And being at home in the 
space of reasons involves not just a collection of propensities to shift 
one's psychological stance in response to this or that, but the standing 
potential for a reflective stance at which the question arises whether 
one ought to find this or that persuasive. 
(McDowell, 1996, p. 125) 
The phrase 'the space of reasons' contains complicated ideas about the 
character of our knowing but it has an important bearing on our understanding 
of Vygotsky's interest in the semiotic. For as we see in a moment it was not 
only Spinoza who influenced Vygotsky but also Hegel. 
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Chapter 6 
Vygotsky and Hegel I 
To grasp the extent to which Vygotsky's ideas go beyond a limited concept of 
abstraction and decontextualisation, it is necessary to understand the different 
philosophical frame and presuppositions in which his thought was developed. 
The preceding chapter established elements of the ideas informing his work 
through an examination of aspects of Spinoza's thought, such as free will, 
determination and truth. This chapter continues with a discussion of the most 
significant philosopher for Vygotsky - Hegel. Hegel's philosophy is not readily 
accessible. As Houlgate remarks, 'there is no short cut. .. There is nothing but 
the long and difficult, at times tortuous, at times exhilarating path through the 
details' (Houlgate, 1998, p. 19). Simplistic guides to Hegel rarely achieve much 
and often falsify his thought completely (Pinkard, 2000). Hence it is not a 
straightforward task to summarise his contribution to philosophy. The aim of 
this chapter, however, is limited to providing illustrations of the link between 
him and Vygotsky and in particular to see how this shows the argument, that 
Vygotsky employed an abstract decontextualised form of reason is groundless. 
6.1 Kant and dualism 
A difficulty with the interpretation of Vygotsky's idea of scientific concepts 
and abstraction, is that it has tended to accept the presupposition of a dualism of 
mind and world if not the dualism itself, that goes back to Descartes. The 
questions of dualism were a major theoretical issue in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century from Descartes to Hume and from Hume the issue was taken 
up by Kant and then by Hegel. 
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Three contrasts between Kant and Hegel can be noted: 
1. Kant's idea of a realm that cannot be known'03 versus Hegel's position 
that everything is knowable. 
2. Kant's argument that the mind already has within it the means to 
construct the world in a particular way as opposed to Hegel's argument 
that the mind emerges in social activity'04 rather than being a priori. 
3. Kant's emphasis on representations lO5 as providing a correspondence to 
the world that we have knowledge of as opposed to Hegel's emphasis on 
meaning arising inferentially within a system. 106 
It must be stressed that the contrast between Kant and Hegel here is concerned 
only with the importance for educational thought of popular understandings of 
their work. As a result it stops short of a full scholarly treatment of their 
philosophies. These contrasts are indispensable for locating abstract rationality 
as a theme in a particular history of philosophy which gives Kant pride of place 
103 Kant's transcendental idealism maintains, for example that, spatial features are not a quality 
of things in themselves but of objects of our representations, 'If the object (the triangle) were 
something in itself, apart from any relation to you, the subject, how could you say what 
necessarily exist in you as subjective conditions for the construction of a triangle must of 
necessity belong to the triangle itself!' (Kant, CPR, A481B65) 
104 The active transformation of the world creates the possibility ofmindlconsciousness, which 
is not pre-given. 
105 "Kant defines representations as 'inner determinations of our mind in this or that relation of 
time'(A 1971B 242) ... [He] argued that sensibility and its sensations were 'the appearance of 
something and the mode in which they are affected by that something' (A 441B 51). [subjective 
perception]. .. Objective perception is further divided into intuition and concept, the former 
relating 'immediately to the object and is single [while] the latter refers to it mediately by 
means ofa feature which several things may have in common' (CPR A 3201B 377). Both are 
produced in an 'act of spontaneity' with intuition being 'given prior to all thought' (B 132) but 
while the intuition provides a field within which the manifold of intuition may appear and 
representation, it is the concept which synthesises these representations into experience and 
knowledge" (Caygill, 1995, p. 355). 
106 The characterization of Kant as being a representationalist thinker is open to serious 
questioning. For instance Rorty takes Kant as an inferentialist as opposed to Descartes, on the 
grounds that Descartes took 'concepts to be representations (or putative representations) of 
reality rather than, as Kant did, rules which specify how something is to be done. Kant's 
fundamental insight, Brandom says, "is that judgements and actions are to be understood to 
begin with in terms of the special way in which we are responsible for them'" (Rorty, 1997, 
p.9). 
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and more or less ignores Hegel altogether. For example the literature on 
Vygotsky does not appear to have consciously taken this history as a basis of its 
understanding but its use of concepts such as: representation, reality, 
constructivism as discussed in Chapter 3 earlier are consistent with its terms. 
Brockmeier notes the contrast between the approaches of Piaget and 
Vygotsky in terms of the 'unsolved relation between the constructivist emphasis 
of the great Geneva scholar and the interpretative approach that has developed 
out of the Russian psychologist, semiotician, and cultural theorist (Brockmeier, 
1996, p. 127). As regards constructivism Leslie Smith argues that Vygotsky's 
approach involves a social Platonism and that this precludes it as a component 
of his thinking: 
Social platonism and constructivIsm are incompatible and so an 
exclusive choice would have to be made between them. Evidently, 
Piaget (1977/1995, pp. 71, 208) denies all commitments to Platonism, 
whereas the Platonist commitments of Vygotskyan accounts have 
been insufficiently realised. 
(Smith, 1996, p. 117) 
The constructivist assumption of the separation of world and mind, leads Smith 
to the conclusion that social Platonism in which logic is enculturated in a social 
space and contructivism are incompatible. 107 To the extent that Piaget was 
influenced by Kant, his understanding of how a child comes to know depends 
upon his implicit conception of engagement with the world as a process that 
brings out the veracity of transcendental idealism. The mind is able to intuit 
because the mind is equipped with the categories of understanding 
characteristic of any human mind. It is these categories of understanding which 
account for the universality and necessity of particular forms of knowledge. 
Leslie Smith's concern with the question of how new knowledge is 
possible is what leads to his critique of Vygotsky. Leslie Smith has recourse to 
these categories when in relation to the question of how new knowledge is 
107 In one way Smith's insight is correct in that he has recognized that Vygotsky work invokes a 
social Platonism which can also be found in McDowell's argument concerning the space of 
reasons and its existence in the world rather than in a purely ideal realm. 
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possible he champions Piaget against Vygotsky. For Smith, the Kantian 
position offers a way out of the learning paradox, as the conditions of knowing 
are in the mind prior to any actual knowledge. In Kantian terms, my ability to 
know geometry is already a condition of my innate conceptual capacity; for 
Piaget, this capacity matures in development. Kant sets out to resolve the 
dualism of world and mind by positing the categories of understanding. His 
goal was to establish the possibility of synthetic a priori108 knowledge; this was 
crucial for overcoming two problems, first the dependence of knowledge on 
experience; and second the rationalist alternative that knowledge is simply the 
internal relation of concepts to one another. 
Hume held that a priori knowledge could only be found in analytic 
propositions, that is in propositions which are true by definition where there is 
nothing contained in the subject which is not already present in the predicate -
for example, 'all bachelors are unmarried men' or 'the angles of a Euclidean 
triangle equal 180 degrees'. Part of what had to be resolved was how our 
experience of the world becomes knowledge for us. Kant asked, what are the 
conditions of the possibility of our knowing?109 i.e. how can our thoughts have 
the content they do? He showed how it is possible to have knowledge that is 
due both to our experience and to the way in which as human beings we are 
capable of understanding. Kant's transcendental idealism implied that the 
possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge of objects of possible experience is 
real because objects must conform to the conditions under which they can 
become objects for us in the first place. Incidentally this is the philosophy 
underlying constructivism and the work within education theory concerned with 
perspectivism - the idea that no knowledge exists beyond the means by which 
that knowledge is realised. The difficulty here of course is specifying what 'the 
108 Knowledge is a priori if it is knowable without recourse to experience. 
109Houigate notes how Kant's 'Copernican revolution' aimed to justify rather than just take for 
granted the assumption that a priori concepts tell us about things. 'Kant wrote in the preface to 
the second edition (1787) Critique of Pure Reason that 'it has been assumed that all our 
knowledge must confonn to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects ... a 
priori by means of concepts, have on this assumption, ended in failure . We must therefore make 
trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, if we suppose that 
objects must confonn to our knowledge' (Houlgate, 1998, p. 8). 
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means by which the knowledge is realised' consists of. Is it the individual 
discourse of a classroom teacher? or the biographies of individual students? or 
the space of reasons within which any propositional statement is made (thus 
giving the proposition an inferential rather than representational form)? or is it 
the 'spirit of a time'? 
It is relevant to note here that the Humean claims which prompted Kant to 
deal with these questions in a new way were characteristic of the modem 
period. Greek philosophy, to which Hegel returned, dealt with the question of 
mind and world in a fundamentally different way from that of the dualist 
approach that came to prominence in the seventeenth century. According to 
Caygi 11 , by the time that Kant came to the problem, Aristotle's account of the 
abstraction of sensible and intelligible forms had 'become narrowed by the 
focus upon the problem of conception or the abstraction of ideas and notions 
from sensible experience. The human subject was divided into faculties of 
sensibility and intellect. The problem of how to bring together sense data and 
ideas was solved either rationalistically or empirically' (Caygill 1995, p. 119). 
Kant's 'Copernican revolution',llo Caygill continues, consisted of reversing the 
idea that cognition conforms to objects, putting in its place the idea that the 
thought of objects conforms to our ways of knowing. I I I This became known as 
transcendental idealism - transcendental in the sense that knowledge transcends 
experience; ideal in the sense that objects are only knowable to the extent that 
they conform to the conditions of our knowing. 
Kant reunited what seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers had 
separated and made distinct. In the process, he exposed the limits of both 
rationalism and empiricism and saw that some way of synthesising the two was 
1 \0 Copernicus improved on Ptolemy's explanation of the motion of heavenly bodies by 
referring to the observer's own motion rather than attributing motion solely to the bodies 
themselves. Kant explained many of the features of objects by referring to the characteristics of 
the observer rather than to those of the objects themselves (Van Cleve, 1994). 
111 According to Kant 'If intuition must conform to the constitution of objects, I do not see how 
we can know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object ofthe senses) must 
conform to our faculty of intuition, I have no difficult in conceiving such possibility (Kant, 
CPR, B.xvii). 
142 
necessary to ground the possibility of knowledge. The logic of his argument 
compelled him to confront the perennial question - the relation between theory 
and practice and, following from this, the relation between the necessary and 
the contingent. By asserting the inadequacy of both empiricism and rationalism 
he was drawn to the conclusion that 'Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind. . .. The understanding can intuit nothing, 
the senses can think nothing' (Kant, CPR, B75, A51).112 
In rejecting the rationalist belief in mathematics as abstract reason able to 
operate independently of experience, he wrote: 'Misled by such a proof of the 
power of reason, the demand for extension of knowledge recognises no limits. 
The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight and feeling its resistance, 
might imagine that its flight would be easier still in empty space' (Kant, 1973, 
CPR, A5, B9). Where Kant posits the relation between intuitions and concepts 
as inextricable (even though they retain their distinct characters), Vygotsky 
working within a Hegelian frame argued that the possibilities of what we 
receIve and what we reflect upon are linked to one another 
geneticallylhistorically. In fact, ways of knowing have an actual, practical 
symbiotic, historical relation: and forms of knowing are actually developed 
from activity rather than by linking the categories of understanding (by our 
nature, as Kant assumes). Vygotsky follows a Hegelian rather than Kantian 
approach to the problem of consciousness. Like Hegel he has a science of 
consciousness. 1 \3 
The issue of abstract rationality appears problematic only when it is 
conceived in terms of a dualist understanding of a mind and world separated 
from each other by a void. Within the framework of dualist theory, the void 
112 Kant defmes receptivity, intuition, spontaneity and the understanding in the following way: 
'If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any 
wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind's power of producing representations 
from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding. Our nature is so 
constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode 
in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think 
the object of sensible intuition is the understanding' (Kant, CPR, B75, A51). 
113 Pinkard relates how Hegel originally called the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Science of the 
Experience o/Consciousness but changed his mind during negotiations with the printer 
(Pinkard, 1996, p. 1). 
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between the subject and object of knowledge can only be overcome either by 
the imposition of a rationality with imperial pretensions or by emphasising, to 
the exclusion of all else, the specificity and situatedness of human values, 
understandings and know ledges. Kant remained dualist in so far as he assumed 
certain categories of the mind and limited the domain of our knowing. Our 
knowledge of the world was understood to arise through the different 
components of how we come to know - spontaneity and receptivity remained 
separate. Bowie explains how once spontaneity (the way the mind makes sense 
of the world) and receptivity (the way the world is given to a subject) are 
understood as not fully separated, it is no longer viable to think of the subject 
and the world in terms of a dualism. Significantly, this is the case for Vygotsky. 
Bowie refers to Schleiermacher, the originator of modem hermeneutics, when 
he spells out these issues. But (of relevance here) he also notes parallels in 
some strains of modem analytical philosophy such as McDowell's Mind and 
World. Robert Brandom also within the analytic tradition, addresses the same 
questions. It is surely not by chance that McDowell states that both his own 
work Mind and World and Robert Brandom's Making it Explicit: Reasoning, 
Representing and Discursive Commitmentl14 can be considered prolegomenas 
to a reading of Hegel's Phenomenology (McDowell, 1996). It is also significant 
that contemporary analytical philosophy, though steeped in the dualist frame of 
thought, is making a move from Kantian dualism to a Hegelian re-thinking of 
the questions of mind and world. In his introduction to Wilfred Sellars' 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind Rorty remarks that: 
Philosophers in non-anglophone countries typically think quite hard 
about Hegel, whereas the rather skimpy training in the history of 
philosophy which most analytical philosophers receive often tempts 
them to skip straight from Kant to Frege. It is agreeable to imagine a 
future in which the tiresome "analytical-Continental split" is looked 
back upon as an unfortunate, temporary breakdown of 
communication .. . 
(Rorty, 1997, p. 12) 
114 Rorty comments on the Hegelian character of the work of his ex-research student Robert 
Brandom as follows: 'Wilfrid Sellars described his project as an attempt to usher analytic 
philosophy out of its Humean and into its Kantian stage .. . Brandom's work can usefully be seen 
as an attempt to usher philosophy from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage - an attempt 
foreshadowed in Sellar's wry description of "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" as 
"incipient Meditations Hegeliennes '" (Rorty, 1997, pp. 8-9). 
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It is interesting to note that this move in analytical philosophy has 
occurred during a period in which there has been an exponential increase of 
interest in Vygotsky and post-Vygotskian research. 
Bowie lists as problems of the dualist framework of Mind (subject) and 
World (object) (1) 'the incoherent separation of knowable 'appearances' and (2) 
the unknowable 'things in themselves'. There is also the question of ' ... how 
we gain an accurate 're-presentation' of a 'ready-made' world of pre-existing 
objects ... that would require a complete account of the difference between 
what is passively received from the 'outside' and what is actively generated by 
the 'inside' mind' (Bowie, 1998, p. x). The dualism underlying accounts of 
mind and cognition are continually referred to. Either the dualism appears 
resistant to attempts to eradicate it from the form of explanation or it is accepted 
as defining the human condition. However the point that is important to this 
thesis is that dualism still underlies some forms of explanation which attempt to 
incorporate anti-dualist conceptions of mind (Lemke, Wertsch). Prawat makes 
the point that the attempts by Vygotskians to deal with the issue of individual 
mentalist descriptions of mind repeat the problems that they attempt to evade. 
As it stands, Prawat argues, 'strategy based Vygotskian theory is subject to 
same dualist afflictions that plague head fitting cognitive psychology. Chief 
among these is the problem of accounting for how a mind separated from the 
world can truthfully represent the world' (prawat, 1999, p. 61). 
Even though attempts to move away from a mentalist conception of mind 
place emphasis on the role of 'socially developed cultural tools as mediators of 
intra- and intermental functioning' (Prawat, 1999, p. 61), there still remains 
either the same epistemological problem or a collapse into relativism with no 
stance on knowledge at all. 
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6.2 Hegel 
It is useful to remark at this point that dualism survived Hegel: it still provides a 
widely held commonsense understanding, even though the claim is made that 
'we are all anti-dualist now'. It is particularly influential in the social sciences. 
The problem of knowing in a dualist world throws up the old antinomies. 
German philosophy has a long tradition of working through this question 
reaching one of its critical moments in Kant's attempt to show how empirical 
knowledge is possible when it requires a universality not found in experience. 
Kant's position provoked a massive controversy in which Hegel played a 
decisive role. Hegel dealt with it from a radically different standpoint that 
transformed the terms in which it can be posed. In contrast to Kant, he rejected 
the categorical separation of subject and object and opened a philosophic space 
within which the antinomies of dualism were transcended. For Hegel (like 
Vygotsky) cognition is a historical process (the phenomenology of spiritl15) and 
philosophy inhabited a totality of all that there is without the need for an 
external or posited foundation. Philosophy has no privileged starting point, nor 
does mind which does not stand free from the matter of which it is part. Hegel 
started from Spinoza's conception of totality as one substance (God or Nature) 
of which everything is part. But he recognised the difficulties that the deep 
entrenchment of dualism created for this approach - like those of attempting to 
understand quantum mechanics within a Newtonian paradigm. He argued that it 
was impossible to grasp Spinoza without a conscious effort. Accordingly to 
Hegel: 'When one begins to philosophise one must first be a Spinozist. The soul 
must bathe in the aether of this single substance, in which everything one has 
held for true is submerged' (Hegel cited in Beiser, 1995, p. 5). The Spinozist 
roots of Hegel's philosophy were important for Vygotsky. Yet associations with 
Hegel often result in a postmodernist caricature of an abstract, hierarchical and 
115 Although Hegel's work bears the title Phenomenology of Spirit, laying it open to the belief 
that it is a mystical work, Pinkard has aptly subtitled his reading of the Phenomenology, 'The 
Sociality of Rea sou'. While Hegel was teaching his work to high school pupils he characterized 
it in his dictation notes as 'a study of "modes of consciousness, knowing (Wissens) and 
cognizing (Erkennens)," ... ' (Pinkard, 2000, p. 333). See also Stewart, (ed) 1996, The Hegel 
Myths and Legends. 
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decontextualised fonn of reason. It should be noted that when Hegel referred to 
Spinoza's single substance he was not alluding to a mystical idea of an 
Absolute and it is perhaps more helpful to understand Hegel's notion of the 
Absolute heuristically. This conception is obviously incomplete, but it indicates 
the role that the Absolute plays in Hegel's argument, as the totality of which 
everything is a moment. 
A difficulty besetting reference to Hegel to develop an argument about 
Vygotsky's work is that common understandings of Hegel's philosophy are 
generally inaccurate or completely distorted. Pinkard (2000) notes how most 
short histories of thought or encyclopedia entries on Hegel make false 
statements about Hegel; misunderstandings are even more common among 
those who have not studied Hegel seriously. Pinkard also points out that most 
reactions to Hegel after Marx were intenningled with reactions to Marx. The 
misinterpretation of Hegel communicates itself to readings of Vygotsky where 
the influence of Hegel is read as evidence of hierarchical conceptions of 
abstract reason. Hegel's concept of the Absolute is often misunderstood as an 
entity rather than a way of working through certain questions. 
It happens, then, that the dualist tendency of modern thought instead of 
seeing Hegel's work as a frame in which questions of the nature of mind and its 
relation to world can be considered, reads it as mystical and speculative. A 
similar fate befalls Vygotsky. Beiser warns against mistaking the absolute for a 
metaphysics of the soul, for God or for Providence. He notes that for Hegel 
there was no need for such a specific kind of entity. '[The] absolute is not a 
kind of thing, but simply the whole of which all things are only parts' (Beiser, 
1995, p. 5). Misunderstanding of Hegel's absolute is an important issue here 
because it relates to the argument in Chapter 7 later about the relevance of an 
antifoundationalist epistemology to Vygotsky's work. 116 It may also be noted 
here that not only did Hegel start from a Spinozist position of one substance 
which includes both thought and extension, he also went back to Aristotle and 
116 While a rejection of pre-given foundations cannot lead to any foundationalist concept of 
knowledge in itself, when linked to a notion of totality it is perfectly consistent with a 
foundationalist position construed as one in which the foundations do not come in advance are 
part of the process of the unfolding of being. 
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Greek philosophy and rejected the claims to clarify thinking by early modern 
philosophers such as Bacon and Descartes. Significantly where Descartes 
started from the separation of thought and being, Greek thought started from 
their unity. 
Any attempt to understand the potential in Vygotsky's ideas must 
recognise the type of philosophy infonning his work. This reqUIres an 
uncompromising adoption of ways of thinking which overcome the dualist 
afflictions to which Prawat refers. At the same time a major obstacle blocks this 
approach; namely that the world we actually live in is dualist in the sense that 
this is the mode in which it actually presents itself. Dualist misconceptions are 
not superseded because the presentations are continually renewed, for example 
our dualist definition of an agent. This is why the development of Vygotsky's 
ideas may appear impractical except in so far as they can be translated into a 
dualist frame. Dualism cannot be overcome by philosophy when the real world 
existence of thought is dualist (Gergen, 1999, Ilyenkov, 1977b). Hegel's crucial 
contribution that philosophy arises after the event bears directly upon the 
relationship between thinking and the conditions that sustain it. Thought and 
word are so inseparably related that thought cannot exceed the bounds of what 
sustains it and what expresses it. In Spinozist tenns we might say each idea has 
its own ideatum. 
The dualist separation of Mind and World central to Kant's investigation 
of the possibility of reason and knowing is precisely what Hegel attempted to 
overcome. As we have seen from Bowie's comments earlier, modern 
philosophers working on the same dualism make the same Hegelian move to 
deny the stark separation of receptivity and spontaneity, arguing that receptivity 
is already conceptual (McDowell)117 or that it must be understood as taking an 
inferential form (Brandom).118 In an identical view a key contribution of 
117 Receptivity is already conceptual in the sense that it occupies a conceptual sphere. 
118Brandom explains how the interrogation of the assumptions of empiricism have led to an 
appreciation of a more rationalist way of thinking (i.e. where the conceptual is not separated 
from the empirical): 'Classical empiricist philosophy of mind takes irtunediate perceptual 
experiences as the paradigm of awareness or consciousness. Classical empiricist epistemology 
takes as its paradigm those same experiences, to which it traces the warrant for and the 
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Vygotsky was to emphasise the way in which words and concepts represent or 
transmit - actually structures thought, rather than reflects thought. Instead of 
following thought, concepts are understood as preceding thought. Children 
enter a space in which concepts already have meaning beyond their grasp. Yet 
the very use of a concept within the social space in which it is sustained 
meaningfully, allows the children's activities to become meaningful within that 
space. Although Kant's later work moved towards overcoming the rigid 
separation of concept and intuition and of spontaneity from receptivity, dualism 
remained (Pinkard, 2000, p. 339). 
6.3 Vygotsky and Hegel 
Deriving the categories of our understanding from what he took our thought to 
be, Kant sought to work out what would be the conditions of our reasoning, 
Hegel worked through particular claims to knowledge on their own terms. He 
argued that it was necessary to go beyond what claims to knowledge took 
themselves to be and to work through particular claims. This is significantly 
different from that approach which posits (however rigorously) what the 
conditions of our knowledge might be. Hegel's approach uses the activity of 
thinking to push thought along by pushing individual thoughts to their limits. 
By contrast to Kant who may be said to have attempted to establish 
universal criteria, Hegel was aware that in different periods, different criteria 
prevailed and that what counted as knowledge was dependent upon these 
criteria rather than upon a universal measure. However, Hegel did not let 
matters rest in what might have been a relativist position, but argued that 
reflection about the nature of knowledge occurred in every period and 
authority of all the rest. As the tradition has developed it has become clearer that both rest on a 
more or less semantic picture, according to which the concept of experience, awareness, and 
knowledge is understood in the first instance in representational tenns: as a matter of what is 
(or purports to be) represented by some representing states or episodes .... Empiricism attempts 
to understand the content of concepts in tenns of the origin of empirical beliefs in experience 
that we just find ourselves with, and the origin of practical intentions in desires or preferences 
that in the most basic case we just find ourselves with.' According to Brandom, Sellars was 
motivated by a classically rationalist thought that 'what was needed was a functional theory of 
concepts which would make their role in reasoning, rather than their supposed origin in 
experience, their primary feature' (Brandom, 2000, pp. 24-25). 
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precipitated reflection on the nature of knowing. In other words, he linked 
knowledge to the movement of historical conditions. Consciousness is 
successively faced with contradictions (or antinomies) arising from what it 
takes to be its object and its knowledge of this object. Hegel himself believed 
the historical nature of thought achieved its fulfilment in the triumph of reason 
as he saw it in his time and place, but the historical nature of knowledge is not 
dependent on any enlightenment conceit. 
The historical nature of knowledge has implications for the materiality of 
thinking, namely that thinking always takes place within a definite historical 
space. According to Hegel, the thought that Kant assumed in deriving his 
categories was not thought per se, but thought at a particular historical point, 
dealing with particular questions and as a result throwing up contradictions that 
appear as antinomies. For Hegel, thinking outside this space and hence outside 
of history, i.e. thinking in terms of abstract reason, simply does not happen. 
Following Hegel this thesis argues that Vygotsky favoured historical rather than 
abstract reason and in doing so opens a question about his work which the 
dualist approach forecloses - what counts as reason? what counts as knowing? 
The contextualist positions, considered in Chapter 2 earlier, make the 
claim to be a criterion of knowledge in opposition to the criterion that Vygotsky 
got from Hegel. In a peculiar parallel of the same point, the contextualist or 
perspectivist position wants to give credence to the idea that knowledge is 
constituted by the means of knowing available. Moreover, to confuse the issue 
still further, those who favour an extreme version of contextualism, reject 
history. In this way their critique of Vygotsky as embracing abstract reason is a 
reflex of their own view of knowledge. 
In developmental psychology there has been a shift from a mentalist 
position focusing on the solitary learner to a 'discursive tum' that emphasises 
the linguistic practices, discursive activities and semiotic mediations by which 
activities take place: it also attaches importance to the socio-cultural contexts in 
which activities occur. At present, it seems strange to consider thinking a 
material activity. However, a move away from mentalism and intemalism 
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towards externalism has even taken place in analytic philosophy where there 
has been some concern with the reductive logical analysis of the way that 
language and, specifically, how sentences picture the world. The linguistic tum 
prompted by Wittgenstein (a key representative of the analytic tradition) 
precipitated a move away from a mentalist conception of thinking; 'It is 
misleading then to talk of thinking as mental activity. We may say that thinking 
is essentially the activity of operating with signs' (Harre and Gillet, 1994, p. 
50). However, explaining thinking in terms of an activity using signs makes 
only a small step towards an alternative to the internalist and mentalist model of 
mind - see Chapter 3. 
The idea that thought works and constitutes its object exists alongside 
the idea of thought as contemplation or an empirical sensing of an external 
world. The two positions, contemplation and empiricism, are not necessarily 
opposed but when taken separately, they suggest opposed understandings of 
knowledge. Put simplistically, where the former sees thought as constituting its 
object, that is to say a constructivist and relativist version of knowledge, the 
latter sees thought as contemplating or sensing a distinct world. This entails a 
representationalist position that posits thought as capable of making 
representations that coincide with a world taken as independently real. 
In Vygotsky's work this simplistic opposition is rejected and the 
possibility of going beyond it is spelled out. According to Vygotsky, 
representations (scientific concepts) arise neither because they reflect a world 
that exists independently of human thought, nor because they construct the 
world in their own image. Rather they arise through the continual reciprocity of 
the constitution of ideas through activity and their successive re-formation in 
thought. 
In Crisis,1l9 Vygotsky expounds this dynamic view of knowledge. In this 
dynamic exposition knowledge formation takes the form of a cycle moving 
119 'The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology' published in English translation (Van 
der Veer, 1997) in The Collected Works of L.S. Vygotsky: Volume 3. 
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from a vital phase of early development to one of stagnation as its maturity 
changes its position vis-a-vis its own development. 
Bakhurst, writes that 'for Vygotsky, the identity of psychology as a 
science depended on the degree to which it contributed to the transformation of 
the object it investigates. Its tasks were not simply to mirror reality but to 
harness it' (Daniels, 1996, p. 24). In other words, Vygotsky's conception of 
knowledge cannot be reduced to a representationalist view of knowledge 
grounded by what Hegel relegated to the unconditioned universal in his 
discussion of the Understanding. By contrast, Wertsch argues that Vygotsky 
had a commitment to universal human rationality as the te/os of development 
which is 'reflected in his claims about how increasing levels of abstraction and 
generalisation attach to "genuine" and "scientific" concepts (Wertsch, 1996, 
p.25). The problem here concerns what scientific concepts are taken to be. For 
example Wertsch refers to scientific concepts as taking a propositional form as 
purported representations of a demonstrated truth. This more common-sense 
representationalist understanding of scientific concepts differs from the 
inferential form proposed by Robert Brandom. This distinction between 
representationalism and inferentialism is significant since the critique of both 
abstract rationality and, at the extreme, rationality per se depends upon a 
particular understanding of the role that concepts play within science and other 
domains (see Chapter 7 later). 
What Wertsch overlooks is the possibility that the abstraction and 
generalization to which Vygotsky refers are not artificial moves made by the 
mind. That is to say, Wertsch does not see that Vygotsky is not working with a 
Cartesian framework which claims to capture an unconditioned universal. For 
Hegel, and following him Vygotsky, the understanding of the universal is an 
integral development of one substance of which thought and extension are part. 
To examine the logic of an argument that rejects dualist premises, it is helpful 
to grasp Hegel's critique of what he called 'Understanding'. The Understanding 
could stand as an example of the common conception of knowledge. In the 
Encyclopedia Hegel describes the characteristics of the metaphysical thinking 
(with which he takes issue) found in philosophers who assume the true nature 
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of things is knowable through thought alone. He comments that this is also the 
way 'in which mere understanding views the objects of reason' (Houlgate, 
1998, p. 7). Hegel also criticised Understanding in the Phenomenology when he 
advanced a radically different way of conceiving what it is to be human, 
possess mind and to exercise free will. In Vygotsky's writings it is possible to 
discern this radically different way of conceiving mind and will, considered in 
the discussion of Spinoza in the previous chapter. This critique will be 
considered more closely later. For the moment it can be noted that Hegel's 
critique of the Understanding was important to Marx and that the use that Marx 
made of it reinforced its importance for Vygotsky. In the Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts Marx demonstrated his roots in Hegel when he writes 
that: 
The great thing in Hegel's Phenomenology and its final result ... .is 
simply that Hegel grasps the self-development of man as process ... ; 
that he thus grasps the nature of work and comprehends objective 
man ... as the result of his own work; "he grasps labor ... as man's act of 
self-creation" 
(Marx cited in Wood, 1988, pp. 67-75) 
The idea that man and his higher mental functions are an ongoing creation of 
his own activity immediately places thought on a different footing. The radical 
break that Hegel made with dualism and the space he opened for an 
investigation of mind that resists a cognitivist or mentalist approach is credited 
by numerous sources: 
In the view of T.W. Adorno, Hegel challenged the naive, positivistic 
belief that experience renders 'something immediately present. .. free, 
as it were, of any admixture of thought', and showed that there is in 
fact nothing in our experience that is not mediated in some way by 
reflection and understanding. In the view of Charles Taylor, Hegel's 
achievement is to have undermined the idea that human consciousness 
can be understood in the abstract and to have insisted that we situate 
subjectivity by relating it to our life as embodied and social beings. 
(Houlgate, 1998, p. 3) 
In the Phenomenology, Hegel worked through the problems of what it is to 
know by examining different forms of historical consciousness. However, it is 
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not a simple examination but an ontological logic where each succeSSIve 
moment arises out of the partialnessl20 of the previous one. Hegel was 
concerned with different forms of consciousness not in terms of simple 
comparisons but as moments in a process of development through which 
successive forms arise out of the inadequacies and one-sidedness of those that 
precede them. 
Where the problem of knowledge - how we can claim to have 
knowledge? and on what basis? - was previously a matter of epistemology, 
Hegel turned knowledge into a matter of ontology. By ontology is meant the 
actual movement of being as opposed to a separate analysis of the object of 
understanding by a subject. Hegel subsumed these separate analyses into the 
actual process of the development of thought. This development is neither a 
simple comparison nor a simple linear progression. Each form of thought is 
taken as the thought of a real age and the movement from one form to the next 
is precipitated by the inadequacy of one form to grasp what it has set itself to 
grasp. To see this schematically as a simple, inevitable process of development 
does not do justice to the richness of the original. Or, it might be said in 
passing, a simple understanding of it which claims that all forms of thought that 
exist at this moment are somehow equal to each other, does not do justice to the 
complexities of the contemporary world. 
Hegel praises Kant for beginning the move to ontology by dealing with 
knowing as a logic. But at the same time he criticises Kant for assuming the 
categories rather than deriving them from thought itself as the necessary 
outcome of self-reflection. 
120 Hegel follows Spinoza in viewing truth as the whole. Partialness means one-sided as 
opposed to many-sidedness, which is the essence of a phenomenon. Essentialism is not 
concerned with things but a process in which its essence of a thing is actualised over time. 
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Unlike Kant, Hegel was not concerned with the foundations with which 
we might be able to discern as the basis of any knowledge, but with the actual 
process through which these foundations are laid in the process of the 
development of thought itself: 
Hegel understands his logical study of categories to be also an 
ontology in the strongest possible sense. Hegel agrees with Kant that 
our categories contain the meaning and structure of objectivity; but 
against Kant, he thinks the categories contain the structure not just of 
objectivity for us, but objectivity as such. . .. not just the objective 
structure of our world but the objective structure of being itself. 
... Hegel's post-Kantian examination of what it is to think, .. .is 
thus . . . a pre-Kantian, quasi-Spinozan examination of what it is to be. 
He proceeds through Kant to his new 'Spinozism'. 
(Houlgate, 1998, p.12) 
Hegel argued that Kant's 'thing-in-itself could be understood only as an 
abstraction. As explained in Chapter 5, his Spinozism entailed a radically 
different understanding of what had previously stood as epistemology. The 
representative relation of an appearance standing in place of a reality was at 
odds with the idea of one substance (the Absolute). Instead, and in accord with 
a Spinozist conception of truth, the real is what has been fully actualised rather 
than merely existent as one-sidedness and not fully actual. A specific 
peculiarity of Hegel's approach is that it takes the appearance of a thing as an 
expression and not a disguise. According to Houlgate: 
Hegel's derivation of the categories in the Logic proves Kant's 
conception of the thing in itself to be an abstraction, by demonstrating 
that what something is in itself has actually to be conceived as 
inseparable from its relations to other things and the way it appears . 
. . . there is in fact no good reason to contrast the appearance of a thing 
with what it is in itself, as Kant does. Appearance, rather, must be 
understood as manifesting what the thing is in itself. And experience 
thus must be understood as experience of what there ultimately is. 
(Houlgate, 1998, p. 13) 
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One of the differences between Hegel's thought and the thought of the 
Enlightenment is sometimes posed as one between empiricism and speculation, 
each of which can be simply opposed to the other by exaggeration, to an almost 
meaningless caricature of itself. Thus empiricism is characterised as an almost 
thoughtless recounting of fact and contemplation as thought totally separate 
from any object. Rockmore (1993) implicitly attacks this bi-polarity by 
distinguishing different forms of empiricism arguing that although Hegel 
criticises Sense-certainty for its one-sidedness he can himself be seen as an 
empiricist insofar as he held to the general position that knowledge comes from 
our expenence. 
Many confusions result from the oversimplification of philosophical 
labels. The philosophical position of empiricism - that nothing can be known 
independently of experience - is taken in such diverse ways that the term loses 
meaning. The reading of Hegel as a mystical thinker would find it hard to 
conceive of Hegel as an empiricist. Yet his anti-foundationalism shares with 
Quine, a renowned empiricist, the position that a merely analytical resolution of 
epistemology - how we can claim knowledge - is mistaken. Knowledge 
ultimately emerges world-historically. The separation of knowing from what is 
to be known has led to paths in philosophy that have thrown up antinomies 
which expose the error of these paths. Quine'S classic Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism referred to in Chapter 4, exposes the failure of the Kantian 
separation of analytic and synthetic statements - the claim that some statements 
are true by definition and others true as matters of fact. Quine questions 
whether anything is ever a priori. In relation to Quine's discussion of 
empiricism, it must be noted that the distinctive feature of Hegel's empiricism 
is its ontological character. For Hegel all theory, even common or garden 
Sense-certainty, already belongs to historical forms of thought and is therefore 
ontological in the sense of belonging to being in one or other of its various 
historical moments. 
Empiricism, in the sense of what Hegel calls Sense-certainty, sees 
experience as the cause of knowledge and the senses as the means for acquiring 
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such knowledge where our representations coincide with the object that they 
purport to represent. For Vygotsky, following Hegel, the process of acquiring 
knowledge is reversed - a correspondence theory of knowledge is rejected and 
eventually what comes to be our representations, arises over a long process of 
development during which they are at no point separate and distinct from their 
process of coming-to-be. Under the influence of Hegel, Vygotsky is bound to 
reject the representationalist view of knowledge, which presupposes a terminus 
where knowledge is complete. When discussing word meaning, for example, 
Vygotsky notes that when a word is first learnt the process of the development 
of its meaning has only just begun. Words are used in a rough and ready way to 
perform particular jobs and in the context of their use and reception their 
meaning is expanded and deepened. 
The peculiar conception of how our representations arise and relate to the 
world is clear in Hegel's arguments about the requirements of science. As 
regards these requirements, Hegel certainly made clear what was not necessary: 
1) The type of knowledge claimed for by the Understanding; 2) The assumption 
of a Given (what Sellars calls the myth of the given) against which the validity 
of our knowledge claims may be assessed; 3) The idea that cognition exercises 
certain categories that allows it to relate to an assumed Given; and 4) The idea 
of a fixed subject and fixed object separated by a void. He puts it as follows: 
Now in order to raise oneself to the standpoint of Science one must 
give up the presuppositions [Voraussetzungen] which are contained in 
the already mentioned subjective and fmite modes of philosophical 
cognition: 1) the presupposition of the firm validity of limited and 
opposed determinations in general, of the Understanding in general, 2) 
the presuppositions of a given, represented, already complete 
substratum, which is supposed to be a standard for determining 
whether one of those thought-determination is adequate to it or not, 3) 
the presupposition of cognition as merely relating of such ready and 
fixed predicates to some substratum or other, 4) the presupposition of 
the opposition between cognising subject and its object, which cannot 
be united with it - each side of which opposition is supposed once 
again, as in the case of the opposition just mentioned, to be 
independently [fur sich] something fixed and true. 
(Hegel, Encyclopedia, par. 35, cited in Forster, 1998, p. 635) 
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This rejection of presuppositions informs his critique of Kant: 
The demand which has become customary through the Kantian 
philosophy, that before actual cognition the cognitive faculty be 
subject to critical investigation, appears plausible at first sight. 
However, this investigation is itself cognition; that it should be 
performed without cognition is senseless. Moreover, even the 
assumption of a cognitive faculty before actual cognition is a 
presupposition both of the unjustified category or determination of 
faculty or power and of subjective cognition. 
(Hegel, Encyclopedia, par. 26 cited in Forster, 1998, p. 635) 
What distinguishes Hegel from Kant and indeed from all other philosophies is 
his starting point. For instance in contrast to Kant whose approach to the 
question of knowing is logical, Hegel takes an ontological position and starts 
his philosophising from what we take ourselves to be doing in knowing, and 
then works through the implicit takings which once expressed lead beyond the 
original claim. The pertinent point is that rather than starting from a position 
that tries to determine what consciousness must consist of, if it is to 'know', 
Hegel starts from the forms of consciousness themselves and takes seriously 
what each of their claims to know comprises. By doing so and examining what 
is authoritative in its claim to know, Hegel shows 1) that more is claimed that at 
first sight would appear to be the case; and 2) that each claim, when fully 
considered, undermines itself and generates within its own terms a further form 
of consciousness; and 3) this further form of consciousness retains implicit 
elements that are exorcised once what is claimed is made explicit. 
In the Phenomenology, Hegel traces the movement of reason through 
different forms - reason where the subject apprehends the world as it is; reason 
which involves tools/categories for getting to grips with how the world is; and 
reason knowing the world of objects in their existence for its own purposes. 
Hegel starts his examination of the forms that Consciousness takes with 
Sense-certainty and shows how once we reflect upon what this means -
knowledge arising in our senses from a direct effect of experience - it becomes 
clear that there is more to it than first appears: To recognise an object is 
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immediately to place it within a system. Thus Sense-Certainty is not quite what 
it claims to be for itself but requires something further to be accepted as even 
the barest claim of some truthful impingement on our senses. Sense-certainty 
claims for itself a knowledge of the world that is immediate i.e. a singularity 
that does not depend on any contribution from us in order to count as 
knowledge. Once this claim is fully expressed it undermines itself in exposing 
that it is inferential knowledge rather than non-inferential. It is in fact not 
immediate but is mediated. What are required are complexes of individual 
things - a system not merely a singular obj ect. This system Hegel calls 
'Perception' where the truth of what seemed to be immediate being is not given 
immediately to the senses but rather is perceived by the mind. Here 
consciousness is distinguished into SUbjective and objective aspects, no longer 
do the two coincide, instead the question of the difference between the 
individual's perception and the object itself, the distinction of appearance and 
reality, arises. Terry Pinkard in explaining the development of mind, what he 
terms 'the sociality of reason', in Hegel's Phenomenology explains the issues as 
follows: 
The subject...originally understood himself purely as apprehending 
subject, someone who stood in relation of acquaintance with the 
objects of knowledge. The guiding metaphor is that of the subject 
viewing the object. With the collapse of that idea, however an 
alternative picture of the subject has emerged - namely that of a 
practical, living subject who deals with objects in terms of his 
cognitive capacities and for whom his concepts are more like tools 
with which he can deal with his environment. 
(Pinkard, 1996, p. 48) 
Hegel's working through of claims to know takes us to a very different position 
from which to consider what it is to experience or to know: 
To see the subject as part of life is to see the object of knowledge not 
as being like the kind of metaphysically construed objects of 'sense-
certainty' or 'perception' that we can only apprehend; it is rather to 
see how these objects fit into the demands of the life of the subject 
himself - that is, into his various practical projects. 
(Pinkard, 1996, p. 49) 
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The important point here is that the world/reality is not given to us, nor is it 
simply apprehended through categories rather it comes to us through our own 
purposes and intents coming to expression or realisation as a role in our own 
projects: 
OUf conceptualising activities are not to be construed on the model of 
our apprehending objects; knowing something is construed instead as 
a fonn of acting. The agent has various desires that demand 
satisfaction, and his conceptualising activities are tools for the 
satisfaction of those desires. 
(Pinkard, 1996, p.49) 
What may appear to be an esoteric discussion in philosophy about epistemology 
or, what is actually in the case of Hegel's account, a detailed and rigorous 
investigation of the appearances (phenomenology) of consciousness, has in fact 
direct implications for the work of Vygotsky. Vygotsky draws on the Hegelian 
dialectic in his work on the education of children with special needs. Writing in 
1931 he takes issue with the pedagogue of the blind who attempts to replace 
vision with 'visual images' through other senses (e.g. touch) without 
understanding the nature of perception. He describes a famous tale used by 
AA Potebnia to show that a single generalisation is not knowledge: 'The blind 
man asks a series of questions which lead to an infinite regress "what is milk 
like?" - "It is white." - "What is white?" - " like a goose." - "And what is 
goose like?" - "it's like my elbow." The blind man felt the guide's elbow and 
said, "Now I know what milk is like!'" (Vygotsky, 1993, p. 203) Following 
Hegel, Vygotsky's argument is that perception and representation is not the 
sphere of compensation for the effects of blindness; 'compensation occurs not 
in the realm of elementary functions but in the sphere of concepts' (Vygotsky, 
1993, p. 203). This is a crucial point given that much of contemporary 
education practice is still conducted on the basis of assumptions about what 
Hegel called Sense Certainty and Perception without appreciating that more is 
involved even at what appears to be this elementary level of 'knowing'. 121 
Arguing that knowledge is not based on sense impressions or what we perceive 
121 Bruner refers to these misconceptions as the general folk psychologies underlying teacher 
practice. 
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but instead arises in thought, Vygotsky insists that the lack of a sense changes 
nothing in human cognition and thought: 
... both the blind man and the seeing man, in principle, know much 
more than they can imagine; they know more than they can absorb 
with the help of their five senses. If we really knew as much as we 
can absorb directly though our five senses, then not a single science 
(in the true sense of that word) would be possible. 
(Vygotsky, 1993, p. 203) 
Emphasising the counterintuitive character of science and following a Hegelian 
line of thinking he goes on to argue: 
For the links, dependencies, and relationships among things which are 
the content of our scientific knowledge are not the visually 
perceivable qualities of things rather they come to light through 
thought. This is also the way it works for the blind child. Thought is 
the basic area in which he compensates for the inadequacy of his 
visual perceptions. 
(Vygotsky, 1993, p. 203) 
This comprehension of the character of thought is drawn from Vygotsky's 
understanding of Hegel and the social nature of mind. Vygotsky recounts how 
in formal logic: 
a concept is nothing other than a general representation. ... [There is 
an] inverse proportionality between the extent and the content of the 
concept. The path to generalisation is thus a path which leads away 
from the riches of concrete reality toward the world of concepts, the 
kingdom of empty abstraction, far from living life and from living 
knowledge. 
(Vygotsky, 1993, pp. 204- 205) 
Vygotsky maintains that in dialectical logic it is quite the opposite: 
A concept seems richer in content than does a presentation. Thus the 
path to generalisation is not a path formally divided into separate 
indications. Rather, it is an uncovering of the links of the relationship 
of a given matter with another. If the subject becomes truly 
intelligible, not through immediate experience, but in all the many 
links and relationships which defme its place in the world and its 
connection to the rest of reality, then one's understanding is deeper, 
more real, truer and more complete reflection than the envisaged one. 
(Vygotsky 1993, p. 205) 
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This argument made in relation to his discussion of the education of the blind is 
surely sufficient to indicate that the criticism of Vygotsky as an abstract 
rationalist is unfounded. 
Ilyenkov is an important figure in the field of post-Vygotskian research 
worked in this same philosophical tradition. He was a significant figure in the 
Mescheryakov experiment which reached results that challenged the empiricist 
version of knowledge (Bakhurst and Padden, 1991). Mescheryakov's work 
which showed how children deprived of sight and hearing could reach high 
levels of intellectual development, lent support to the Vygotskian idea that 
intellect 'is formed under the influence of society, through tools, speech and 
rules of behaviour' (Levitin, 1982, p. 216). An important conclusion reached by 
Mescheryakov and Ilyenkov was that knowing is not dependent on the senses as 
understood by empiricism, but arises in a humanized environment. Levitin tells 
how Ilyenkov in his booklet Learn to Think from Youth came to write: 
When Meshcheryakov's four pupils kept a packed audience of 
hundreds of students and teachers enthralled for three hours, one of 
the many notes from the audience read, 'Doesn't your experiment 
refute the old truth of materialism whereby there is nothing in the 
mind that wasn't ftrst in sensations? They don't see or hear anything, 
but they understand everything better than we do.' "I conveyed that 
question, letter by letter, through the ftnger (dactile) alphabet to Sasha 
Suvorov. I was sure he could answer it better than me. And indeed, 
Sasha replied promptly and clearly, speaking into the microphone: 
'Who told you that we don't see or hear anything? We see and hear 
with the eyes of all our friends, all people, the whole human race. ' 
(Levitin, 1982, pp. 216-217) 
Ilyenkov uses the example of Meshcheryakov's four pupils to illustrate the 
significance of the 'humanised environment' of 'objectivised human capacities' 
which we inhabit. This environment extends to material objects, codes of 
behaviour and the ordering of life in time and space. The possibility of the 
experience of sensing for the blind/deaf child arises, not by a mind directly 
interacting with a world but by a mind that is immediately social. 
162 
Bakhurst judged Ilyenkov's work to have major significance for the 
way in which traditional questions of knowledge have been circumscribed: 
we should grant Ilyenkov that considerations about the nature of our 
'humanized' environment must figure in any remotely adequate 
account of the human condition and the powers of our mind and 
language. This is something much philosophy particularly of the 
analytic stripe, has failed to appreciate, relegating such considerations 
to the contingent context of thought and language, rather than the very 
medium of the mental 
(Bakhurst, 1997, p. 39) 
These limitations of analytic philosophy and the tum by McDowell and 
Brandom suggest a Hegel connection between Vygotsky and Ilyenkov and 
contemporary philosophers such as Mc Dowell and Brandom. 
The historical location of Hegel which has been associated, like that of 
Marx, with the failures of what has been seen as a political project of 
Enlightenment rationality, has compromised the reception of his work. Thus, as 
his significance as a philosopher has been diminished so his influence on 
Vygotsky has been seen in a somewhat negative light, as evidence of an 
atavistic commitment on Vygotsky's part to a concept of reason that stands 
above context subprenaing all multiplicity and variety to its own end. In fact, as 
we have seen, Hegel was the greatest critic of abstract rationality, though it is 
nonetheless paradoxical in that Hegel should find a renaissance in the tradition 
of analytical philosophy that is so much at odds with his form of 
philosophising.122 Given the popular caricature of Hegel it is not surprising that 
he should be associated with the idea of an abstract rationality which is used as 
a hallmark of poor educational practice and that Vygotsky should be tarred with 
the same brush. McDowell's 'Hegelian' claim that receptivity is already 
conceptual123 involves a conception of 'reason' quite different from that which 
122 RJ.Bernstein suggests that John McDowell's "analytic" and former Oxford colleagues must 
have thought McDowell's reference to Hegel, informing his work Mind and World, ajoke. For 
'Hegel is a philosopher that few "analytic" philosophers have taken seriously (ore even read) -
a philosopher typically held up for ridicule, as someone who epitomizes the intellectual vices 
that "analytic" philosophers have sought to overcome' (Bernstein, 2002, p. 9) 
123 Although I have called this McDowell's Hegelian claim, McDowell exploits Kant's 
terminology to make his case of the unboundedness of the conceptual. He clarifies that in 
answer to the question: 'Does Kant credit receptivity with a separable contribution to its 
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Wertsch quite correctly takes to task - that is an extreme of a decontextualised 
schooled knowledge, presented without regard to its genetic development, 
ignoring all sense of learning as the actualisation of concepts. Chapter 7 
continues the effort of this thesis to establish sufficient links with Hegel's 
philosophical approach to sustain the argument that Vygotsky's concept of 
rationality did not conform to the version of Enlightenment characterised in 
contemporary work. 
cooperation with spontaneity? It is possible to answer in both the affirmative and the negative. 
However it is possible to take from Kant's conception of experience that 'reality is not located 
outside a boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere' (McDowell, 1996, p. 41). 
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Chapter 7 
Vygotsky and Hegel II 
This thesis has examined the philosophical background of Vygotsky's 
work to show that his notion of reason was far more sophisticated than the 
expression 'Enlightenment Rationality' suggests. This chapter considers four 
areas in which Vygotsky's concept of reason differs from Enlightenment 
rationality: 1. Foundationalism and anti-foundationalism; 2. The conception of 
science; 3.The conception of development and; 4.Idealism and materialism. The 
latter is developed more by Ilyenkov though it can be reasonably interpreted as 
part of a general drift ofVygotsky's work. 
These areas are treated here as though they were separate but this is for 
practical reasons only. In point of fact they are not simply interrelated but 
different facets of a totality. To demonstrate this point however would require a 
longer excursion into Hegel than is possible here. Suffice it to say that questions 
concerning rationality and questions concerning starting points, i.e. foundations 
or data are really part and parcel of one another. Although these different areas 
(foundationalism, science, development, idealism and materialism) are treated 
separately, their selection is not arbitrary nor are the questions concernmg 
practice which take the place of a conclusion in the final section. 
7.1 Foundationalism and anti-foundationalism 
Wertsch's criticism of abstract rationality discussed above is now 
considered again from the point of view of foundationalism and anti-
foundationalism. This point of view locates the question of abstract reason 
within the contemporary rhetoric for conceptualising what is negative about 
abstract theory. Although discussion of abstract rationality is not normally 
conducted in terms of foundationalism and anti-foundationalism it is helpful to 
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bear this matter in mind since it would appear to interconnect with those other 
aspects of the critique of rationality which favour multiple know ledges as an 
alternative to what is taken to be the logocentrism of rationality. 
In Postmodernist thought foundationalism and anti-foundationalism are 
posited as a simple opposition - on the one side foundationalism as a denial of 
human creativity; on the other, anti-foundationalism as an opportunity for 
infinite variety and creativity. However, two problems arise with this 
opposition: first, anti-foundationalism conceived as the simple opposite of 
foundationalism does not eradicate all its elements; and second, rejecting 
foundationalism and posing anti-foundationalism as its alternative does not 
imply free human creativity to the extent that postmodernists Imagme. 
Moreover, as already suggested, underlying the criticism of abstract rationality 
is an un-theorised conception of freedom. When foundationalism is understood 
as a denial of human creativity and a representative of logocentric rationality, 
anti-foundationalism is promoted for allowing space for infinite human variety 
and creativity: such is the position of postmodernists such as Gergen. But what 
is missing from the concept of anti-foundationalism is the possibility of 
material constraints on our thinking imposed by our cognitive activity in the 
world. 
Foundationalism and anti-foundationalism are concerned with the way 
knowledge is obtained. The one starts from the secure ground of what is known 
to be certain and builds upon it; the other denies the existence of such a secure 
starting point. But this direct opposition has not been universally accepted and 
Hegel rejected it out of hand. Although Vygotsky is explicit about the 
importance of Hegel for his work Wertsch takes it for granted that Vygotsky is 
a foundationalist in the sense of operating with presuppositions that the nature 
of knowledge is given in advance of any activity and that development is 
determined teleologically. Wertsch argues repeatedly (Wertsch, 1991, 1996, 
2000) that Vygotsky has a deep philosophical commitment to Enlightenment 
traditions of abstract rationality and shared with his colleagues involved in 'the 
first grand socialist experiment in the form of the Soviet Union' ... 'a belief in 
some form of universal rationality and a belief in the possibility of progress 
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towards such rationality' (Wertsch, 2000, p. 22). He takes as evidence for this 
view, what he believes to be, foundational assumption underlying Chapter 5 
and 6 of Thinking and Speech. For Wertsch, what he takes to be Vygotsky's 
assumptions of 'referential relationships between signs and objects' and 
'increasing generalization and abstraction' lead inevitably to the position 
whereby the 'decontextualisation of mediational means' IS the aim of 
development: 'In Vygotsky's view assumptions about meaning [in language] 
provide the foundation for defining human development and telos' (Wertsch, 
2000, p. 22). To avoid these presuppositions which he sees as the 
Enlightenment conception of rationality, Wertsch emphasises local meaning-
making: 
I shall argue that there are some major inconsistencies in his writings, 
in that he sometimes espoused abstract rationality as fe/os of 
development but on other occasions assumed that other forms of 
mental functioning occupy that role. . .. such inconsistencies reflect a 
struggle between basic philosophical commitments, on the one hand, 
and the results of analysing complexities of human speech, on the 
other. 
(Wertsch, 1996, p. 26) 
In a later work he writes that 'Vygotsky was deeply committed to 
Enlightenment traditions of abstract rationality.' Wertsch equates abstraction 
with the 'decontextualisation of mediational means': it is the semiotic potential 
available in abstraction (and the systematicity of interrelationship of signs) 
which 'yields increasingly, powerful ways to categorize, reflect and control the 
world' (Wertsch 2000, p. 22). This characterisation of rationality and its 
rejection, however, leaves the alternative position open to charges of relativism 
and the devaluation of knowledge. 
What can be noted here is that the question of the nature of rationality has 
an important bearing on the relation of theory and practice. Where rationality is 
deemed a universal abstraction, theory is viewed as applicable to practice in 
such a way as to 'categorize, reflect and control the world'. It was this view of 
theory which was denounced by Schon (1983) when he commented on the 
dissonance between the swampy lowland of practice and the high ground of 
theory. It was Schon's comment illustrative of the inadequacies of the 
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competency approach to teacher education, that prompted Joseph Dunne's 
'conversation' with philosophers with the aim of finding out what rationality 
could mean if it were not to be applied as a technique to achieve specified ends 
- the all too familiar contemporary aim of control through regulation and 
accountability. 
The critique of 'the Enlightenment project' as a version of abstract reason 
applied to the world in an authoritarian way has been extremely influential in 
education research, leading many commentators to question knowledge per se. 
Vygotsky himself recognises a view of rationality as controlling and regulating 
at the expense of richness and diversity when he criticises formallogic l24: 
It is completely clear that if the process of generalizing is considered 
as a direct result of abstraction of traits, then we will inevitably come 
to the conclusion that thinking in concepts is removed from reality . ... 
Others have said that concepts arise in the process of castrating reality. 
Concrete, diverse phenomena must lose their traits one after the other 
in order that a concept might be formed. Actually what arises is a dry 
and empty abstraction in which the diverse, full-blooded reality is 
impoverished by logical thought. This is the source of the celebrated 
words of Goethe: 'Gray is every theory and eternally green is the 
golden tree of life'. 
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 53) 
However, as this commentary on the generalisations of formal logic shows, 
Vygotsky's view of rationality is quite different from the one which construes 
'the development of meaning [as] a matter of increasing generalisation and 
abstraction' (Wertsch, 2000 p. 20). 
124 'From the point of view of formal logic, the development of concepts is subject to the basic 
law of inverse proportionality between {the} scope and the content of the concept. The broader 
the scope of the concept, the narrower its content. This means that the greater the number of 
objects that the given concept can be applied to, the greater the circle of concrete things that it 
encompasses, the poorer its content, the emptier it proves to be' (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 53). 
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In contrast to this impoverished verSIon of reason Vygotsky argues 
instead that: 
A real concept is an image of an objective thing in all its complexity. 
Only when we recognise the thing in all its connections and relations, 
only when this diversity is synthesised in a word, in an integral image 
through a multitude of determinations do we develop a concept. 
According to the teaching of dialectical logic, a concept includes not 
only the general, but also the individual and particular. 
In contrast to contemplation, to direct knowledge of an object, a 
concept is filled with definitions of the object; it is the result of 
rational processing of our existence and it is mediated knowledge of 
the object. To think of some object with the help of a concept means 
to include the given object in a complex system of mediating 
connection and relations disclosed in determinations of the concept. 
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 53) 
Wertsch's concern with Vygotsky's treatment of rationality centres on what he 
takes to be the conception of truth in which words are designative of things. 
Some statements by Vygotsky do indeed look like examples of a suspiciously 
simple correspondence of truth. Statements such as those which suggest once 
the child has appropriated scientific concepts they have grasped reality would 
be a case in point. However, what can be missed in readings ofVygotsky which 
take such statements out of context at face value, is his use of a Hegelian and 
Spinozian inspired conception of reason which rejects a simple idea of 
correspondence out of hand. 125 Put simply, for Vygotsky a concept does not 
correspond to an object but enables thinking by including the object 'in a 
complex system of mediating connection and relations disclosed in 
determinations of the concept' (Vygotsky, 1998, p. 53). 
125 Although Hegel can ultimately be viewed as a correspondence theorist he is one of a quite 
different kind than Wertsch considers. 
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Unlike the caricature of abstract reason, Vygotsky's conception of reason is 
embedded in the historical processes involved in the genesis of concepts: 
Thus the concept does not arise from this as a mechanical result of 
abstraction - it is the result of a long and deep knowledge of the 
object. ... Psychological research is disclosing that in a concept we 
always have an enrichment and deepening of the content that the 
concept contains. 
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 54) 
The link between reason and the world implied here is at odds with the abstract 
caricature of reason found in popular commentary with Hegel. 
It has been stressed in previous chapters that a dualist conception survives 
unnoticed in the presuppositions of the criticisms of abstract rationality. This 
implicit dualism conjures up a version of rationality in which reason is so 
divorced from the world that it can be easily dismissed as a grandiose gesture, 
yet in fact, Hegel dismissed this version as 'the vanity of reason'. Statements 
such as 'all that is real is rational' have exposed Hegel to accusations of a 
hierarchical, logocentric form of reason, where what is known also happens to 
coincide with Hegel's version of events - e.g. the superiority of the Prussian 
state. The understanding of Hegel outside Hegel scholarship and the accounts of 
his philosophy which have arisen from the Communist party dogma of 
dialectical materialism complicates matters further. In particular Hegel's anti-
foundationalism has not been appreciated. Pinkard deals with the 
misapprehensions of Hegel in the introduction to his biography: his remarks 
are worth quoting at length: 
Hegel is one of those thinkers just about all educated people think they 
know something about. His philosophy was the forerunner to Karl 
Marx's theory of history, but unlike Marx, who was a materialist, 
Hegel was an idealist in the sense that he thought reality was 
ultimately spiritual, and that is developed according to the process of 
thesis/antithesis/synthesis. Hegel also glorified the Prussian state, 
claiming that it was god's work, was perfect and was the culmination 
of all human history. All citizens of Prussia owed unconditional 
allegiance to that state, and it could do with them as it pleased. Hegel 
played a large role in the growth of German nationalism, 
authoritarianism, and militarism with his quasi-mystical celebrations 
of what he pretentiously called the Absolute. 
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Just about everything in the first paragraph is false except for the first 
sentence. 
What is even more striking is that it is clearly and demonstrably 
wrong, has been known to be wrong in scholarly circles for a long 
time now, and it still appears in almost all short histories of thought or 
brief encyclopaedia entries about Hegel. 
(Pinkard, 2000, p. ix) 
In Pinkard's caricature of the common conception of Hegel's philosophy all the 
elements of the familiar criticisms of Vygotsky can be found; in particular: 1) 
the idea of a telos of abstract rationality towards which all cognition develops 
(Wertsch); and 2) the idea that Vygotsky was an idealist dealing with concepts 
and symbols rather than matter and tools (Zinchenko). Pinkard's point is that 
Hegel's philosophy has not been understood beyond a small field of scholars. 
But while the idea that Hegel's approach was crudely foundational is in error, it 
is also the case that it was not simply anti-foundational. For Hegel the absence 
of a pre-given foundation does not mean the existence of no foundations at all. 
Rockmore explains Hegel's position as follows: 
The justification is then, not already there, present from the beginning, 
so to say like something that is preserved and unchanged through the 
reasoning process .... the justification is created or produced during the 
development of the theory ..... To begin, it is not enough to begin, for 
there is and can be no privileged beginning point. We . ... encounter the 
relation between system and history. The true only becomes true in 
and through its development, its real unfolding in the course of which 
it actualises itself. 
(Rockmore, 1993, p. 63) 
We start as an anti-foundationlist but, having built our foundations as we go 
along, we finish as foundationalists. As Neurath (1932) put it 'We are like 
sailors who have to rebuild their ship in the open sea, without ever being able to 
dismantle it in dry dock and reconstruct it from the best components' (Neurath 
cited by Cartwright et ai, 1996, p. 89). Both Hegel and Neurath were fully 
aware that their view of knowledge had a socio-cultural or historical dimension. 
Creating and transforming the ground of knowledge as we go along (i.e. 
history), comes to have a central role. The rejection of foundations of thought 
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entailed in this position is effectually also a rejection of abstract reason. In the 
same way that Hegel has been misunderstood for a commitment to an abstract, 
foundational notion of reason, so Vygotsky is misunderstood by criticism which 
does not take account of his anti-foundationalism: 
Vygotsky's discussion of Spinoza's 'theory of method' shows clear evidence of 
anti-foundationalism: 
A theory of method is, of course, the production of the means of 
production, to take a comparison from the field of industry. But in 
industry the production of the means of production is no special, 
primordial production, but forms part of the general process of 
production and itself depends upon the same methods and tools of 
production as all other production. 
(Vygo~ky, 1997a,p.253) 
Vygotsky endorsed Spinoza's argument that we should not commit ourselves to 
a search going back to infinity. To discover the best method for finding truth 
we do not need to find a method of finding a method: 
By such proceedings, we should never arrive at knowledge of the 
truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. The matter stands on the 
same footing as the making of material tools, which might be argued 
about in a similar way. For, in order to work iron, a hammer is needed, 
and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless it has been made; but in 
order to make it, there was need of another hammer and other tools, 
and so on to infinity. We might thus vainly endeavour to prove that 
men have no power of working iron. But as men first made use of the 
instrument supplied by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of 
workmanship, laboriously and imperfectly, and then, when fmished, 
wrought other things more difficult with less labour, and greater 
perfection; and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to 
the making of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of 
more complex tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived 
at making, with small expenditure of labour, the vast complicated 
mechanisms which they now possess. So, in a like manner, the 
intellect, by its native strength, makes for itself intellectual 
instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other 
intellectual operations, and from these operations gets again fresh 
instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations further, and 
thus gradually proceeds until it reaches the summit of wisdom. 
(Spinoza cited by Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 254) 
Two indications of the importance of Hegel for Vygotsky research are 1) the 
absence of an unbridgeable epistemological chasm between thought and world 
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and 2) following from this, the conception of development as a non-linear 
process embedded in historical resources. In particular Vygotsky took on board 
Hegel's position that while we must be anti-foundationalist at the start we 
cannot help but develop foundations for our knowledge as we proceed. Hegel 
rejected all claims to a priori knowledge and to knowledge apart from 
experience. As Rockmore puts it: 
According to Hegel, philosophy, that he, like Kant, regards as the 
highest form of knowledge, and that he later in a famous passage in 
the Philosophy of Right will compare to an owl, can only take wing 
afterwards, or after the fact. The point is that for Hegel, knowledge, 
including philosophy, is not and cannot be a priori; on the contrary, it 
emerges in and is the product of collective effort of human beings 
over the course of recorded history to come to grips with their world 
and themselves. 
(Rockmore, 1993, p. 85) 
When the Hegelian dimension of Vygotsky's thought is acknowledged, it 
becomes clear that Vygotsky's understanding of the concept is far richer than 
that which is often attributed to him. Far from having a decontextualised view 
of abstract rationality, Vygotsky's reason is ontological. Like a snowball rolling 
down a mountainside, his concept grows through the material it picks up in its 
descent: 
Thus the concept does not arise from this as a mechanical result of 
abstraction - it is the result of a long and deep knowledge of the 
object. ... Psychological research is disclosing that in a concept we 
always have an enrichment and deepening of the content that the 
concept contains. 
(Vygotsky, 1998, p. 54) 
A concept's relation to the world is not one of correspondence (though 
ultimately Hegel can be understood as a correspondence theorist though not one 
which Wertsch reacts against when he is concerned with the designative 
approach to word-meaning). A concept's development cannot be separated 
from the world of which it is a part and in which it plays a role of constituting 
conditions for knowing. However, such conditions are not arbitrary as they are 
in some constructivist understandings of word-meaning. Rather they are 
intricately connected to the formations in which the concept functions. 
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Vygotsky's understanding of the concept offers the possibility of grasping 
the gap between mind and world - and its mediation - as creative. The concept 
is a result of a complex process of development in which thought and the world 
are never categorically separated. 'In Hegel's view, the word [by which 
Vygotsky means concept] is existing vitali sed thoughts. The connection 
between thought and word is not a primal connection that is given once and 
forever. It arises in development and it itself develops' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 
285). 
7.2 The conception of science 
Scientific concepts are not the apex of abstract rationality in the way that 
commentators such as Wertsch and Lemke suppose. Criticism of abstract 
reason often coincides with a criticism of science, which in postmodem thought 
is frequently seen as an authoritarian claim to knowledge. The conception of 
science underlying this position is not however unchallenged. For instance 
interesting positions taken up in the philosophy of science by authors such as 
Nancy Cartwright, Roy Bhaskar, and Ian Hacking consider scientific theory as 
something other than generalisation and abstraction (representation). In 
different ways each of these authors takes issue with the idea that theory 
represents the world and describes real events. However, claims of this type do 
not necessarily lead to a view of theory as a social construction (viewing it as 
just one more perspective), or to its devaluation, since they open the way to 
seeing the relation between scientific concepts and the world in iterative terms: 
at some points theory and the world are isomorphic; 126 at others they are 
dissonant. 
126Hofstadter remarks that: 'It is a cause of joy when a mathematician discovers an 
isomorphism between two structures which he knows. It is often a "bolt from the blue", and a 
source of wonderment. The perception of an isomorphism between two known structures is a 
significant advance in knowledge - and I claim that it is such perceptions of isomorphism 
which create meanings in the mind of people' (Hofstadter, 1980, p. 50) . 
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The idea that scientific concepts are the expression of an abstract reason 
applied to the world, is not what Vygotsky had in mind and the attempts to 
interpret what he actually had in mind in these tenns fails to appreciate his 
understanding of science. In discussing the character of science and the 
misunderstandings of it, Vygotsky refers to Marx. 'The essence of any 
scientific concept was defined in a profound manner by Marx: "If the fonn in 
which a thing is manifested and its essence were in direct correspondence, 
science would be unnecessary'" 127 (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 193). Vygotsky has a 
particular concern for the value of theory, abstract thought and the possibilities 
inherent within it: 'It might seem that analysis, distorts reality - creates artificial 
conditions for observation .... ' but he goes on to maintain, that 'The strength of 
analysis is in abstraction, like the strength of experiment is in artificiality' 
(Vygotsky, 1993, p. 147). 
Vygotsky's appreciation of science as a practice which cannot be set apart 
from our engagement with the world and has a nonnative character (our 
transactions with nature carry significance) is illustrated by his view that 'each 
word is already a theory' and that the 'real and the scientific fact' do not 
coincide: 128 
... while the highest scientific abstraction contains an element of 
reality . .. Even the most immediate, empirical, raw, singular natural 
scientific fact already contains a first abstraction. The real and the 
scientific fact are distinct in that the scientific fact is the real fact 
included in a system of knowledge ... The material of science is not 
raw, but logically elaborated, natural material which has been selected 
according to a certain feature. The fact itself of naming a fact by a 
word is to frame this fact in a concept.. . it is an act toward 
understanding this fact by including it into a category of phenomena 
which has been studied before. Each word is already a theory. 
(Vygotsky, 1997a, p. 249) 
127 See Marx and Engels, Collected Works, V.25, chap.2. p. 384 
128 F eynman in The Character of Physical Law offers a sense of this lack of coincidence when 
he argues: There is ... a rhythm and a pattern between the phenomena of nature which is not 
apparent to the eye but only to the eye of analysis; and it is these rythmns and patterns which 
we call Physical Laws ... ' (Feynman cited by Cartwright, 1986, p. 55). 
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The emphasis on artificiality and abstraction resonates with an argument made 
by Ian Hacking that phenomena and more specifically 'effects', on the whole, 
do not occur in nature but are created by a careful effort of theory and 
experimental design. It is through the activity, procedures and techniques of 
experimentation that we are able to express matter such that its characteristics 
are amenable to the form of conceptualisation that creates regulative and 
predicative capacity: 'To experiment is to create, produce, refine and stabilise 
phenomena' (Hacking, 1983, p. 230). This line of argument has little in 
common with the representational view of reality in which laws describe effects 
in the world. 129 In this view, intervention prises reality into expressing itself in 
particular forms which do not exist without it. Hacking explains his position as 
follows' .. the phenomenon of physics- the Faraday effect, the Hall effect, the 
Josephson effect - are the keys that unlock the universe. People made the keys 
and perhaps the locks in which they turn' (Hacking, 1983, p. 229). It is 
important to note that while making the case for the manufacture of phenomena, 
Hacking maintains that this approach is firmer ground for a hard headed 
scientific realism than the conventional view of theories as representations. 
Bhaskar and Cartwright are similarly at odds with the common 
hypothetico-deductive conception of science. According to this conception of 
science a hypothesis is made, events are deduced and predicted and then tested 
against reality. By contrast Cartwright (1986) distinguishes different orders of 
scientific theory on the basis that there is a trade off (inverse proportionality) 
between the explanatory power of fundamental theoretical laws and their 
predictive capacity. Bhaskar (1978), for his part, echoing Bacon's claim that 
experiment is twisting the lions' tail, argues that the relation between laws and 
events is not one of constant conjunction: rather it is what we do in science 
which produces the regularities. 
Crucially, Vygotsky has not only a different appreciation of science from 
that which relates theory directly to observable empirical objects in the world, 
129 There is a dissonance, even an asymmetry, between thought and world. Hacking (1983) 
repeats Feyerabend's point that events do not serve well as the basic building blocks of matter. 
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but tied up with this is a different appreciation of intellect. The fact that humans 
possess a second nature, which allows a different sort of contact with the world 
from that of animals or machines, makes it possible for human beings to 
overcome the limitations of their physical characteristics. The specific nature of 
scientific knowledge, as Vygotsky following Marx understood, prevents the 
disability of a sense from necessarily impairing the development of the intellect. 
This development does not depend upon the 'receptivity' ofa bare 'Given': 
the links, dependencies and relationships among things which are the 
content of our scientific knowledge are not the visually perceivable 
qualities of things: rather they come to light through thought. This is 
also the way it works for the blind child. Thought is the basic area in 
which he compensates for the inadequacy of his visual perceptions. 
(Vygotsky, 1993, p. 203) 
This artistic character of science is intimated by Ilyenkov when he writes that 
'The capacity to think is just the capacity to inhabit an idealized environment' 
(Bakhurst, 1991, p. 244). 
Vygotsky was well aware of the arguments, taken up later by philosophers 
of science, that the relationship of knowledge to the world is neither one of 
induction nor mere description. As would be expected of a writer well read in 
Hegelian philosophy, Vygotsky rejects a correspondence theory of truth in 
which our knowledge arises from the world and immediately maps on to it, 
isomorphic ally. He is at pains to make the point that this is not the way in 
which a scientific concept contains knowledge. 'The scientific concept 
necessarily presupposes a different relationship to the object, one which is 
possible only for a concept' (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 193). The difference between 
scientific concepts as they are commonly understood, as descriptions of the 
world and as they are understood by Vygotsky, drawing upon Marx, is that for 
Vygotsky they are constituted historically rather than abstractly. When Marx 
speaks of abstractions in the Grundrisse, he understands them as 'forms of 
being'. 
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The possibility of universalising abstractions arise 'world-historically': 
As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the 
richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as 
common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular 
form alone. On the other side, this abstraction of labour as such is not 
merely the mental product of a concrete totality of labour. Indifference 
towards specific labour corresponds to a form of society in which 
individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and 
where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence 
indifference. Not only the category of labour, but labour in reality has 
here become the means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased 
to be organically linked with particular individuals in a specific form . 
.. . and that therefore this society by no means begins only at the point 
when one can speak of it as such. 
(Marx, 1973, pp. 104-106) 
Marx criticises an abstract application of categories without regard either to 
their origin in, or expression of, their material context: instead he points to how 
categories emerge historically: 
This example of labour shows strikingly how even the most abstract 
categories, despite their validity - precisely because of their 
abstractness - for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific character 
of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, 
and possess their full validity within these relations. 
(Marx, 1973, p.l06) 
Marx writes of how bourgeois society is the most developed and complex 
organisation of production and of how its development makes features of other 
forms of production understandable. However, this understanding is not 
achieved by the mere application of a category: 'Human anatomy contains a 
key to the anatomy of the ape .... The bourgeois economy thus supplies a key to 
the ancient, etc. But not at all in a manner of those economists who smudge 
over all historical differences and see bourgeois relations in all forms of 
society' (Marx, 1973, p. 106). 
This is a more subtle point than it appears when read simply as argument 
for a telos of development. In the last sentence Marx attempts to distinguish this 
ontological conception of development from one which merely imposes 
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abstract categories in order to construct explanation. Vygotsky makes a similar 
criticism of assumptions about method when he refers to the way in which 
psychologists (like Marx's bourgeois economists) take concepts derived from 
one perspective and apply them to others as though they represented constants 
of reality rather than variables which developed with reality historically. This 
approach reduces concepts (as though they were identical in transfer) to 'round 
and empty zeros' (Van der Veer and Valsiner, 1993, p. 145). 
Although particular concepts arise historically, their relation to the world 
is not isomorphic in the sense of corresponding directly to particular instances 
of an empirical given. Thus, in rejecting an empiricist way of deriving 
categories, Marx continues: 
It would therefore be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic 
categories follow one another in the same sequence in which they 
were historically decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by the 
relation to one another in modem bourgeois society, which is precisely 
the opposite of what seems to be the natural order or which 
corresponds to historical development. 
(Marx, 1973, p.107) 
In dealing with our possibility of knowing in this way Marx shares with Hegel a 
rejection of the dualism of a distinct mind and world. Vygotsky's socio-genetic 
conception of mind entails the same conception of the development of 
knowledge and the nature of science. Vygotsky cites the passages from Marx's 
Grundrisse quoted above in Crisis and uses it against Pavlov's understanding of 
how science proceeds when, repeating Marx's statement 'the anatomy of man is 
the key to the anatomy of the ape' he argues for what he terms 'this 
methodological principle of the "reverse" method' (Vygotsky 1997a p. 235). 
7.3 The idea of Development 
Marx and Hegel's idea of history and development is reflected throughout the 
development of Vygotsky's thinking on concepts. Vygotsky rejects the notion 
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of a linear development from the everyday to scientific concept in favour of an 
approach in which scientific concepts, in their fonnation, act back on everyday 
concepts. The way Vygotsky works with these ideas counts as further evidence 
against the accusation that he is a recapitulationist or stagiest in terms of his 
conception of development. Scribner (1985) has provided a strong argument to 
refute this reading, clearly Vygotsky's use of Marx's argument indicates that he 
does not hold to the conventional notion of development often attributed to him 
(Smith, Tomlinson and Dockrell, 1997). 
It is necessary to have some knowledge of the Hegelian notion of 
development to understand the potential in Vygotsky's ideas and to appreciate 
that he did not subscribe to the caricature of evolutionism mistakenly attributed 
to both Hegel and Marx. It is worth noting that it is difficult, if not impossible 
to take account of this Hegelian sense of development when Vygotsky is 
assimilated into the paradigm of contemporary psychology. A particular 
instance of a misreading of Vygotsky is evident in a recent text that draws 
similarities between Vygotsky and Piaget's ideas. What is striking about this 
text is the fact that the authors are led by their assumption that Vygotsky shares 
their unproblematised narrative of development to misquote him. Claiming that 
there is a common view that intellectual development occurs as a sequence of 
stages,130 they align two passages supposedly drawn from the relevant text to 
support their argument that Vygotsky and Piaget shared the same view on 
development: 
a commitment to this view is made explicitly by both Piaget and 
Vygotsky, for example; 
'we do in fact fmd, in the analysis of fonns of social equilibrium, 
these same structure .... (just as the) cognitive mechanism in children 
involve three distinct systems.' (Piaget, 1995a, pp.56) 
'Development consists in three intrinsic stages.' (Vygotsky, 1994, 
p.216) 
(Smith, Tomlinson and Dockrell, 1997, p. 2) 
130 The authors are aware of the complexities in providing a characterisation of development but 
what stands out in their text, from their more subtle consideration, is a stageist view of 
development common to Vygotsky and Piaget. 
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The two passages are presented as definitive, but they are not accurate 
quotations. The text from which the 'quote' 'Development consists in three 
stages' has been extracted is Rene Van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner's Vygotsky 
Reader which actually translates Vygotsky as writing: 
If one were to attempt to make schematic [my emphasis] inferences 
from our research, they would basically reveal that the road which 
leads to concept development consists of three intrinsic stages, each of 
which in tum, can also be subdivided into separate parts or phases. 
(Van der Veer and Valsiner, 1994, p. 216) 
Even if it could be doubted that it matters that Vygotsky qualifies talk of stages 
with the qualification that; 'If one were to attempt to make any schematic 
inferences ... ' the question would remain of the frame of reference which leads 
to an adjustment of quotations that not only alters the syntax but omits the point 
that it is concept development rather than development in general that is being 
referred to. As in Van der Veer's translation, so in Norris Minick's Thinking 
and Speech in Volume 1 of The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky the cautious 
qualification, 'an attempt to represent ... schematically' is present and the 
reference is to concept development rather to development in general: 
If we attempt to represent the genetic implications of our research 
schematically, it indicates that the course of concept development is 
composed of three basic stages each of which breaks up into several 
distinct phases. 
(Vygotsky, 1987, p. 89) 
The omission of words from Vygotsky's text obscures the distinctive character 
of his views of development which is subsumed into the common sense 
understanding within cognitive psychology. 
Bakhurst's study of Soviet philosophy in relation to conSCIOusness IS 
more amenable to a Hegelian idea of development in Vygotsky's work. 
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In counterposing Vygotsky's position to the view of development which 
understands results as the outcome of prior stages, Bakhurst writes: 
the idea that psychological faculties themselves exist prior to 
experience. He denies that the child enters the world naturally 
equipped with embryonic fonns of higher mental functions from an 
understanding of more basic psychological mechanism (of the kind, 
perhaps, with which animals and human children are endowed by 
nature). The higher mental functions, he claims, are irreducible to their 
primitive antecedents, either phylogenetic or ontogenetic. . . . The 
complex is the key to the comprehension of the simple. He argues that 
a proper understanding of elementary capacities rests on a grasp of 
higher mental functions and not vice versa ..... 'the anatomy of man is 
the key to the anatomy of the ape. 
(Bakhurst 1991, p. 66) 
Taking the phrase of Marx concerning the anatomy of men and apes Bakhurst's 
argument points to a rejection of a foundationalist approach to mind, that is a 
conception of the development of intellect as evolutionary process from lower 
to higher stages. 
7.4 The ideal and the real 
It is useful at this point to take stock: So far I have argued that neither the 
view that there are foundations on which knowledge may be built, nor a 
conception of scientific theory as corresponding to the world as it is, nor a 
hierarchical idea of development, do justice to Vygotsky's work. Now a further 
point needs to be added namely that the polarisation of the ideal and the real 
into mutually exclusive opposites, also leads to misapprehensions. The 
polarisation of the ideal and real is integral to the Cartesian dualism of mind 
and world. Contemporary criticism of Vygotsky have been based on dualism 
despite an intention to transcend it, while in the Soviet Union attacks on 
Vygotsky during his lifetime were framed in terms of the opposition of the ideal 
and real. In the Soviet Union the philosophic presuppositions of Cartesian 
dualism took the form of a Stalinised 'Marxism' in which the material was 
conceived as brute matter and the ideal posited as mystical and bourgeois. This 
clearly led to a profound misreading of Vygotsky. It is here that the significance 
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of Ilyenkov's thought can be grasped. For, in challenging the presuppositions 
for Stalinised Marxism and in particular rejecting the polar opposition for the 
real and the ideal, he returned to a conception of Marxism as that ofVygotsky. 
Ilyenkov is a particularly significant figure here because as David 
Bakhurst has demonstrated, his work can be linked to both Vygotsky on the one 
side and to John McDowell on the other, thus making McDowell's work 
relevant for the understanding and interpretation of Vygotsky. What is it about 
Ilyenkov's work that makes this connection with McDowell? Basically it is that 
both turn to Hegel for rejecting a categorical distinction between the ideal and 
the real. 
The way in which Ilyenkov, from a quite different tradition to McDowell, 
addresses what he calls the problem of the ideal provides important insight into 
the question of the social nature and sociogenesis of mind. But it should be 
noted that his conception of universal reason is again distinctively different 
from that caricatured in critiques of reason. For it does not entail a particular 
reason able to depict the world but rather the ability of the' thinking body' to 
move in such a way as to make the form of any other body (Ilyenkov 1977a, p. 
44-47). Its key point is an appreciation that our ability to think, our second 
nature is part of nature and not distinct from it. 
Ilyenkov follows Vygotsky arguing that higher mental functions are the 
realisation of human potential, but that humans are by nature social animals and 
the realisation of this potential can only happen socially. At this point what 
arises is the extremely difficult problem of how the brain can be realised as 
mind only through activity. For Ilyenkov this arose in his considerations of 
Kant idea of "transcendentally inborn" forms of operation of the individual 
mentality as a priori "internal mechanisms". Against this position and in line 
with Vygotsky and also Hegel, he insisted upon the self 'the self-consciousness 
of social man assimilated from without by the individuaL .. ' and stressed that: 
'It is these forms of the organisation of social (collectively realised) human life 
activity that exists before, outside and completely independently of the 
individual mentality .. .'(Ilyenkov, 1977b, pp. 80-81). We have here, to put it in 
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simple terms, a concept of reason in which individuals participate rather than 
one which is constructed by individuals. 
For Ilyenkov the rejection of the simple opposition of idealism and materialism 
is explicit and unqualified: 
It will readily be appreciated how much broader and more profound 
such a positing of the question [the ideal and the material] is in 
comparison with any conception that designates as "ideal" everything 
that is "in consciousness of the individual" and "material" or "real", 
everything that is outside of the consciousness of the individual, 
everything that the given individual is not conscious of, although this 
"everything" does exist in reality, and thus draws between the "ideal" 
and the "real" a fundamental dividing line which turns them into 
"different worlds" that have "nothing in common" with each other. It 
is clear that given such a metaphysical division and delimitation, the 
"ideal" and the "material" cannot and must not be regarded as 
opposites. 
(Uyenkov, E.V., 1 977b, p. 81) 
A simple example of the materiality of thinking-activity is that of tying a knot 
in a handkerchief as an aide memoir i.e. constituting a material thing as an ideal 
object. The most important ideal object is of course money i.e. a thing of no 
intrinsic significance in itself but one that is the very stuff of wealth; an ideal 
object which clearly has the most massive material implications. One of these 
implications is to condition the way we begin to think about the world in the 
first place. Reference to this aspect of money features prominently in 
Ilyenkov's argument concerning the materiality of the ideal. What we might 
normally think of as separate and distinct from the world that we inhabit (a pre-
conceptual Given) is, although ideal, constitutive of our activity. As humans we 
inhabit a world constituted not only by causes but also by reasons. 131 
McDowell deals with the same issues as those raised by Ilyenkov's 
consideration of the ideal and the real through his examination of the limits of 
contemporary epistemology. The crux of his argument is: 1. That epistemology 
131 The interest in Uyenkov's work is that he aspires to reconcile the space of reasons and the 
space of causes, to portray us as minded beings who are inhabitants in a natural world, but 
whose distinctiveness resides in the fact that our mode of existence cannot be exhaustively 
explained in causal terms. (Bakhurst, 1997, p. 39) 
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is not best conceived in terms of in terms of a separation of mind and world and 
2. That humans are constrained by reasons as well as causes. 
In a typically Hegelian way, McDowell exposes what he calls the 
philosophical anxieties present in contemporary epistemology. He argues that 
the way in which the problem of epistemology is outlined in contemporary 
writings produces a philosophical anxiety about the very possibility of thought. 
He utilises the distinction in modem philosophy between impressions 
(empirical description) and knowledge, to expose an implicit problem/tension in 
what we take to be the conditions or foundations of our knowing. On the one 
hand, he argues that we are faced with the thought that what we conceive as the 
empirical world could not (by our very conception) stand in judgment over our 
thought, yet on the other hand the retreat to a form of Coherentism to avoid this 
difficulty leaves us equally anxious as to the purchase that any self-defining 
system might have on anything that is external to its own internal coherence. 
The key point of McDowell's argument for the thesis here is the breaking down 
of the barrier between mind and world by his formulation the 'unboundedness 
of the conceptual'. What follows from his engagement with contemporary 
philosophy is that 'the space of reasons' can be conceived of as in the world. 
This offers a possibility of seeing the world as 'enchanted' again but not in the 
way that it was seen as enchanted in pre-modern times. 
McDowell has not actually spelt out what he means by 're-enchantment' 
but it is clear from his writings that it must entail recognition that reason is a 
force in the world. For in rejecting the tradition of Cartesian dualism McDowell 
sees reason on both sides of the divide so to speak: indeed it is because there is 
a space of reason in the world that human beings are capable of grasping it by 
exercising their rational capacities. This presence of reason on both sides of the 
divide allow McDowell to resist the charge of idealism i.e. that the world is 
simply what thought takes it to be. The crucial move that McDowell makes is to 
argue that to be in touch with the world at all (as a human) assumes a normative 
context. 
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McDowell's work has greater sophistication and subtlety than a few 
sentences can convey but the purpose here is not to summarise McDowell 
beyond the point of showing that the philosophic tradition within which he is 
developing his ideas about epistemology is the same as that within which 
Vygotsky and Ilyenkov worked, namely the Hegelian tradition. What can be 
said of McDowell can also be said of Robert Brandom: again there is a highly 
elaborate innovation in contemporary philosophy which looks back to the 
Hegelian tradition within which Vygotsky and Ilyenkov worked. The fact that 
leading contemporary philosophers are turning to Hegel does not endorse a 
particular reading of Vygotsky; what it does however is underline that it 
provides support for taking Hegelianism seriously and thus at one remove 
taking Vygotsky's statements about the importance of Hegel for his work 
seriously. The issues at stake here come into focus over the question of reason 
where a sharp distinction exists between the conceptualisation by Hegel and 
those who followed him on the one hand and the critics of logocentrism and 
'the enlightenment grand narrative' on the other. 
In as much as this thesis has attempted to adjust a contemporary rhetoric 
about rationality by providing some of the philosophic background to 
Vygotsky's work it has also tried to introduce an aspect of the area which is not 
given sufficient attentions and that is the point that humanity is defined by its 
ability to respond to reasons as well as causes. 
7.5 What is practice? 
In bringing Hegel back onto the agenda of contemporary philosophy -
McDowell and Brandom are bringing back also, though it is not part of their 
immediate project, the philosophic tradition that shaped the work of Vygotsky 
and also Ilyenkov. The aim of this thesis has been not only to argue that 
Vygotsky's work was influenced by Hegel but that his work cannot be properly 
understood outside this influence and that it can be misunderstood when it is 
assimilated into the alternative Cartesian tradition of western thought. 
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The connections between the philosophic tradition within which Vygotsky 
framed his work and contemporary philosophy is of interest in its own right. 
The work of McDowell and Brandom adds strength to the claim that 
Vygotsky's work should be considered within this frame of thought and that its 
translation into a different and alien framework is likely to lead to serious 
misinterpretations. However, even if this argument which forms a major part of 
this thesis is accepted, the question remains of whether Vygotsky's work has 
practical implications for contemporary education or, to be absolutely precise, 
whether Vygotsky's work as seen through a Spinozist and Hegelian lens has got 
practical implications. 
The prospects are not initially encouraging for at first sight philosophy as 
such and, in particular, the philosophic tradition within which Vygotsky 
worked, appear far removed from the issues which face educational 
practitioners. But before concessions are made to what already in the 1780's 
Kant called 'the old saw that it is alright in theory but it won't work in 
practice, ,\32 it is important to note that practice is not a self-evident and 
independent criterion. In fact, it is not immediately clear what counts as 
practice in the first place. Clearly the measures taken by teachers in classrooms 
and policy makers in educational administration must address the imperatives 
of circumstances. But if these circumstances are made so engulfing by political 
pressure, bureaucratic inflexibility or constraints upon teachers as to allow no 
scope for self-determination and discretion, than corresponding to Spinoza's 
distinction between un-free and free actions, these measures will be more of the 
nature of responses rather than practices. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that Spinoza considered freedom not in 
terms of the absence of constraint but of a full recognition of all the dimensions 
of the circumstances within which individuals were working. Freedom, to put it 
another way, did not for Spinoza imply the absence of necessity but its 
recognition, hence the capacity to deal with it. Applying Spinoza, connection to 
\32 Kant (1792) On the Proverbial Saying: "All is Very Well in Theory. but No Good in 
Practice. " 
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practice yields the idea that only certain types of action qualify, namely those 
which are based upon a full and by implication, free examination of 
circumstances. What is practice is not given independently by circumstances 
and the supposition that practice provides criteria by which theory can be 
judged is subject to the same type of criticisms of dualism and the 'myth of the 
given' considered earlier. In relation to theory, practice is not an independent 
datum, because theory supplies a part i.e. grasping the circumstance in thought 
is an indispensable element in the determination of practice in the first place. 
As soon as the idea of practice as an independent datum is abandoned and with 
it the idea that if it is not giving directions for practice, theory must be abstract -
complexity is inevitable. In place of the simple opposition there is distinctness 
and inseparability - theory and practice are not the same, yet they cannot be 
considered apart from one another. As Marx said of the forms of value, they 
'belong to and mutually condition each other, but at the same time they are 
mutually exclusive or opposed extremes.' 133 The reference in this statement of 
Marx's to Hegel's Logic is unmistakeable and it points directly towards the 
premise of this thesis and the conclusion that it seeks to establish, namely that 
far from being an abstract undertaking which has no particular bearing on 
practice, philosophy plays an essential role in 'making explicit' what is taken to 
be practice in the first place - or to be precise that tradition of philosophy within 
which Vygotsky worked. 
133 Marx, K., 1976, p.140. 
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